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This thesis sets out to explain the outcome of liberalization processes across the globe during 
the post war period, the research question being: When a regime liberalizes, what affects the 
risk of the process ending with either democratization or authoritarian reversal? 
Scholars of comparative politics have strived to explain the many regime changes throughout 
the post war period to the present, in particular, democratic transitions. As more and more 
hybrid regimes, neither fully democratic nor autocratic, has been recognized in the literature, 
the debate has acknowledged that the traditional transition paradigm must be modified as to 
disentangle the process of political liberalization from that of transitions. Rather, democratic 
transition is only one possible outcome of political liberalization – it might as well end with 
authoritarian reversal. However, despite this acknowledgement, the various outcomes of 
liberalization processes has not been systematically compared and explained on a global scale. 
Here lies the motivation of this thesis.  
A process-oriented approach traces historical events of political liberalization by observing 
movements upwards along the Polity IV scale. This generates 115 spells of liberalization in 
the analysis period from 1950 to 2006, by which a 105 is examined due to loss of data on the 
independent variables. Following the perspective of structural contingency, the outcome of 
liberalization – democratic transition or authoritarian reversal – is examined by an event 
history analysis, more specifically, Cox competing risk models.      
The analysis results imply that different endpoints of liberalization can be explained by 
economic growth performance, ethnic fractionalization of society, type of autocracy, presence 
of legislative assembly and the conflict level during liberalization periods, while the inclusion 
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The evolution of political events that have swept across the Arab world this spring poses a 
puzzle to all participants and witnesses: will the political opening be sustained through 
summer or will the regime only go back to its old authoritarian ways? Will the movements 
away from repression reach democracy, stabilize, or regress? What determines the outcome?  
No one can predict the future, but we can draw lessons from former experiences because 
events of political liberalization are not unique to history. Middle East-countries like Egypt 
and Tunisia have faced periods of political openings before, and now as then, hopes for a 
democratic future are blended with an anticipated risk of renewed repression. Perestroika, the 
silent revolution of Mexico, the fall of Franco, the Brazilian military coup d‟état, the Algerian 
election, amongst other liberalizations during the last decades – all signified political openings 
of different authoritarian regimes at different times, some of which have lead to democracy, 
others have slid back to autocracy. Thus events of liberalization seem to repeat itself at 
different timings and places in history, only the conditions change, with various outcomes. As 
political scientists we seek to explain through comparison why some liberalized autocracies 
democratized while others did not. Hence, this thesis asks:  
When a regime liberalizes, what affects the risk of the process ending with either 
democratization or authoritarian reversal? 
Although the literature offers much descriptive theory of the “gray zone” between autocracy 
and democracy, testing competing explanations of what determines the outcome of 
liberalization processes is lacking. Political liberalization moves the regime away from 
authoritarianism, but it does not necessarily lead to a democratic transition of the regime.  
Entering the “gray zone” between autocracy and democracy does not necessarily mean that 
the regime is in transition (Carothers 2002), but it is a risky state for the regime to be in: it 
might be more prone to reach a transition and die in favor of democracy; by contrast it might 
slide back into autocracy. Movement away from autocracy is what this thesis calls the process 
of political liberalization. While democratization – the transition from an autocracy to 
democracy – is a highly studied phenomenon, the consequences of liberalization are still 
somewhat unexplored. Usually liberalization has either been a bi-subject in the study of 
democratization (Bratton and van de Walle, Huntington 1991, Mainwaring, O‟Donnell and 
Valenzuela 1992, O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Przeworski 1991) or studied in the absence 
of democracy (Brumberg 2002, Howard and Roessler 2006, Levitskey and Way 2002, 
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Ottoway 2003, Shedler 2002). But in order to detect the consequences of political 
liberalization in general, one must compare all potential outcomes. So far, studies of 
liberalization have had a tendency to focus on either positive cases (liberalization culminating 
in democracy) or negative cases of liberalization (liberalization without democratization). 
Variation on the dependent variable is a basic principle of science (Geddes 1990), but in the 
case of liberalization, it has not been sufficiently applied. Therefore this thesis will compare 
all cases of liberalized autocracies in the post war period to explore whether they lead to 
democratization or ended in reversal.  
This comparison requires conceptual clarity about the boundaries between liberalization, 
democratization and reversal. Although it is widely acknowledged that liberalization is a 
distinct phenomenon from that of democratization theoretically and empirically, they are not 
always treated so analytically in the literature, as Schneider and Schmitter (2004) have 
pointed out.
1
 Putting liberalization and democratization in the same box obscures the 
relationship between the processes because it assumes that liberalization automatically 
spawns the other. According to Levitskey and Way (2001:51) such “democratizing bias” is 
found in most of the earlier democratization literature, but also in recent works (see for 
example Teorell 2010). However, this is far from a given development. While liberalization 
may be a process towards democratization, in the end it might turn away from democracy by 
reversal (Carothers 2002, Levitskey and Way 2002, Shedler 2002). While liberalization 
means a change within the regime (for example, the movement from an autocracy with very 
limited liberties and no elections to one with more extensive liberties and elections dominated 
by the incumbents), democratization means a change of the regime (indicated, for example, 
by the removal of the dominant incumbent party). The first one implies autocracy, the other 
democracy, at its minimum. Because it makes a great difference for the man in the street 
whether he will be able to choose his own political leaders and hold them accountable or not, 
scholars should not overlook this very important distinction. Therefore this thesis sets out to 
illuminate the conceptual boundary between the two processes of liberalization and 
democratization, operating with a precise threshold for democracy. Here lies the prerequisite 
for analyzing the consequences of liberalization and avoiding “democratizing bias”. 
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Diamond (2002), Gill (2000), Levitskey and Way (2002), Scneider and Schmitter (2004), there is a continuous 





While qualitative analysis and inductive theorizing have explained what liberalization is, and 
how and why it comes about, what determines the outcome remains unresolved. The literature 
offers plenty factors that are expected to affect the chances of democracy, but how does the 
presence of the same factor relate to the opposite risk of reversal? The question seems almost 
obvious, however remains unexplored.  
 
1.1 Testing theory during times of liberalization 
This thesis builds an original approach by identifying two main challenges in the study of 
liberalization outcomes – one theoretical and one methodological. The first one concerns 
combining contingent and structural explanations. Although the field acknowledges that both 
structures and actors matter for political change, it has seldom been combined in one analysis 
of liberalization. This thesis will combine methodological approaches of structures and 
agency with an institutional perspective. It poses questions commonly asked and answered in 
conventional democratization theory, but which has not been conditioned on the process of 
political liberalization. Given liberalization, do structural, institutional or contingent factors 
determine the outcome? Are some types of autocracies more prone to democratize than 
others? What is the effect of the presence of nominal democratic institutions, like legislative 
assembly and political parties? How will a higher conflict level affect the outcome? Are 
ethnic divisions bad for the chances of democratization? In short, given liberalization, what 
determines whether it will end with democratization or reversal?    
How these questions are to be answered leads us to the second challenge in studying the 
consequences of liberalization, namely evaluating inductive theories and qualitative analyses 
with deductive, quantitative testing.  Because comparative historical analysis and empirical 
case-studies only reach so far, testing competing explanations on a global scale is needed in 
order to establish general patterns.  
1.2 A process-oriented approach 
The scope of generalization increases with empirical foundation, i.e. the amount of cases 
included in the analysis.  Hence in this thesis I want to study all cases of liberalization in the 
post war period. The quantitative approach enables this kind of global study.  Hopefully the 




The primary reason why cases of political liberalization until now have not been compared 
worldwide is the notion that is it not possible to measure according to a common scale 
(O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986). But if democratization is a comparable phenomenon across 
the globe at various times, so is liberalization. And if democratizations is measurable 
according to common theoretical criteria, then so are liberalizations. What remains is making 
the observations and collecting these cases before comparing them.  As this thesis will show, 
the analytical tools are there, only the data are not ready made. This poses a challenge for all 
who wish to explain the consequences of liberalization, and this thesis will rise to the 
occasion.  
Studying liberalization requires detecting movements towards as well as away from 
democracy. Doing so, event history analysis is the appropriate tool where the process of 
liberalization is treated as the history preceding the potential outcome of democratization or 
reversal. It allows us to test the particular effect of explanatory variables on both the risk of 
democratization and reversal, which has not been done conditional on the liberalization 
process. In contrast to other longitudinal methods, event history analysis is able to deal with 
uncertain outcomes by which some regimes may still be in the process of liberalizing at the 
time of analysis.  
In order to analyse such liberalization processes and their outcomes, they must be observed 
according to measurable criteria for what regime change qualifies as a case of liberalization 
and what qualifies as democratization or a reversal. This thesis offers a suggestive approach to 
how this can be done, namely on the basis of movements along the combined regime scale of 
the Polity IV Project (see Marshall and Jaggers 2009a). Over the period from 1950 to 2006 it 
generates 115 observations of liberalization by which 44 is followed by democratization, 49 
end in reversal and 22 are still ongoing at the end of analysis time.
2
 Obviously, the validation 
of the analysis relies on the appropriateness of the operationalization of the liberalization 
concept. Within its own constraints, this thesis intends to take measurement validity seriously 
by case-oriented validation, evaluating the relation between the systematized concept and 
positive cases generated from the measurement procedure. Still, measurement attempts are 
bound to receive critique. That should not scare students of comparative politics away from 
making such efforts. Its innovation lies in the fact that if it contributes to any further 
discussions on this unresolved problem, it will hopefully be a step on the way to solve it.   
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1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The first chapter introduces the main concepts of this thesis, were the main object is to 
differentiate political liberalization from democratization and develop operational criteria for 
measuring the process of liberalization quantitatively. The second chapter concerns the 
theoretical discussion of explanatory variables. The third chapter argues why quantitative 
analysis, particularly event history analysis, is a suitable approach for studying the outcome of 
liberalization, before building Cox competing risk models. The forth chapter develops 
operational measurement of liberalization processes by applying the combined regime index 
of Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). Furthermore, the explanatory variables and 
hypotheses are operationalized. The analysis is executed in chapter five, first by describing 
the generated observations of political liberalization, and tidal trends in democratizations and 
liberalization reversals during the period of analysis from 1950-2006, then estimating Cox 
competing risk models before discussing the robustness and theoretical implications of the 
findings from the analysis. Lastly, the conclusion offers the overall answers to the research 
question and provides suggestions for future research.  
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2.0 Theoretical framework 
The conceptualization will follow the procedure suggested by Adcock and Collier (2001) 
where a background concept for political regimes is chosen on the basis of the research 
problem before developing a systematized concept for political liberalization of regimes. This 
is done through a broad evaluation of alternative conceptions. The reconceptualization 
extends the empirical coverage by abstraction; lessening the attributes, extending empirical 
coverage, while avoiding conceptual stretching by differentiation between democratization 
and liberalization, as recommended by Sartori (1970). These systematized concepts of 
liberalization and democratization will be applied later on in the operational procedure.
3
 But 
first, in order to study the relationship between liberalization and democratization, we must 
define the conceptual borders of these types of regimes, especially what is meant by 
„democracy’. 
 
2.1 The background concept  
Studying regime change implies comparing different regimes, and also has implications for 
the level of analysis. This thesis understands a political regime as set of rules and procedures 
that regulate political decision making, defining who has access to power and resources and 
how political power is exercised. These power structures create a system of relations between 
civil society and the state.
4
 The political unit of a regime differs from the institution of 
government; one can change the head of state, or the institutional arrangement, but the regime 
extends beyond the particular government as long as the major power structures remain the 
same. Thus governments are nested within the regime, the latter concept being on a higher 
level of abstraction. Consequently, studying regime change requires we establish conceptual 
boundaries on the level of regimes (and not of government). 
Typically we distinguish between democracy and autocracy as the main types of regime. 
What defines the difference? Robert Dahl (1971:4) defines political regimes along two 
theoretical dimensions, namely public contestation and political participation. Public 
contestation involves the competition for the conduct of government. It distinguishes 
monopolistic regimes, in which political power is concentrated in the hands of the few, and 
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competitive regimes, in which power is dispersed among several institutions and groups 
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997:39). Political participation involves the citizen‟s opportunity 
to participate in public contestation. On this dimension, regimes range from exclusive or 
inclusive, depending on the proportion of the population involved in public decision making.  
Regimes vary in the extent they permit public opposition to government policies and allow for 
popular involvement in such policies. The more effective the opportunity of the citizens to 
contest the conduct of government, the more competitive the regime. The larger the 
proportion of citizens who have the right to participate in public contestation, the more 
inclusive the regime. A regime may be more of one or the other, at least in theory. It is 
competitive but exclusionary when it allows for public contestation while excluding large 
segments of society in participating. Or, it is inclusive while not competitive when it 
suppresses all political alternatives to the regime while allowing the populace to participate in 
governing. In practice, these dimensions may vary interchangeably. For example, a free and 
fair election for legislative assembly could mean an increase in the degree of both contestation 
and participation in the regime.
5
 But the executive power of regime may still be exclusive and 
non-competitive. According to Dahl‟s (1971) theory, both dimensions – contestation and 
participation – must be effectively fulfilled for the regime to be democratic. Autocracy 
represents the opposite extreme: they typically repress both political contestation and 
participation. But if the degrees of participation and contestation can vary, where exactly 
should the line be drawn between autocracy and democracy? If a regime is a set of rules and 
procedures that regulate the exercise of political power, what makes it democratic and not?  
 
2.1.1 What makes a regime democratic? 
There are many ways to define democracy as a regime. Within a vast literature on democracy, 
one can find multiple definitions and the debate seems never ending. Over all, there are two 
schools of thought; those who define democracy primarily in substantive terms and those who 
have a formal understanding of democracy (Bobbio 1989). The first on implies a maximalist 
definition, the second a minimalist one (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). It is in between these 
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two traditions that I place the discussion of this thesis and make a conceptual choice.
6
 As the 
discussion below will show, this thesis takes a middle ground. 
The first one, stressing values and ends as prerequisites for democracy, can be appropriate 
when studying the quality of democracy. The research question of this thesis however 
concerns when regimes become democratic, and so, we must first see to it that democracy is 
present before evaluating its quality (Hadenious and Teorell 2004). The problem with 
substantive criteria‟s for what is democracy is that of conceptual boundaries becoming 
subjective; then they are also movable depending on where one stand (literally, in the world, 
more metaphorically, in politics). Therefore, this kind of comparative research requires that 
we operate with observable criteria rather than subjective ideals (Huntington, 1991:7). For 
this reason, the debate on democracy in the democratization literature has lead to a consensus 
around some version of a procedural definition (see Collier and Levitsky 1995:2-5), and so 
will this thesis, following the Schumpeterian tradition: 
“the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the 
people‟s vote.” 
(Schumpeter , 1947:269) 
Schumpeter‟s definition of democracy puts emphasis on competition by which rulers are 
selected and political power regulated. Autocratic rulers on the other hand, acquire power by 
means other than competitive elections. Authoritarian powers may be inherited, taken through 
a coup d‟état or a revolution, installed by the military or foreign powers (Gandhi, 2008:7). In 
so far as we have established that democracy involves competition for the people‟s vote, the 
question remains who are “the people”? That, the Schumpeterian definition does not answer. 
Autocracies may be characterized by competition within a limited group or class, while 
excluding others outside this group or class from participating. One example would be Great 
Britain before extending suffrage to include the working class (Dahl 1971). Although it was 
considered democratic in its own time, after the World War II significant exclusion was no 
longer deemed acceptable for democratic regimes (Huntington 1991). Therefore, in addition 
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 When I told an experienced scholar about my project, she wondered: “How is that possible? For what is 
democracy really? No one knows.” It is my belief that all is not relative in the matter of defining democracy but 
that, in face of alternative conceptions, one has to make a choice, founded in theory, and consistently pursue the 
theoretical logic of that concept. So I replied: “It is a choice.”  
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to Schumpeter‟s emphasis on competition, a sufficient definition of democracy also involves 
participation: 
“a political system is democratic to the extent that it‟s most powerful collective 
decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which 
candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is 
eligible to vote.” 
(Huntington, 1991:7) 
This definition has two parts: “elections” and “universal suffrage”. Following Robert Dahl‟s 
(1971:4) terms, they reflect two dimensions of democracy, notably competition and 
participation. However, contestation and political participation is more than mere elections.
7
 
Imbedded in the concept of democracy are also the limitations on executive power 
(Huntington 1991:10). While the scope of political power is typically unlimited under 
autocracy, power does not come without accountability under democracy.
8
 To enhance the 
abuse of power, in democracy, the rulers must subject their execution of political powers to 
the rules of democratic institutions. Thus democracy is not just the method of electing; it is 
the rules of the process of which the election is conducted and power exercised. The rules of 
the game may vary in different types of democracies,
9
 but what they have in common is that 
they make alternation of power possible, and so, even those who apply a minimalist definition 
of procedural democracy acknowledge that certain criteria must be met in order for the rules 
to be democratic (see Przeworski et al., 2000:16):  
 
Firstly, the outcome must be uncertain ex-ante – meaning none can control the election 
outcome beforehand. In autocracies, elections are typically rigged in a way that makes it 
impossible for the opposition to win, for example, when the most significant part of the 
opposition is not allowed to participate, like the exclusion of Aung San Suu Kyi in the last 
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 For the citizens to have the opportunity to participate freely as voters as well as compete fairly as political 
actors, they must enjoy civil and political freedoms, as Dahl (1971:3) points out. Thus, freedoms are treated as 
an implicit feature of the procedural approach (Huntington 1991:7). Such freedoms are often translated into 
formal rights. This thesis chooses not to define democracy in terms of such rights in order to avoid the problem 
of subjectivity. 
8
 Theoretically, one can distinguish between vertical and horizontal accountability. Elections typically provide 
for vertical accountability between the people and their rulers, while on the horizontal level power is separated 
and dispersed between state institutions which perform legal control with each others‟ execution of such powers. 
Thus democracy involves both vertical and horizontal accountability. 
9
 Majoritarian and consensus models are subtypes of democracy (confer Lijphart 1999), among others. I will not 
elaborate on such subtypes any further since they are not of relevance for this level of analysis. 
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election in Burma of 2010. Such pre-engineering over time has been common way of 
controlling election outcomes in semi-authoritarian regimes like Egypt and Azerbaijan 
(Ottoway 2003:139). Others simply cheat with numbers. The Tunisian election where 
President Ben Ali won 99.91 percent of the vote in 1999 was not much credible (Howard and 
Roessler 2006). Without a real chance for opposition to win and the incumbent party to lose, 
elections per se do not make a regime democratic.  
 
Secondly, the outcome of the election must be complied with ex-post – the winner is actually 
allowed to assume office as the most powerful decision maker. In autocracies the result is 
typically not respected if the opposition actually wins, for example, if the military intervenes 
through a coup d‟état like in the Algerian election of 1989 or the incumbent refuses to leave 
office. Thus in democracy no other decision maker reigns than the democratically elected one 
– the military must be tucked under civilian control.  
 
Lastly, political power is to be executed within the limits granted by pre-established rules and 
procedures, a principle often called the rule of law. For example, the power to rule is granted 
for limited period of time – rulers do not rule forever as the future holds new chances of 
winning and losing elections.  
 
Such procedural criteria for democracy allow us to avoid the “fallacy of electoralism” (Karl 
1995) and differentiate between democracy and other competitive or inclusionary regimes. 
Here lies the threshold for democracy: Once a regime passes such a procedural threshold it 
has become democratic. This is relevant for the evaluation of what is democratization. 
 
2.1.2 When does a regime become democratic? 
When a regime passes such a procedural threshold it is in a state of transition towards 
democracy. A process where an autocratic regime becomes democratic is typically called 
democratization. Here, democratization is defined as a transition from authoritarian regime to 
the installation of democratic government by free and fair elections (O‟Donnell 1992:18-19). 
One should distinguish between democratization and consolidation as two different processes 
of transition: While democratization is a transition to democratic government, consolidation is 
a transition from democratic government to the effective functioning of a democratic regime 
without authoritarian regression. Note that in this study, we ask when liberalization will end 
11 
 
with democratization, not democratic consolidation. The reader should be aware of this 
distinction, as it has consequences for the operationalization of “democracy”.
10
  
But autocracies may become more inclusive and competitive without reaching democracy. 
For example, an autocracy may open up for opposition in parliament, without putting the 
executive to the electoral test. The autocratic regime may permit opposition to a very small 
part of the population. Or, the regime may allow people to participate in “governing” though 
not in public contestation. They are not fully authoritarian, nor democratic, as they feature 
some, although limited, participation and contestation. They are so called “liberalized” 
regimes (O‟Donnel and Schmitter 1986:7). The process where autocracies move towards 
more participation and contestation, so called political liberalization,
11
 is the main concept of 
this thesis.  In the next section I will explain what liberalization is in definition and 
differentiate it from democratization more specifically. 
 
2.2 Conceptualization 
Now that I have chosen the background concept of political regimes according to Dahl‟s 
definition, what remains is developing systematized concepts for different types of regime 
change. As this thesis seeks universal application, the reconceptualization of political 
liberalization will follow the logic of Sartori (1970) – defining by extension and negation. But 
before moving “one step up the ladder”, one must elaborate on the different definitions and 
applications on a less aggregate level in order to disentangle the process of political 
liberalization from that of democratization.  
 
2.2.1 Quite a pickle 
Following the increasing interest for regime transitions, liberalization has become a common 
term within political science. Note that in this study, we are only concerned with the concept 
of political liberalization which should be distinguished from the meaning of economic 
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 However, the use of the term political liberalization is not straight forward. In 
theories of democratization, the concept of political liberalization is traditionally treated as the 
first step towards democratization or as an intermediate component in a transition (Dahl 1971, 
O‟Donnell 1978, O`Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Huntington 1991, Mainwaring, O‟Donnell 
and Valenzuela 1992, Linz and Stepan 1996, Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, Gill 2000). In 
contrast, empirical researches often see liberalization as a state of its own, in cases where 
authoritarian regimes become less authoritarian but fail to democratize (see Brynen, Korany 
and Noble 1995, Brumberg 2002, Cavatorta 2004, Volpi 2005, Schneider and Schmitter 
2004). The argument of this thesis is that political liberalization is a distinct event for the 
regime that may end with other events like democracy or authoritarian regression, but not 
necessarily. Change in the regime does not necessarily lead to a change of the regime 
(Mainwaring 1992). Liberalization involves the former, democratization the latter. But the 
state of liberalization does pose a risk for the survival of the regime, the outcome being 
uncertain. Therefore, I argue that liberalization should be treated as an historical event with an 
uncertain path towards different destination states, where democracy is only one of them.   
The thesis aims at capturing these features of liberalization both in its theoretical 
conceptualization of liberalization and in the empirical analysis of its outcomes.  
In order to answer what the consequences of liberalization are in general, we need to compare 
cases of liberalization across time and space. Accordingly, we need a universal concept that is 
applicable to any time and place and measureable so it is suitable for empirical testing. This 
poses a challenge because, to the best of my knowledge, no world-wide comparison of cases 
of liberalization has been done, and hence, no universal concept exists.  The use of the term 
has varied with its application, which is limited to theory primarily, apart from regional 
studies and country case analysis (Africa and the Middle East especially) – political 
participation without contestation, contestation without participation, civil rights, civil society, 
nominal institutions, flawed elections – are among the things political liberalization is said to 
involve.
13
 Thus the concept has been stretched and bended in ways that fit the context or the 
particular cases under study: stretched when it is being confused with democratization; 
bended when it includes only certain types of political liberalization. As stated by Schneider 
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and Schmitter (2004:60), there is a need for better conceptualization and operationalization 
overall:  
“Neither liberalization nor consolidation has been consistently conceptualized, much 
less operationalized, in the literature on democratization. They have been used quite 
often (and controversially), but almost invariably in an erratic fashion – even by the 
same author in the same work.”  
Schneider and Schmitter (2004:60) 
This task demands us to develop a consistent concept that travels well, without going too far. 
Doing so, I follow the logic of Sartori (1970) for concept formation – defining by extension 
and negation. That is, to develop a definition which is general enough to include actual cases 
of liberalization across time and space, and also limited enough as to say what it is not, i.e. 
differentiate it from democratization. Thus we achieve a substantial understanding of what we 
are comparing. So what is political liberalization, in definition? The next section is a guided 
tour through the conceptual forest of alternative definitions in search of a systematized 
concept of political liberalization. 
 
2.2.2 What political liberalization is, and is not 
As an analogue of economic liberalization, political liberalization reduces government 
intervention in the political market, breaking up monopolies of political authority and 
allowing a plurality of opinions and organizations (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:159). 
Thus it involves the rolling back of state control in the political space, leaving room for more, 
albeit limited oppositional activity. One aspect of the increased participation for opposition is 
the liberalization of civil society. According to Przeworski (1992), political liberalization 
means autonomous organization of civil society because “a common feature of all 
dictatorships is that they cannot and do not tolerate independent organizations” (Przeworksi, 
1992:107-108).
14
 This argument should be moderated, because, commonly, most authoritarian 
regimes allow for some degree of independent organization, only totalitarian regimes do not.
15
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 Przeworski (1991; 1992) uses the term „dictatorship‟ synonymously to autocracy. 
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Totalitarian regimes per definition do not have independent civil society (Gill 2001). Most authoritarian 
regimes do not meddle in the private sphere as long as people do not take a public stand against the authorities. 
Only totalitarian regimes go so far as to require individuals to participate actively in supporting the regime 
through state led organization. Historical examples of totalitarian regimes are rare, but haunting, such as 
Germany under Hitler, the Soviet Union under Stalin, China under Mao and North Korea today.  
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This reflects the relative state capability of controlling civil society, which varies across 
autocracies. They often tolerate selectively; they may ban unions and parties, while not doing 
a good job in controlling religious societies or the universities. What poses a real threat to the 
regime is the autonomous organization of political forces, and not organization in itself.
16
 
Therefore, “autonomous organization” is too loose a term. The question remains how much 
organization must exist independent of the regime for it to be a liberalized one. More than 
before, but the exact extent is difficult to determine, and not so appropriate an aim if different 
types of authoritarian regimes are to be included in the definition and we acknowledge the 
fact that all types of authoritarian regimes have the potential of liberalizing. Also, the focus on 
civil society is too limited because it is the system of relations between civil society and the 
political regime which is liberalized, not civil society per se. As noted by Mainwaring 
(1992:299) and so dreadfully experienced by protesters in Syria during the Arabic spring in 
2011, mass mobilization is not a sufficient condition for regime change. Although popular 
mobilization from below does signify an essential feature of liberalization, there must be a 
significant departure from the usual practise of repression in part of the regime (O‟Donnel and 
Schmitter, 1986:7). 
The contestation dimension is often thought to constitute the liberalization of rights (see 
O‟Donnel 1979, Dahl 1971, O‟Donnel and Schmitter 1986, Bratton and van de Walle, 
1997:159, Brynen, Korany and Noble 1995:3-4). More specifically, political liberalization is 
described to involve the official recognition of basic civil liberties, as in the definition 
provided by O‟Donnell and Schmitter (1986:7): “Liberalization is the process of making 
effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal 
acts committed by the state or third parties”.  
Indeed, liberalization of rights does capture one possible part of the process, but it assumes a 
development where people have legal guarantees before they storm the streets, which is 
obviously not the case. Legalization may come later, but it need not be a part of the 
liberalization from the onset (Gill, 2000:47). The emphasis on rights stems from the 
assumption made by O‟Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and others that liberalization only 
happens from the top-down. Here I must agree with Przeworksi (1992) and Gill (2000) in that 
liberalization is an interaction between splits within the ruling elite on top and popular 
mobilization from below.  Furthermore, this thesis agrees with Gill (2000) in his claim that 
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the conception of liberalization in terms of rights is overly legalistic. I suspect that several 
authors choose a legalistic notion because it makes liberalization easy to measure in terms of 
formal rights. This is in line with Dahl (1971:3) who uses the term liberalization 
interchangeably with contestation: institutional guaranties in terms of freedoms are what 
effectively broaden political competition.
17
  Understanding the degree of contestation simply 
as rights means climbing one step down the ladder of abstraction conceptually (Sartori 1970). 
Defining rights thus as the only attribute of liberalization makes the concept too narrow, as it 
excludes cases of liberalization which is not characterised by legalization. A complete notion 
should also incorporate the possibility for opposition to exist without being de jure legal, 
popular mobilization to happen without legal guarantees, institutions to be established before 
passing new laws. As Sartori (1970) advices, instead of limiting the concept to specific 
attributes, choosing one over the other, one should rather climb one step up the ladder and 
include all those attributes that partake contestation as well as participation. Hence, we must 
climb one step up the ladder as we acknowledge that liberalization partakes more contestation 
in the regime. But as concluded above, liberalization also involves increased participation in 
the regime. Hence, the concept must incorporate both dimensions. 
In some cases the liberalization of a regime becomes institutionalized. According to Martins 
(in Gill, 2000:47), 
“The liberalization of authoritarian rule can therefore be defined as the adoption of formal democratic 
institutions and the simultaneous exclusion of the four principles which give to such institutions their true 
democratic content: consensus concerning the rule of the game, political accountability of the rulers, the right to 
ample political representation, and alternation of power.” 
Gills (2000) critique also goes for the exclusive emphasis on nominal institutions of this 
definition.   The onset of liberalization is marked by state control rolling back and leaving de 
facto room for independent popular activity before adoption of democratic forms of 
institutions (Gill, 2000:48).  Liberalization may involve institutionalization, but often the 
formal adoption of such institutions occur only part way through a process of liberalization, if 
it ever gets that advanced. On the other hand, nominal democratic institutions like legislative 
assembly can be present as mere “window dressing” even before a liberalization process 
begins, because autocracies vary in their degree of institutionalization (Gandhi 2008). 
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Therefore, institutions may be treated both as cause and effect in liberalization: the regime 
may establish democratic institutions as a result of the liberalization process (effect), and 
democratic institutions under autocracy are more likely to engage in the liberalization of civil 
right (cause) (see Gandhi, 2008: 138, 185). It is clear that institutions cannot be a prerequisite 
for liberalization. Where liberalization is marked by institutionalization, it is only one of 
several possible cooptation strategies of the regime which, if applied, may have an effect on 
the outcome of liberalization (see section on explanatory variables below for further 
elaboration).  Obviously, an autocracy with nominal democratic institutions would make an 
autocracy both more inclusive and competitive if real opposition is allowed to participate in 
them. Therefore this thesis will treat institutionalization as a particular survival strategy within 
the process of liberalization. Hence, liberalization does not exclude institutionalization of the 
regime, but it cannot be a necessary criterion as it could leave out both liberalization of civil 
society and civil rights, depending on what comes first in time. A concept should not be so 
sensitive as to include only one possible order of events, as the sequence may vary amongst 
different cases of liberalization.   
We need a definition that is broad enough to capture the oppositional participation that 
liberalization allows for, and which at the same time is precise enough to show the limited 
nature of liberalization. Therefore this thesis will follow the definition by Huntington:  
 
“Liberalization is the partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing governmental leaders 
through freely competitive elections. Liberalizing authoritarian regimes may release political prisoners, 
open up some issues for public debate, loosen censorship, sponsor elections for offices that have little 
power, permit some renewal of civil society, and take other steps in a democratic direction, without 
submitting top decisions to the electoral test.” 
(Huntington, 1991:9) 
Thus liberalization may include a range of changes with the common effect that they broaden 
political participation and contestation in the regime. What liberalization does not include is 
change of the power structure of the regime (O‟Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:9, Przeworski 
1992:107, Gill, 2000:48). This is what differentiates liberalization from democratization:  
“What liberalization alone does not connote is the right for citizens acting equally and collectively to 
hold their rulers accountable, up to and including the possibility that their citizens may remove their 
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rulers from power by a pre-established procedure, such as defeating them in elections. That process of 
inserting accountability to citizens into the political process is what we mean by democracy…”  
(Schneider and Schmitter, 2004:61) 
Recall Dahl‟s (1971:4) definition of democracy: full public contestation and participation in 
such contestation. If liberalization means more participation and contestation, where does the 
border line to democratization go precisely? Democratization is the transition to democratic 
government, nothing less. As states by Linz and Stepan (1996:3): “Democratization requires 
open contestation over the right to win control of the government, and this in turn require free 
competitive elections, the result of which determine who governs.” When a regime liberalizes 
to such an extent that it reaches the procedural minimum of free and fair elections, the process 
has become so advanced that it has merged into democratization. Thus, the border line 
between liberalization and democratization is free, competitive executive elections. Whereas 
liberalization refers to the political process of reforming authoritarian rule, democratization 
refers to the construction of institutions of divided power (Bratton and van de Walle 
1997:108). Authoritarian reform may include elections, but not according to democratic rules 
as defined in this thesis. Political liberalization is the increased degree of participation and 
contestation in the regime, without the installation of a democratically elected government. 
Thus the concept formation here follows Sartori (1970:1041) – making the concept of 
liberalization more general and inclusive, without any loss of precision: “The larger the class, 
the lesser its differentia; but those differentia that remain, remain precise.” This point cannot 
be stressed enough: Nothing beneath the procedural minimum of democratically elected 
government should be called democratization.
18
 
In principle then, there is a clear difference between liberalization and democratization. In 
practise, the processes may shade into each other. This should not lead observers and 
commentators to interpret liberalization as “mini-democratization”. Much too often is 
liberalization confused with democratization, probably because when viewing transitions to 
democracy in retrospect, one can find that in some of them there was a process of 
liberalization before the installation of an interim or democratically elected government. In 
such cases liberalization has become so advanced that is has merged into democratization. But 
this is far from a given development. Democracy can happen without liberalization 
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beforehand, and liberalization need not lead to democratization (O‟Donnell and Schmitter 
1986, Huntington 1991, Przeworski 1992). Such analysis suffers from selection bias by only 
including positive cases of democratization, without comparing with negative cases. This 
thesis will avoid such selection bias by comparing cases of liberalization, not cases of 
democratization, and show that the cases of liberalization have various outcomes, where 
democratization is only one of them. When does liberalization actually spawn 
democratization, and when does it not?  
 
2.3 The process of liberalization  
This section will describe the process of liberalization which is the subject of this thesis, 
building on the inductive theories by O‟Donnel and Schmitter (1986) and Przeworski (1991). 
Although it is not a qualitative study of the particular liberalization process of each regime, it 
is important to understand what happens during liberalization as to understand its potential 
outcomes. The transition school offers several descriptions of how the process of 
liberalization may evolve in different directions. These are general patterns and 
commonalities induced by comparing empirical cases of democratization.
19
 The reader should 
be aware that the story about liberalization told here is a highly general one. Nevertheless, the 
pattern seems to repeat itself for different liberalization processes across time and space. It is 
also reveals some variables which may affect the final outcome, as will be explained below.  
In face of a crisis of some sort, either in terms of external pressure like popular unrest or an 
internal split within the power block (or both), authoritarian rulers may choose, as a survival 
strategy, to liberalize the regime. The project of liberalization may be launched as a gradual 
attempt to democratize the regime, with promises of democratic reforms taking place 
eventually sometime in the future. But even more often, liberalization is intended as a 
controlled opening of the regime that results in the broadening of its social base, without 
changing its power structure (Przeworksi, 1992:115). As a means of strengthening their 
position within the power block, the Liberalizers will seek new alliances with regime 
outsiders while still repressing real political alternatives to the regime. By allowing some 
autonomous organization of civil society and incorporating new groups into the authoritarian 
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institutions, the Liberalizers want to relax social tension and broaden the support base of the 
regime (Przeworski, 1992:109). Thus liberalization is a partial, step-by step opening of the 
political system (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:160). If successful, liberalization moves the 
regime towards democracy only so far, but not further, and the liberalization equilibrium 
prevails.  
But there is a risk that once repression declines, oppositional forces may continue to mobilize, 
following an outburst of organization within civil society that declare their independence of 
the regime (Przewrski, 1992). A freer press which suffers from less censorship may want to 
become more regime critical, public meetings may evolve into public rallies, regime 
opposition may demand for further democratic reform and fair electoral rules (Gill, 2000). 
O‟Donnell and Schmitter (1986) call this the “resurrection of civil society”. If the regime 
loses control of the liberalization process, and popular protest takes a mass character in the 
streets, liberalization can no longer continue. Intended as a controlled opening from above, it 
is no longer considered a feasible survival strategy and the regime is forced to choose between 
renewed repressions or to democratise the regime (Gill 2000, O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 
Przeworski 1992).  
Therefore, liberalization is considered to be an inherently unstable process which must result 
either in democratization or an authoritarian regression (O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Gill 
2000, Przeworski 1992, Huntington 1991). As stated by Huntington (1991:137): “the third 
wave strongly suggests that liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the 
halfway house does not stand.” However, other empirical analysis has shown that some 
autocracies are able to sustain political liberalization over an extensive period of time without 
democratising or reversing of the opening process (Brumberg 2002, Cavatora 2004, Schneider 
and Schmitter 2004). In their study of regime transition in Africa (1988-94), Bratton and van 
de Walle (1997:119) found that the most common path was liberalization without 
democratization. Thus, liberalization can have several outcomes: some liberalized autocracies 
can remain liberalized, while others democratize or go back into autocratic reversal. When 
will the outcome of liberalization be repression and when will it be democracy?  
According to the transition school, the process is likely to end with repression if the regime 
only wants to liberalize while ready to repress if need be, but civil society continues to 
mobilize because it mistakenly expects that the regime is willing to democratize and not opt 
for repression since it would be inefficient. The process is over once is suffers a temporary 
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setback or permanent reversal (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). Democracy is only possible 
if regime reformers and moderates in the opposition can come to an understanding of mutual 
dependence in order to realize their primary goals. The alliance between regime reformers and 
the opposition relies heavily on their ability to control and neutralize anti-democratic forces 
on both sides. In short, a split regime must face a united opposition (Huntington 1991, 
Przeworski 1992, O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986). There are a lot of „ifs’ in this description, 
suggesting that something contextual can influence this game. 
What then explains the outcome? Now that we have explained how the process of 
liberalization may develop into different directions, the question remains under what 
conditions these developments are likely. Why do some liberalized autocracies democratize 
while others do not? A framework for explanatory variables is what follows.  
 
2.4 Bridging structures, institutions and contingency 
The theoretical literature on democratization offers a wide range of competing explanations 
about regime change. The first debate concerns the relative impact on political change of 
structural factors versus individual actions and events. Are regime transitions a result of 
underlying preconditions at the level of structures of the economy and society? Or does 
political change depend on the preferences and strategic choices of political actors and the 
intended or unintended consequences of their actions? In comparative politics literature 
overall, there is a methodological consensus that structures at the macro level are best at 
predicting political stability, such as the consolidation of a regime, while agency is better at 
explaining political change, like regime transition (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, O‟Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986, Przeworski et al. 2000). In the analysis of liberalization, the choice 
between structural and actor approach is not so clear cut. One the one hand, liberalization 
involves regime survival, on the other, the risk of terminating into another state which 
involves a change of the regime. This requires a combined approach. 
On the one hand, the actor approach provides for a terminology that is applicable to most 
transition cases independent of context. For example the categorization by O‟Donnell, 
Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) of preferences is useful in explaining why different type of 
elite actors would make the choices they do, at least in retrospect. The actor approach does 
not explain however the set of choices available to them, or the relative power balances in the 
regime or between the regime and the opposition. Neither does it explain what determines the 
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ability of the opposition to mobilize or the need of the regime for cooperation and concession. 
Such contextual factors are considered exogenous to the theory. Therefore a purely actor 
centred analysis would be merely descriptive with little predictive power. If choices where 
never constrained, then any outcome would be pliable. As Bratton and van de Walle 
(1997:26) put it, “However uncertain the processes of regime transition may be – and they are 
highly uncertain – they are never purely random.” Therefore it is logical to include structural 
factors that may shape the preferences and set of alternative choices available to the actors at 
play: to relate the strategic choices of elite actors to the structural constraints and 
opportunities upon which they must act (Gill 2000:72, Linz and Stepan 1996). Thus strategic 
action is contextual: “historically created structures, while not determining which one of a 
limited set of alternatives political actors may choose, are “confining conditions” that restrict, 
or in some cases enhance, the choices available to them” (Karl, 1990:7).  Indeed, people make 
history, and history shape politics.  Here lies the core of the methodology applied in this 
thesis.  
An analytically combined approach of structures and agents is what Bratton and van de Walle 
(1997:43) call structural contingency.
20
 Current events are not only shaped by structures; 
actors can also change the rules of the game. Liberalization is exactly a period of change 
where actors try to redefine the rules as a response to historical created structures. The 
structural contingency approach understands political change as a continuous interaction 
between structure and agents and puts special emphasis on the process of such interaction. 
Thus liberalization is always a continuous interaction between regime and civil society, 
government and opposition, rulers and the people (Gill 2000, Mainwaring, 1992:301, 
Przeworski 1992). Furthermore, the “structure” of political contingency presupposes that 
historical events consist of patterns of regularities in political behaviour that makes them 
comparable and predictable. We cannot read minds, but we can read the structure of the game: 
the type of actors who are at play, the choices available to them, the institutional setting of 
which strategic action takes place, and thereby its potential outcome.  
The process of political change involves a struggle over institutions, in particular. Institutions 
matter for political action because not only do institutions make the grounds of political 
conflict, they also mediate the battle field:  “institutions shape the goals that political actors 
pursue and... structure power relations among them, privileging some and putting others at a 
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disadvantage” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:2). The influence of institutions should not be 
confused with structural determinism – neither will this thesis pursue a strictly formalistic 
view of institution as I acknowledge that not all norms exist on paper, and in the end actions 
are made by people and not paragraphs. The institutional perspective applied here sees 
liberalization outcomes as a result of strategic interaction between regime elites and 
opposition, shaped by structural conditions under which they take place. Thus this thesis 
combines the better of two worlds with the approach of structural contingency.   
Testing this approach, the set of explanatory variables are extricated from the conditions of 
the liberalization process which is expected to influence the outcome. Studying the 
consequences of liberalization, I do not believe in an expansive approach testing all possible 
theories of democratization; rather I choose to examine a parsimonious set of variables within 
the structural contingency framework. Within this framework, given the process of 
liberalization is set in motion; these are the variables I find most relevant when advising the 
literature for explaining not only democratization as an outcome but also autocratic reversal.  
 
2.5 Theoretical expectations of explanatory variables 
2.5.1 Economic performance 
The relationship between economic and political change has been a major source of theorizing 
in studies of democratization. Following the structural contingency perspective, this thesis 
will explore the impact of the economic performance of a liberalized regime. By now there 
exists a consensus in the democratization literature that while economic level of development 
may be useful in explaining political stability, regime change is connected to more immediate 
economic trends and crisis (Munch in Berg-Schlosser 2004: 70-71; see also Bratton and van 
de Walle 1997, Gill 2000).
21
 The research question of this thesis examines liberalization as a 
process of political change and furthermore, democratic transition, not democratic 
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consolidation, as a potential outcome. Therefore the discussion will restrain itself to consider 
the influence of more immediate economic trends on the outcome of a liberalization process 
rather than level of development in general.  
Once the regime has liberalized, how can regime performance influence the outcome? How 
does economic performance affect the chances for democratization versus reversal? There are 
two possible versions of hypotheses on how economic performance will offset regime change: 
either, economic performance will make democratization more or less likely, ore, economic 
upturns and downturns will make authoritarian reversal more or less likely. The following 
discussion will explain how economic performance is thought to influence regime change one 
way or the other.  
O‟Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986), among others, have implied economic 
performance crisis as a catalyst for democratic transitions, although this expectation is not 
incorporated into their models (see also Baloyra 1987; Malloy and Seligson 1987). As a 
matter of regime performance, economic growth is expected to influence the perceived 
position of the regime and its ability to sustain liberalization as a viable survival strategy.  
This is because economic performance can have an immediate effect on the populace and its 
standards of living (Gill 2000:84) and thereby induce popular attitudes towards the regime of 
which the regime must respond. On the downside of economic performance, Gill (2000) see 
economic performance crisis as a source of popular unrest and internal regime division:  
“As economic growth slows, or even drops, the regime is confronted with a policy dilemma about how 
to respond to the economic difficulties. Within the society at large, the slowing of economic growth 
creates hardship for many sectors of the population, often including those upon which the regime relies 
for support. Confronted with both a policy dilemma and a challenge to its support base, potential 
divisions within the regime are likely to become manifest. As the interests of such groups suffer, 
mobilization independent of the regime is likely, with its transition into oppositional politics a common 
development”.  
(Gill 2000:9) 
Thus slow growth can induce internal and external pressure on the regime and thereby cause 
regime change in the direction of democracy. Similarly, others have argued that economic 
performance crisis undermine legitimacy of any type of regime, be it democracy or autocracy, 
and will trigger regime change in either the direction of democratic transition or authoritarian 
reversal (Bermeo 1990; Epstein 1984; Diamond and Linz 1989; Richards 1986; Markoff and 
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Baretta 1990), because this means “a reduction in the resources available to political elites for 
sustaining bases of support” (Haggard and Kaufman 1995:29; 1997). This view was supported 
by findings of Przeworski and Limongi (1997) but not in their revised version (Przeworski et 
al. 2000:117): “Indeed, it appears that economic circumstances have little to do with the death 
of dictatorships.”
22
 Also Gasiorowski (1995) found no significant relationship between slow, 
negative economic growth and democratic transition.
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 However, Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2001:939) found that transitions are more likely during recession periods because the cost of 
political turmoil is lower in such episodes. Following this argument, (low) economic growth 
during a liberalization period would make democratization more likely an outcome. 
On the well-to-do-side of economic performance, Huntington (1991:69) argues that “rapid, 
economic growth raises expectations, exacerbates inequalities, and creates stresses and strains 
in the social fabric that stimulate political mobilization and demands for political 
participation”. Thus rapid growth is also expected to have a positive influence on 
democratization. A different argument regarding economic upturns, pointing in another 
direction, is offered by Mainwaring (1992:325): if the economy has done well over a period 
of “political opening”, the prospects of economic chaos under democracy seems remote, 
hence, making repression or a coup from the military less likely. Following this argument, 
economic performance would have a negative influence on authoritarian reversal of a 
liberalization process. But this argument can be counterbalanced by an opposite logic. As 
Mainwaring and Share (1986, in Bratton and van de Walle 1997:36) note,  
“A favourable economic situation may give authoritarian elites the confidence 
necessary to begin a transition, but it may also provide justification for remaining in 
power. An economic crisis often creates problems for transition to democracy, but it 
can also contribute towards the erosion of authoritarianism.”  
So different logics point in opposite directions; moreover, previous findings are not 
conditioned on a process of regime change such as liberalization. Therefore, how economic 
performance influences the outcome of liberalization is still an open question.  
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 Przeworski et al. (2000) use the term dictatorship synonymous to autocracy, operating with a dichotonomous 
classification of dictatorships and democracies in 141 countries during the period of 1950-1990. Furthermore 
they apply event history analysis, the same approach that will be executed in this thesis. 
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 Gasiorowski (1995) operates with a trichotonomous classification of autocratic, semi-autocratic and 
democratic regimes restricted to 97 Third World countries during the period of 1950-1989. Also he applies a 




2.5.2 Type of autocracy 
Although autocracies repress political contestation and participation, they are not without 
competition and constraints from their own ranks (Gandhi, 2008). How they are able to 
protect themselves from internal threats vary with the institutional method by which they 
organize their rule. The competition between rival factions takes different forms in different 
types of autocracy with different consequences (Geddes 1999). According to Gill (2001:91) a 
crucial structuring element in the course of transition is the nature of the authoritarian regime 
in power at the time liberalization begins (see also Geddes 1999, Huntington 1991, Linz and 
Stepan 1996, Mainwaring 1992, Przeworski 1992, Teorell 2010). Following different patterns 
of authority is various potentials for regime disunity and interaction with the opposition, 
shaping the attitudes within the regime regarding withdrawal from power (Gill, 2000:51). 
Thus, the power structures of a regime reveal who are the political elites at play and the power 
relations between them, and hence, the threats they face and the alternative choices available 
to them. Therefore, regime divisions are not only important in terms of the origins of 
liberalization but also its effects (Gill, 2000:49). By asking who are the liberalizers, why they 
would opt for liberalization as a survival strategy in the first place, and analysing the cost of 
(re)turning to repression as oppose to the possible benefits from a democratic development, 
we can hypothesize whether liberalization is merely a way of stabilizing the regime or a 
genuine step on the path of passing power to others.  
The most distinctive and most variable institutional feature of authoritarian regimes is the role 
played by the military in politics (Gasiorowski 1995:883). The military may rule directly 
through the institution of the armed forces or a junta; the military may be politicized as to 
intervene in politics when need be; or the military may be under civilian control and take a 
more professional role. This creates various scenarios of military-civilian relations within the 
regime which is expected to influence the outcome of liberalization.  
In military-led autocracies, there is invariably tension between the military as government and 
the military as institution (Geddes 1999, Gill 2000, Huntington 1991, O‟Donnell 1978, 
Mainwaring and Valenzuela 1992:324, Mainwaring and Share 1986, Stepan 1971). The 
military as institution strives to remain above politics and to keep intact the professionalism 
and the unity of the armed forces. Political differences within the military as government 
however or between it and the military as institution can cause troublesome divisions within 
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the armed forces. Therefore military leaders may opt for leaving office as a means of reducing 
these divisions.  
The military‟s willingness to leave office largely depends on how the military defines its 
mission – whether their primary interest is defined as preserving the military as government 
or as institution. When the military assumes a political role, they may do so temporarily. 
According to Huntington the military leaders during the Third Wave virtually never defined 
themselves as the permanent rulers of their country and therefore where better placed to 
terminate their regimes: “They held out the expectation that once they had corrected the evils 
that brought them to power they would exit from power and return to their normal military 
function” (Huntington, 1991;115). The cost of resigning from executive power could be less 
for military than civilian leaders, because they still have a permanent institutional role other 
than politics and governing. Those regimes that really see themselves as temporary, may 
embark upon a process of liberalization not as a strategy to hold on to power, but as one 
designed to surrender it to others  (Gill, 2000:50). A commonly mentioned case in point is 
Brazil, where the military rule was a response to an immediate sense of threat but never 
intended as a durable solution in face of internal erosion of the military as an institution (Gill 
2000, Mainwaring 1992:324, Stepan 1988). Handing over power to civilian elites has a cost 
paid in political influence.  But it would be worth it if the military is able to preserve its 
autonomy, without having to deal with the disputes of politics. 
Challenging this view, others have argued that “new professionalism” (Stepan 1974) or 
“idiosyncratic conditions” (Rouquié 1986) have often led military to play a more permanent 
role and therefore presumably more resistant than civilians to relinquish power and permitting 
democratization to occur. As Dahl (1989:250) notes, the military is likely to reject civilian 
control if they believe that the system they are obliged to preserve is endangered under 
democratically elected leadership. While the cost of civilian autocracy may be acceptable, the 
cost of a democratic elected government may be considered too high. This is especially the 
case if military leaders fear the influence of radical opposition forces. For example, militaries 
in Latin America have seized power to counter-act the revolutionary threat of the “Left” 
(Gandhi 2008:82), and Islamic forces in the Middle East (Esposito1998). In that case, they are 
only likely to step down and accept democracy as an outcome when such a “threat” is 
eliminated (Mainwaring 1992:325). If not, military should be much resentful towards 
democracy if it means that the military be persecuted for former sins, and lose significant 
resources. As long as the military still have a choice, it is only likely to step down voluntarily 
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if granted so called exit guarantees – no prosecution and continued autonomy of the military 
forces (Huntington, 1995).   
Were the military to give up their control of government, they do not also give up their 
control of the instruments of violence with which they could resume control of government 
again (Huntington, 1991:119). Have the military gone political in the past, one can never 
exclude the possibility that it will intervene in the future. This is the risk that civilian rulers 
often face. When the military assumes a professional role, but is still an autonomous force, 
civilian rulers are largely depended on building the trust of the military as to avoid their 
intervention. During a liberalization process this largely depends on their ability to neutralize 
the opposition and restore social order as to show they are in control of the situation. If not, 
they cannot exclude the possibility that the military might intervene. To counteract the 
possibility that hardliners in the military will take over power by a coup, the civilian leaders 
might opt for an alliance with moderates in the opposition. However, they risk that moderates 
ally with radicals, and that the military will abort the liberalization process by a coup if it 
“goes too far”. That became the case when the Front Islamique de Salut (FIS) won the 
Algerian election of 1992 (Esposito 1998).  
However, the military is likely to support whoever will preserve their integrity and prestige, 
and this is not always perceived to be the current regime. If the civilian leadership has not 
done a good job in pleasing the military, and the opposition is a united one of “the people”, 
the military might intervene as to assure a peaceful transition to democracy. That seems to be 
the case in contemporary Egypt. Here, the regime leaders could not rely on the armed forces 
to repress the masses on their behalf – they had to use private gangs and partisans, which was 
ineffective. This signified a split between the civilian leaders and the military, which in turn 
fed mass mobilization resulting in the eventual fall of the regime. The final outcome of the 
transition election however is still uncertain as of the time of writing.  
Another scenario would be when the civilian regime has control over the armed forces. In that 
case, the military is not an autonomous actor. Then the civilian regime is likely to use the 
armed forces as an instrument in preserving their non-democratic rule (Dahl, 1989:250). 
According Linz and Stepan (1996) a civilian leadership is better placed to initiate and 
participate in democratic transition than a military leadership because its members are closer 
linked to society and are more likely to see themselves as potential winners from the transition 
process. On the other hand, they are better able than the military to introduce liberalization 
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and stop it short of democratization without undermining their position. According to 
Huntington (1991:120) a democracy would be more costly for civilian political actors because 
they cannot resume a professional role like the military – they cannot rise above politics. Not 
only would they have to give up monopoly of power but also the opportunity to compete for 
power by democratic means. Consequently, a transition from a one-party system to 
democracy is likely to be more difficult than the transition from a military regime to 
democracy. This argument may seem a bit paradoxical, because the party can remain a 
political actor. In this sense, the separation from politics may be less complete for civilian 
leaders than it is for the military when they withdraw. But as Gandhi (2008:81) points out: “In 
turn, dictators are dictators because they cannot win competitive elections, because their 
preferences diverge from those of the majority of the population”. Reformers are only likely 
to become Democratizers if they have sufficient strength to compete under democratic 
conditions given some institutional guarantees (Przeworksi 1992). But that would be hard to 
guarantee under the uncertainty of democracy. 
In summary: When the military constitutes the major leader of the regime, then the internal 
state of the military is decisive; if the split of the regime is one of the military, the prospects 
of transition will be improved compared to a split between a unified military and a civilian 
leadership (Gill, 2000:93). Even when the military is not the dominant element of the regime, 
its relations to the civilian rulers may prove to be decisive (Snyder, 1992 in Gill, 2000: 256): 
If the military takes a stance against democracy, its prospects are slim; if it favours regime 
change, it might intervene as to assure a peaceful transition to democracy or remain neutral as 
to not repress opposition forces in their pursuit of democracy. A civilian autocracy in control 
of the military forces is likely to pursue liberalization as a means of self-preservation and not 
a step towards democracy. However, as the discussion above has shown, these arguments can 
also work in other directions, so it is not a given which pattern one should presume. 
Although a systematic relationship between autocracy type and democratization has not been 
so easy to prove in earlier historical comparative analysis (Huntington 1991, Linz and Stepan 
1996), it has been confirmed by more recent world-wide deductive analysis by Geddes (1999; 
2003), Brownly (2007) and Teorell (2010). However their categorizations of autocracy types 
are inconsistent, and moreover, none of them link this relationship to processes of regime 
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change such as political liberalization.
24
 This thesis separates itself from previous attempts by 
testing the relationship between autocracy type and democratization conditional on the 
process of liberalization; in addition, it will test its relationship with authoritarian reversal as 
well; and lastly, it will do so without blurring the effect caused by military-civilian relations 
and other regime institutions. The discussion about how autocracy type should be 
operationalized with according hypotheses will follow in the Methodology section (see Data 
and Operationalization).  
 
2.5.3 Conflict level 
The fate of the regime does not only rely on relation between regime elites, it also relies on 
interaction with the rest of society. Following the initial “opening” signalling a departure from 
the usual practise of the authoritarian regime, O‟Donnel and Schmitter (1986) expect a 
“resurrection of civil society” by which the regime must respond. Here lies the contingency of 
the process: will there be an outburst of popular mobilization? Will there be violent 
confrontation between regime supporters and opponents? Will liberalization prove to be a 
successful cooptation strategy, ore will civil society revolt, forcing the regime to redefine its 
strategy?   
As Przeworski (in O‟Donnel, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986:Ch.3) observes, movements 
away from the usual authoritarian practices have the effect of lowering the cost – real or 
anticipated – of individual expression and collective action. This in turn, will have a 
multiplier effect – “a melting of the iceberg of civil society which overflows the dams of the 
authoritarian regime” (Przeworski 1992:109). Mass action through outbreaks of strikes, 
demonstrations, riots and revolts can affect the power balance between regime supporters and 
defenders and thus be significant in advancing the democratic cause (Gill 2000:59). Thus civil 
society often plays a part in structuring the transition process through popular and radical 
mobilization: “Popular mobilization dictates the rhythm of transformation since it propels the 
regime to decide whether to repress, coopt, or devolve power” (Przeworski 1992:109).  
According to O‟Donnel and Schmitter (1986:7), if liberalized practices are not immediately 
aborted, they tend to accumulate, become institutionalized, and thereby raising the effective 
and perceived cost of their eventual annulment. Przeworski (1992:110) however expects that, 
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 While Geddes (1999:116) chooses to exclude such processes of regime change from her analysis (1999:116), 
Teorell (2010:32) makes the fallacy of confusing the term liberalization with democratization despite the fact 
that he recognizes they are not the same type of regime change. 
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inevitably, liberalization will lead to mass struggle into the street because while autonomous 
movements emerge within civil society, there are no institutions where these organizations 
could present their views and negotiate their interests. Because of the closed character of state 
institutions, the newly organized groups have no other place to take their struggles than the 
streets. When liberalization takes a character of mass eruption, liberalization as a means to 
restore order has failed. In that case, it is likely to undermine the Liberalizers within the 
regime because it proves to the hardliners that they are not in control of the process. Also 
O‟Donnel and Schmitter (1986:11) deem conflict to be harmful for the prospects of 
democracy:  
“it is possible and desirable that political democracy be attained without mobilized violence and 
dramatic discontinuity. The treat of violence and even frequent strikes, protests and demonstrations are 
virtually always present, but where the via revolucionaria is taken, or when violence becomes 
widespread and recurrent, the prospects of democracy is dramatically reduced.”  
O‟Donnel and Schmitter (1986:11) 
If democracy is to stand a chance, violent conflict cannot dictate the process: Just like 
softliners has to control the hardliners within the regime, moderate forces must be able to 
control the radical forces within the opposition as to not provoke the hardliners. Violent 
confrontation indicates that the repressive forces within the regime, and the radical elements 
within the opposition, have taken charge of interaction, in which case the chances for 
democracy are dim. 
Others have argued that violent confrontation between hardliners and radicals may be 
conducive to democratization – the cost of democratization can decrease once the 
authoritarian regime has defeated the subversive threat from radical opposition forces that 
challenges the dominant order (Mainwaring 1992:325) – this is said to have been the case in 
many South American cases, where the military wiped out guerrilla organizations, thereby 
eliminating the threat of revolutionary upheaval before re-establishing a more open political 
system. 
To the best of my knowledge, there has been no systematic attempt to test the impact of 
contingent event on the outcome of liberalization. The work of Teorell (2010) represents a 
part-way attempt considering the impact of popular mobilization from below on 
democratization. His model differentiates and thereby encapsulates the effect of strikes, riots 
and demonstrations on transition to democracy or democratic breakdown. The findings 
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regarding democratization are limited:  While anti-government demonstrations had a 
significant, positive influence, neither violent riots nor national strikes proved to have 
significant effects on democratization. None of these forms of popular mobilization appear to 
trigger autocratic downturns (Teorell 2010:102). I however find this attempt incomplete 
because the events are treated as if they appear in a world without responses – more radical 
strategies like revolt, political purges, assassinations, and guerrilla warfare can also evolve 
during an opening of the political space and is likely to push liberalization towards an end.  
Furthermore, since the causal mechanisms of such contingent events are expected to involve 
multiplier effects (as explained above) their impact should not be viewed in isolation: 
following an anti-government demonstration is a response from the regime; it might be 
followed by purges of regime opponents, which again can fuel revolt, which again 
exacerbates the conflict level. These mechanisms cannot be captured without taking all 
“temperature-indicating” actions, radical and moderate, from the regime and opposition, into 
account. Therefore it makes more sense to treat contingent events in relation to each other and 
test the sum effect of the overall, aggregate conflict level on the risk of authoritarian reversal 
and democratization as potential outcomes of liberalization. In light of the discussion, what 
consequences should one expect from an increased conflict level? 
What seems certain about the uncertain is that once the conflict level is turned up, it is likely 
to be the death of liberalization. It is however dubious whether a high conflict level will push 
liberalization away from or towards democracy. Visible conflict is necessary to drive the 
process towards democracy, but runs the risk of back firing. Thus mobilization is expected to 
be a two-edged sword for the masses. 
Much of the reasoning by O‟Donnel and Schmitter (1986) as well as Przeworski (1992) above 
seems to rely on whether organization becomes institutionalized, lowering the risk of reversal 
while increasing the risk of democratization. According to Gill (2000), institutional 
organization, rather than contingent events, are more likely to predict the endpoint of 
liberalization: “…it is clear that without organization, mass activism is unlikely to be 
sufficiently sustained or focused to be able to contribute substantially to the democratization 





2.5.4 Legislature under autocracy 
Although autocracies suppress contestation and limit political participation, they do rely on 
support from certain segments of society (Gandhi 2008:74): “All dictators face two problems 
of governance: first, how to thwart rebellion and second, how to obtain cooperation.”  
Autocracies just as democracies vary in their institutional arrangements. Some even adopt 
nominal democratic institutions such as legislative assembly and regime party. Why would 
they do so, if the regime is not democratic? For a long time it has been assumed that 
institutions under autocracy do not matter for political outcomes (see Friedrich and Brzezinski 
1965, Brooker 2000). It is said to be the most neglected issue in the field (Munch 2003; 
Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; 2007; Gandhi 2008; Teorell 2010; Share and Mainwaring 
1999).
25
 According to Gandhi (2008) these institutions under autocracy perform functions 
beyond mere “window dressing”. Rather, the degree by which autocracies are institutionalized 
signifies their relative need for cooperation with the rest of the society. All autocracies need a 
support base; and liberalization of a regime is the broadening of its social base (Przewoski 
1992).  Not only do autocracies face threats from their own ranks as described above. They 
may also face considerable pressure from forces within society. When the threat from regime 
outsiders is considered to be large and repression of these forces seems ineffective, the regime 
may opt for cooperation by offering some concession. Thus, when sufficiently threatened, 
institutionalization is assumed to be means of regime survival. However, the inclusion of 
opposition into regime institutions is expected to pose a risk; once included, they provide 
arenas for continued opposition pressure and demands for democratic reform. 
Therefore, this thesis expects a legislative assembly, as a nominal democratic institution, to be 
crucial for the outcome of liberalization. The degree to which liberalization is characterized 
by institutionalization varies across cases of liberalized regimes. What does this variation 
account for? What kind of effect should one expect from the adoption of legislative assembly?  
Under autocracies, legislatives provide for an arena for controlled bargaining and 
negotiations. Incorporated groups may find that they have more to gain from cooperating 
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 Authoritarian elections and hegemonic party systems are widely studied descriptively or in relation to 
democratization (see Reuter and Gandhi 2010; Shedler 2002; Diamond 2001; Geddes 1999;2003; Teorell 2010), 
but legislatures and opposition parties are less explored.  Although Gandhi (2008a;2008b;2009), also with 
Przeworski (2006; 2007), has done some intriguing work on exploring the autocratic functions of legislative, 
parties and elections and their effects on autocratic government survival and specific policy outcomes (civil 
liberties and economic policies among others), the impact of legislative assembly on democratization or 
authoritarian reversal remain unexplored in relation to liberalization. 
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within regime institutions than rebel in the streets and risk extermination. Formally, 
parliament may be granted legislative powers, at least in certain policy areas or the 
opportunity to veto some executive policies.   Informally, access to parliament provides for 
rents and spoils, privileges and perks. For the autocratic leaders, a legislative assembly may 
be an effective instrument in co-opting outsiders and inducing their cooperation, the 
advantage being that it is not the inner sanctum where the most important decisions are made 
(Gandhi and Przeworski 2006:14). For the opposition, participation in legislatures provides an 
opportunity to pursue its interests and values within the framework of the autocracy – to 
transform the regime from within when the chances of immediate dictator overthrow are slim 
(Gandhi and Przeworski 2006:14). Thus adopting a legislative assembly is not a null sum 
game, but a two way road. It does impose a cost on the rulers: by transcending some political 
influence to other groups, the rulers must suffer more constraints than before. But after all, it 
is not such a high price to pay if it neutralizes the risk of being overthrown. A legislative 
signifies a strong opposition relative to the regime. However, legislatives under autocracy are 
not without control: some may be directly appointed by the regime, others elected partly or 
solely by citizens, but only with candidates approved by the regime (Gandhi, 2008:35). They 
are not an effective constraint on executive power as a truly democratic institution would be; 
they lack democratic principles such as rule of law, popular sovereignty and accountability 
(Martins in Gill 2000: 47).  
When nominal democratic institutions are present during liberalization, what kind of risk does 
it pose for the regime? One might expect that opening up parliament for opposition raises the 
risk that the opposition will use it as a channel to demand for further democratization. 
Therefore, it is argued, institutionalized autocracies are more likely to democratize. Hence 
autocratic legislators might make democracy more likely and reversal less. On the other hand, 
Gandhi (2008) and Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) claim the presence of legislative assembly 
have a stabilizing effect the survival of autocratic governments. That would lead us to expect 
legislatures to have a consolidating effect on the liberalized regime, moreover, making 
liberalization less likely to end with either reversal or democratization. These findings will be 




2.5.5 Political parties  
Although some autocracies allow participation within legislatures only as non-partisans or as 
members of a single regime party, other rulers choose to allow for multiple parties within 
parliament. In this case, the regime party has not been efficient enough as to absorb sufficient 
parts of the opposition and would indicate an even stronger opposition relative to a legislative 
without multiple parties. Still, closely controlled, multiple parties can still be an effective 
instrument of authoritarian rule by forming so called “fronts” of regime supporters only under 
different labels (Gandhi, 2008:79). Also, separating the opposition into fractions may be 
effective in maximizing support by pursuing the tactic of “divide and rule” while isolating 
those who refuse to support the regime. Thus the cost of including several parties in the 
regime is lower than its benefits. On the other hand, others argue that autonomous party 
organization does signify an empowerment of opposition forces, and a risk for the survival of 
the autocracy. According to Gill (2000:60,126) this empowerment lies in its organizational 
capabilities to mobilize support from civil society forces. Thus they are better positioned to 
confront and negotiate with the rulers and thereby to influence the course of development 
within the regime. Therefore, the argument goes, where such civil society forces as political 
parties are present, regime reformers will fear the consequences of suppressing them and 
rather be encouraged to bring about change that ultimately turns into democratization. 
Consequently, one would expect the presence of political parties during liberalization to have 
a positive influence on democratization, while preventing authoritarian reversal.  
Empirical analyses on the subject are scarce, although some recent attempts have been made 
to test the effect of multiple parties under autocracy on democratization. Lai and Hoover 
(2004) find that party inclusion does not have a significant effect on democratization. This 
finding leads them to conclude that autocracies that do not exclude parties do however not 
allow them to actually compete for power, limiting parties ability to influence democratic 
transition (Lai and Hoover 2004:558). Only competitive parties are conducive to 
democratization (some would say it is inherently a part of democratization). Similarly, Teorell 
(2010) finds that multiparty elections under autocracy have a positive influence on 
democratization. However, I find it hard to say whether this is an effect caused by competitive 
elections or of parties as such. Furthermore, competitive multiparty elections are more an 
attribute of democratization than of liberalization.
26
 In order to avoid endogenity problems, 
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 For reasons of endogenity, this thesis will not test the effect of competitive elections on democratization. Even 
if this effect was operationalized with a technical lag, I expect one would find that competitive executive 
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this thesis will examine the consequences of allowing parties to organize in the regime (and 
not necessarily to compete) which signifies the limited nature of liberalized regimes while 
separating them from hegemonic autocracies. 
 
2.5.6 Ethnic heterogeneous societies  
Besides from a divided regime, the opposition must form a united front against the regime for 
democracy to be the outcome of liberalization (O‟Donnel, Shmitter and Whitehead 1986; Gill 
2000; Teorell 2010). Under what structural conditions is a united opposition more or less 
likely? To what degree society is ethnically fractionalized has a potentially big role to play in 
the strategic evaluation of potential power under democracy. Ethnically divided societies has 
been theorized as a hinder for democratic engineering (Dahl 1971, Lijphart 1977, Rabushka 
and Sheples 1972, Horowitz 1985) because it is expected to pose a risk of increased conflict 
during periods of political change and thereby cause trouble for a democratization process. 
However, as Fish and Brooks (2004) note, the empirical evidence has been scarce, much due 
to lack of effective measures of group identities. Furthermore, the effect of cultural cleavages 
has been tested somewhat ad hoc and not conditioned on such a process of political change in 
which its effect is assumed to come to work. The process-oriented framework of this thesis is 
an improvement in this respect. Because of the structural contingency frame work of this 
thesis, when I ask about the effect of ethnic fractionalization I instead ask about the strategic 
calculation each ethnic group does during liberalization: What does ethnic groups expect to 
gain from supporting a move to democracy (democratization)? Do they risk gaining more or 
less political power and security under democracy? The mechanism is described thus: 
The first reasoning why ethnic divisions should be harmful for democratization, view ethnic 
preferences as primordial: Socialization and identity formation is a fundamental part of 
human existence. From our birth our identity and rules are adopted in group belonging 
circumstances dominated by family, kinship and community. Thus the language we acquire 
bounds the individual ego to a set of ritual, habits and cultural identity of “the home range” 
(Rokkan 1974). The constraint of belonging to one home range raises the bar for exiting and 
hinders attempt to unite several different home ranges to a larger collective unite. When 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
elections are inevitably conducive to democratization, because they are inherently a part of the democratization 
process as defined in this thesis. Furthermore, I find it hard to argue that this would indeed be an independent 
effect of elections, but rather that it would be spurious; there is likely to be some underlying background effect 
which causes some elections to be democratically successful while others not.    
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society becomes politicizes so does the home range; such group formations create cultural 
cleavages based on “ideology of identity” as oppose to economically founded “ideology of 
chances” (Rokkan 1974). The first creates an obstacle for democratic politics because cultural 
boundaries are hard to overcome, making consensus on common rules harder to deliberate. 
Lijphart (1999:32), writing on types of democratic engineering, takes this point further and 
says that if in a democracy one group consistently end up with the power seats, the other 
groups are likely to protest the democratic system: 
”majority rule is not only undemocratic but also dangerous because minorities that are 
continually denied access to power will feel excluded and discriminated against and 
may lose their allegiance to the regime.” 
 
This is typically so in ethnic heterogeneous societies, because the cultural cleavage is fixed 
and tends to be the most conspicuous; each voter will vote the same every election based on 
(locked) ethnic group preferences. Hence, power alternation becomes less likely, and the 
minorities risk being condemned to permanent opposition. These minorities might have 
reasons to fear democracy as a principle of exclusion. 
Forward-looking ethnic groups might oppose democratization on grounds other than merely 
political exclusion. Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) argue that ethnic groups, once in 
power, will strive not only to insulate power from other groups and but also create privileges 
to its own. Thus, the apprehension towards democracy is exacerbated; not only will one 
majority ethnic group win all elections (if we are to follow Rokkan and Lijphart), but also 
create socio-economic disadvantages for all others. There are also great possibilities that the 
majority ethnic group reverses a democratic transition as means to consolidate power and 
insulate other groups. This is confirmed in their empirical analysis; “…fractionalization seems 
to increase the probablility of ending up in a more autocratic (and more insulated) regime” 
(Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi 2004:27). In a similar analysis Alesina, Devleeschauwer, 
Eaterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003a) also find that the fractionalization is inversely related to 
democracy (the same index as applied in this thesis), and writes: 
“in more fragmented societies a group imposes restrictions on political liberty to 
impose control on the other groups. In more homogenous societies it is easier to rule 
democratically since conflicts are less intense” (2003a: 12).  
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This thesis is not concerned with democratic reversal, but the point is still valid in a structural 
contingency framework: forward minded ethnic groups might resist democratization efforts in 
the first place because in their minds it only makes sure that the majority group gets the upper 
hand. 
Others argue ethnicity as a source of conflict is not a function of demography, but of political 
choices made during times of regime change (Beissinger 2008). As Bowen (1996) argues so 
passionately, ethnic conflict is not a result of ethnic divisions per se, but of political choices 
from the top to rule and mobilize along such dividing lines. Also Mosseau (2001) finds that 
ethnic heterogeneity is not associated with political violence, except under conditions of 
political change. Following these arguments, one should expect increased ethnic mobilization 
in the immediate wake of political liberalization.  First, since we know that liberalization is a 
process of increased organization and an extension of the political sphere one can assume that 
it will be a process of emerging group interests which tend to increase ethnic mobilization 
(Nagel and Olzak 1982).  At the same time, during times of regime change political elites are 
prone to play emerging differences up against each other. By playing the ethnic card and 
mobilize on ethnic divisions as to consolidate and uphold their rule, they provide a breeding 
ground for ethnic conflict (Rabushka and Sheples 1972, Snyder 2000, Beissinger 2008). 
Under these conditions, minority-majority risks are likely to come into play.   
Turning back to the questions posed initially – what do ethnic groups gain from supporting 
democratization; will there be more or less to political power and security to gain under 
democracy – the answers do not give bright prospects for democratization. First, opposing 
ethnic group interests are more likely to become pronounced during liberalization, and hence 
split them as a unified political opposition. If the regime plays its cards right they might be 
successful in a strategy of divide and rule, lessening the prospects for democratization. 
Second, because these ethnic divisions are likely to become manifest during the liberalization 
process, all ethnic groups, except the one in numerical majority, have a reason to fear the 
consequences of democratization. At best they will be excluded from political power under 
democracy, at worst they will be deprived socio-economic goods and rights. There is even a 
possibility that it will end up with a new autocratic regime, where elites are only concerned 
with preserving privileges for their own ethnic group. Thus ethnic minorities have nothing to 
gain from democratization and thus no reason to support it. Third, and finally: if ethnic 
conflict becomes so intense during a process of political opening, it becomes more likely that 
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the regime reverses the liberalization process under the pretext of restoring civil and political 
order.  
In sum, if we assume ethnic groups consider potential cost and benefits under democracy 
tomorrow when they make strategic choices during the liberalization process today, the 
theoretical expectations regarding democratization and reversal are pretty clear cut. The fear 
of the empowerment of one group over the other makes the prospects for a united, pro-
democratic opposition less likely. Hence, ethnic fractionalization is expected to have a 
negative influence on democratization and possibly a influence effect on autocratic reversal. 
 
2.5.6 Summary of independent variables 
To sum up, the discussion of variables that are theoretically expected to have an impact on 
liberalization outcomes leaves the thesis with six independent variables: Structuring the game, 
economic growth indicates the performance of the regime, ethnic fractionalization the 
potential (dis)unity of the opposition. On an intermediate level of explanation, institutions like 
type of autocracy, legislator and parties indicate the relative strength of the regime and the 
opposition, considered crucial for how the actors calculate their strategies. Contingent events 
that evolve along the way indicate the conflict level during the course of liberalization of 
which the regime must respond and thereby its chances for endurance or termination. 
Together, these explanatory variables explain the continued and changing conditions during 




Now that I have explained the theoretical background for the independent variables, I will 
present the methodological approach for testing their effect on the outcome of liberalization 
empirically. In the Methodology chapter follows is a discussion of operationalization of these 
variables and their specific hypothesis. But first I will explain why these hypotheses should be 
tested through quantitative analysis, more specifically, why event history analysis is the 
proper approach.  
 
3.1 Why a quantitative approach? 
 
“…if comparative politics is conceived as a method of control, then its generalizations have to be 
checked against “all cases”, and therefore the enterprise must be – in principle – a global enterprise. So 
the reason for world-wide comparisons is not simply that we live in a wider world; it is also a 
methodological reason“. 
(Sartori 1970:1035) 
Choosing a methodological approach is about finding valid answers to the questions we are 
posing. This thesis aims at testing theory, namely the relationship between liberalization 
outcomes and a number of independent variables, and is thus an attempt of making causal 
inference. This implies choosing a research design which enables global comparison and to 
observe liberalization processes over time.   
Given this task, the advantage with quantitative analysis is that it allows us to compare 
information from a large number of cases which provides for statistical control and hence the 
potential for generalization (Georg and Bennet 2005, King, Keohane and Verba 1994). 
Knowledge about general patterns is obtained at the expense of complexity and particularities 
about unique cases, which are the opposite advantages with qualitative analysis (Ragin 1987). 
However, as mentioned in the introduction, qualitative studies of democratization processes 
have already provided us with in-depth theories about the causal mechanisms at work, 
induced from studies of regime change in particular areas and eras. What remains is testing 
the validity of these theories by a worldwide comparison during the whole post war period.  
This must be the next step for accumulating new knowledge about why some liberalized 
regimes democratize while others do not, in which this thesis partakes. 
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The validity of generalization relies on the operationalization. Once we move up “the ladder 
of abstraction” (Sartori, 1970) the contextual complexity of each case is renounced for the 
utilization of more general concepts and causes. The danger of moving to high up the ladder is 
to empty it for qualitative meaning. However this thesis will avoid conceptual stretching by 
consistently pursuing the systematized concept in its operational measurement. Furthermore, I 
will evaluate the measurement validity of this operationalization by comparing the resulting 
sample with qualitatively established patterns of regime change during the post world war 
period (Huntington 1991, Brumberg 2002).
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The quality of quantitative research relies heavily on the validity of its methodological 
assumption. Therefore the assumptions made when choosing methodological tools should be 
in accordance with theory and as close to real world cases as possible. As quantitative 
approaches in social sciences are becoming more and more sophisticated it is possible to find 
an approach which reflects the temporal, gradual nature of a phenomenon such as 
liberalization. The substantive problem here would require a comparative analysis of 
longitudinal data. More specifically, a longitudinal approach such as event history analysis is 
able to capture the various histories of liberalization within regimes and its possible event 
outcomes. The substantive logic of event history analysis will be explained below, as will the 
reasons for applying it in the study of liberalization and its uncertain path towards or a way 
from democracy.  
 
3.2 Why event history analysis?  
3.2.1 Modeling timing and change 
Political scientists may be concerned with studying events like elections, wars, policy 
implementation, transitions, strikes, revolutions and other events of historical or political 
importance. Events such as these consist of some qualitative change occurring at a specific 
moment in time (Allison, 1984:9). Often we are not only interested in whether something 
changes or not, but when it changes. When the research question, explicitly or implicitly, 
involves timing and change, event history analysis is a suitable tool. It allows the researcher to 
investigate not only if something happens, but when something happens and how long 
something persists before it changes. The concern with change is often tied to an interest in 
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 See section 5.2 Tidal trends of the baseline p. 74. 
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“history” preceding this change. My research question involves studying liberalization as the 
history preceding a possible transition to democracy or authoritarian reversal. The major 
assumption of event history analysis is that the duration spent in one state is related to the 
likelihood of experiencing some event at a certain point in time. Intuitively, this assumption 
corresponds well to the expected relationship between liberalization and democratization; that 
liberalization is associated with eventual democratic transition, although with a corresponding 
risk of stopping short of transition and rather reversing. Investigating the relationship between 
these processes demands that we observe both events: “The premise of event history analysis 
is to model both the duration of time spent in an initial state and the transition to a subsequent 
state, that is, the event.” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:8). The thesis will use event 
history analysis to model observations of liberalizations and their duration before they end 
and furthermore, record when they ended with either democratization or autocratic reversal. 
By doing so, we are able to investigate the risk that liberalization will end with either 
democracy or autocracy, as explained further below. 
 
3.2.2 A substantive interest in risk 
Studying event history may involve the notion of survival, risk and failure (Box-Steffensmeier 
and Jones, 2004:3): As something persists, as it survives, what is the risk that it will 
subsequently end, or fail to survive? Originating in the field of biomedical research, the 
method is commonly applied in research with a substantive interest in survival or occurrence 
of death. Just like a medical researcher can ask what the risk is that a person will survive or 
die from cancer, a political scientist can ask what the risk is that a regime will survive or fail 
to survive from political conflict. Given some qualitative change in the regime, the 
liberalization, what is the risk that it will fall? Given that a regime has liberalized, what is the 
risk that it will fail to persist? Furthermore, what is the risk that liberalization will end in 
terms of democratization as oppose to a reversal of the process? Because liberalization 
inhibits the risk of ending with different event types it involves the concept of competing risk, 




3.2.3 The concept of competing risks 
In the case of liberalized autocracies, they may suffer several fates: either they become 
democratic, (re)turn autocratic, or stay liberalized. This implies that a liberalized autocracy 
faces different kinds of risks; that of democratization as oppose to the risk of reversal. Event 
history analysis allows us to investigate different kinds of risks corresponding to what type of 
event liberalization ended with - either democratization or autocratic reversal. Thus event 
history analysis makes it possible to answer how liberalization ended.  
 
3.2.4 The effect of independent variables on risk 
Not only does event history analysis make it possible to answer when and how liberalization 
ends, but also why liberalization ends. This thesis aims at explaining the reason for 
liberalization ending with different results by examining the effect of covariates on the 
probability that liberalization either ends with democracy or autocracy. Event history analysis 
is indeed a comparative one, allowing the researcher to examine information on many 
observations over time and hence make comparative inference about differences and 
similarities across the cases (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). Thus event history analysis 
allows us to make claims not only about factors that influence the risk of something 
happening, but also how differences across political systems are related to this risk. Hence, 
event history makes it possible to answer why some liberalized autocracies democratize while 
others do not.  
However, analyzing liberalization also includes cases that do not experience any failure event, 
at least not within the time of observation. Fortunately event history analysis is able to deal 
with this problem of uncertainty also, as will be explained below. 
 
3.2.5 Censoring – when history has no ending 
As noted above, autocracies may be able to stay in a liberalized state for an extensive period 
of time. In principle, liberalizations may never even end, at least not within the time period we 
are able to observe them. When a subject is observed for a period of risk, but the failure event 
is unknown, we are dealing with so called right censoring. Censoring occurs whenever an 
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observation‟s full event history is unobserved either because of missing data or the timing of 
the analysis (Box-Steffesmeier and Jones, 2004:16, Cleves 2010:30). For example, the 
process of liberalization may still be ongoing when the time of the analysis stops and we 
simply do not observe subjects long enough for all of them to fail. What lies in the future we 
do not know. Since we can only rely on information from the present, we are left with both 
liberalizations that have ended and those which future outcomes are unknown. How are we to 
deal with this problem of uncertainty? 
We would not want to exclude liberalizations without termination from the analysis: 
Including censored cases is essential for the research results because, although the research 
question is concerned with the occurrence and non-occurrence of failure, it is equally 
interested in the history preceding such an event. The duration of liberalization is expected to 
have an effect on the risk of failure, in other words, the likelihood that the liberalization 
eventually ends. By overlooking censored cases one would lose out on important information 
about the most persistent systems. The censored cases might be systematically different from 
uncensored cases, and not including them in the analysis would render serious bias in the 
coefficient estimates due to the case selection process (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 
2004:19). A lesser worse alternative to omitting censored cases from the analysis would be to 
use a binary indicator as the dependent variable and model the (logit or probit) likelihood of a 
spell terminating. But an indicator variable cannot capture variation on the duration until 
event, and hence, would preclude information on survival (Peterson, 1995). Therefore 
standard regression methods are ill suited for research questions where timing of the event is 
seen as equally important as its (non)occurrence:  “usually we are concerned both with the 
occurrence or nonoccurrence of some event as well as the length of time the unit survived 
until the event occurred” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:19).   
Fortunately, event history modeling effectively allows us to take this nuance into account by 
observing right censored subjects instead of omitting them from the data set, and hence, avoid 
selection bias. Because event history analysis is concerned with both the persistence of 
liberalization as well as its ending, it can draw on information from both censored and 
uncensored observations: Failed cases of liberalizations, the uncensored observations, 
contribute to information about both survival and failure times. Censored cases of 
liberalization do not provide for information about failure since they never ended during the 
period of observation, however, they can still contribute with information on survival. And 
although we do not know the actual failure event, the estimation of risk enables us to say 
44 
 
something about the probable failure of all the liberalizations whether they have ended or not. 
Thus, event history methods are capable of handling the problem of uncertainty. Actually, 
event history analysis is unique in their capacity to cope with uncertain future outcomes like 
this, as they are able to account for both censored and uncensored observations (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:19).  
This technical ability is often offered as a good excuse for choosing event history modeling 
instead of ordinary linear regressions like OLS. But in fact, linear regression are capable of 
handling right censoring as well, so called censored-normal regression (see Cleves et al., 
2010:2). The real problem with ordinary regression methods, according to Cleves et al. 
(2010), is the assumption of normality. The core advantage of event history analysis is the 
substitution of the normality assumption with a time function more appropriate for the 
problem at hand (Golub, 2008). In the case of liberalization no such presumptions should be 
made, as will be explained further below.  
 
3.2.6 When time is not of essence, but a nuance  
When choosing a longitudinal research design, the researcher should be aware of the 
underlying assumptions about the distribution of time as it can affect the estimation of 
variable effects. That the results of analysis are being determined by the assumptions and not 
the data is always a potential problem when modeling a phenomenon quantitatively. What are 
reasonable assumptions to make about a phenomenon should only be chosen on strong 
theoretical grounds, and never simply because it proves convenient. 
The problem with linear regression is that it assumes a normal distribution of time up to an 
event. This means to assume that a liberalization process could only have a linear 
development over time. That would be an unreasonable assumption to make regarding the 
time-path of a liberalization process, because there is no theoretical reason to assume any 
regularity in its nature regarding time, much less why it should be linear, or logistical for that 
matter. Ordinary OLS modeling is not robust to violations of the time assumption and thus 
such an analysis could give biased results in this analysis.  
Event history analysis offers a range of parametric models assuming other distribution 
functions that could be more reasonable for the problem under study. However, it is hard to 
justify any particular shape for the underlying time distribution for most social phenomenon 
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(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, Golub 2008). Neither does testing the appropriate time 
function statistically prove to be much robust (Golub 2008). The cost of imposing the wrong 
assumptions could be enormous biased results, because the choice of distribution function 
fundamentally affects the estimated coefficients (Alison 1984; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 
2001; Bennet 1999; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997;2004). Avoiding a situation where the 
assumption determine the results leads us to search for methods that do not require 
assumptions about the distribution of the residuals (Cleves et al., 2010:3). When theory does 
not give us a good reason for assuming a specific development over time, and we want to 
know how independent variables influence the development, then a semi parametric model 
would be the best choice (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, Cleves 2010, Golub 2008). A 
semi parametric model means one which is nonparametric in sense that it makes no 
assumptions regarding the distribution of time, while parametric in the sense that the effect of 
the variables is still assumed to take a certain form (Cleves et al. 2010: 5). If however one 
takes interest in the underlying time-path, that is, the effect of time itself, it can still be 
estimated from the data without having to make any assumptions beforehand. Thus time 
dependency is only a statistical nuance, and not an expected essence.  
 
3.3 Specifying a Cox competing risks model 
So far this chapter has explained the reasons for choosing a quantitative analysis and 
furthermore, argued why event history analysis is the most appropriate method for testing the 
determinants of liberalization outcomes. Within event history method there are several models 
to choose from. In this section I will explain the logic of the Cox proportional hazard model 
and competing events, and argue that a Cox competing risk model is the most appropriate one 
compared to other event history models. This will involve a discussion of the underlying 
assumptions of the Cox model and its specific interpretations.  
 
3.3.1 Cox proportional hazard model 
The most commonly used semi-parametric model is the Cox-proportional hazard model (Cox 
1972, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, Cleves 2010). Actually, The Cox proportional 
hazard model is by far the most popular and recommended within event history methods, 
specifically for studying social phenomenon (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, Cleves 
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2010, Golub 2008). Besides computational elegance, the Cox model offers the flexibility of 
testing variable effects without assuming any particular time-path. In event history models the 
risk, or the probability, that an episode ends at a particular point in time, given that it has 
lasted up to this point in time, is captured by the hazard rate. For the Cox model, the hazard 
rate for the ith subject is  
     xjj xthxth exp0  
where regression coefficients, Bx, are to be retrieved from the data (see Cleves, 2010:129). 
Thus, the hazard rate is estimated from theoretically relevant variables. The hazard over time 
when all variables are set to zero, the so called baseline hazard, is represented by h0(t). The 
baseline hazard is the underlying effect the passage of time has on the hazard rate once all 
independent variables in a model are controlled for (Golub, 2008:531). Here, the baseline 
hazard is left unspecified.
28
 This is considered an advantage when we are unable to make 
reasonable assumptions about the shape of the hazard, and we want to avoid producing 
misleading results about Bx.
29
 However, the baseline hazard rate, although highly adapted to 
the observations at hand, can be estimated from the data (Box-Steffensmeier 2004:193). 
Interpreting the shape of the baseline hazard rate can show what kind, if any, time 
dependency exists for the liberalizations under study, as will be done in the analysis chapter.  
 
3.3.2 The proportional hazard assumption 
Although the baseline hazard is not assumed to take any particular shape, it is assumed that, 
whatever the general shape, it is the same for everyone, everywhere. That is, “each 
observation‟s hazard function follows exactly the same pattern over time” (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:132). Formally, the Cox model states that one subject‟s hazard 


















                                                          
28
 Because the baseline is left unspecified, the Cox model has no intercept; rather it is “absorbed” into the 
baseline hazard function leaving the intercept unidentified ((Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:49, Cleves 
2010:131). 
29
 If we specified the functional form of h0(t), the model would be more efficient in estimating the Bx (Cleves 
2010:130). However, because it is unknown we must leave it unspecified. 
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which is constant, assuming the variables xj and xm do not change over time (Cleves, 
2010:129).  The so called proportional hazard assumption (PH-assumption in short) requires 
that the effects of independent variables are not dependent of time – that the coefficients are 
so called time-independent (Golub 2008:532). It maintains proportionality in the variable 
effects, meaning that the instantaneous risk of failure between any two subjects is constant 
over their entire survival time (Golub, 2008:536). This is a strong assumption which is likely 
to be violated when observing subjects for a longer period and the values of the variables 
change over time. If the proportionality assumption of coefficients holds, the estimates will be 
relatively easy to interpret, however, if violated; the PH-assumption could render little 
meaning to the estimates. Whenever time varying variables
30
 are included in the model, the 
PH-assumption is likely to be violated because, in definition, the variables cannot change with 
time (see formula above). When time-varying variables are present, and the coding of 
covariates therefore changes with time, the hazard ratio is no longer constant but rather 
depends on time (Golub, 2008:538). The challenge is detecting whether this variation results 
in a proportionality violation that is significant enough to warrant correction with a time 
dependent, also called time varying coefficient (TVC).
31
 The PH-assumption is a common 
problem for most event history models when including non-constant variables. Fortunately 
the Cox model offers a superior handling of the PH-assumption compared to other models.
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For a Cox model, the PH-assumption states that the effect does not change with time except in 
ways that one has already parameterized (Cleves, 2010). The PH-assumption is a testable one 
in regards of the Cox model and can be easily handled by the method of Grambsch and 
Therneau (1994), which is available in the STATA software applied in this analysis. Both 
Box-Steffensmeier and her colleagues (2003) as well as Golub (2008) recommends testing the 
residuals of individual covariates in order to determine their (non-)proportionality. Such PH-
testing will be performed and systematically dealt with in the Analysis chapter.
33
 If non-
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 Time-varying variables (also known as time-varying or time-dependent covariate) should be distinguished 
from time-varying (or time-dependent) coefficients: the former depends on time in terms of the values of the 
variable, but the marginal effect remains the same although the variable changes, while the latter depends on 
time in terms of the marginal effect changes, although the values of the variable do not necessarily change 
(Cleves, 2010:190). According to Golub (2008:532), the political science literature on survival analysis tends to 
use the terms interchangeably, while in fact they are analytically distinct. Conflating them would obscure the 
crucial difference between state changes and decay- and accreditation functions.  
31
 Due to these letters, time varying coefficients are often and mistakenly confused with time varying covariates 
(TVCs), which I will call time-varying variables. 
32
 According to Golub (2008:536ff), neither parametric nor log-logistic models offers any flexibility in their 
(proportionality) assumptions, and therefore the Cox model should be preferred whenever one wants to include 
time dependent coefficients (TDCs). 
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proportionality exists, the PH-assumption is relaxed by treating time as a variable in 
interaction with the non-proportional variable, as recommended by both Box-Steffensmeier 
and Zorn (2001) and Golub (2008). Thus, when the time varying effect is properly specified 
in the Cox model, the proportionality assumption is no longer violated (Cleves, 2010:204). 
Furthermore, the baseline hazard will be recovered to learn more about the general time 
dependency of the liberalizations under study.  
 
3.3.3 Specifying failure time and likelihood function 
A liberalization process can end at any point in time. It is a so called continuous time process, 
as oppose to events only occurring at discrete, often predetermined times, like voting on 
Election Day. Therefore a continuous time model is required over a discrete time model. For 
a continuous time model like the Cox, since failure can happen at any point in time it is the 
ordering rather than the actual failure time that is of essence in the likelihood calculations. 
The Cox model uses the partial likelihood method to estimate the effect of the covariates on 
the hazard of a liberalization ending in one year. The partial likelihood function assumes that 
the intervals between successive failure times contribute no information regarding the 
relationship between the covariates and the hazard rate (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 
2004:51). Because the baseline hazard function is unknown, the time rate is assumed to take 
an arbitrary form, and is simply a way of ordering the events. The actual survival times of 
censored and uncensored cases are not directly incorporated into the likelihood. It is the 
ordered failure times, rather than the interval between them, that contributes information to 
the partial likelihood function. Thus the Cox model only uses “parts” of the available data, 
hence the Cox likelihood is a “partial” one. Cox regression results are based on forming, at 
each failure time, the risk pool or risk set – meaning the set of subjects who are at risk of 
failure – and then maximizing the conditional probability of failure (Cleves, 2010:145). Hence 
the name maximum partial likelihood estimation (MPLE) (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 
2004:152).
34
 The partial likelihood calculation presumes that liberalizations end at ordered 
times. The data is recorded on a yearly basis, hence, when liberalizations end in the same 
year, the data cannot tell the exact ordering of which liberalization ended first during that 
same year. Then special treatment of the likelihood calculation is required in order to produce 
proper estimates. How to handle simultaneous failure times is what follows. 
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 Confer Cleves (2010:146) or Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002:101-104, 130-133) for a more technical 
elaboration on how partial estimates are maximized.  
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3.3.4 Handling tied data 
The actual times at which failure occurs are not relevant in a Cox model – the ordering of the 
failure is. As such, the partial likelihood function cannot account for events failing at the 
same time – it presumes that failures happen in ordered times. This seems to be a big 
restriction as cases of liberalizations can end in the same year. Therefore the likelihood 
function should be modified to account for simultaneously occurring failure times. When a 
spell of liberalization ends the same year as several other spells of liberalization, the exact 
ordering is unclear because the data do not tell us which one actually ended first during that 
year. These are cases of so called tied data, that is, instances of failure occurring at the same 
(tied) times.  Tied data pose a problem for the partial likelihood calculation in the ordering of 
failure times, and hence makes it impossible to determine how many subjects are at risk at all 
times. However, it is reasonable to assume that the liberalizations did not end actually at the 
exact same date, day, or in the same hour. In reality, their failures occurred at separate times. 
Then all one needs to do is find a way of ordering. Fortunately, the Cox model can be adapted 
as to handle tied data by approximating the partial likelihood function, another primacy of the 
Cox model over parametric approaches (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004:53, Golub 
2008:539). The STATA software offers several optional approximation methods. The 
Breslow method of handling tied data is the most common one, widely used because of its 
computational efficiency. However, its precision decreases as the number of ties increases. 
Ties are not an extreme problem in my data, the maximum number of liberalizations ending 
at the same time being 6 (see overview of tied data in Appendix). Nevertheless, for reasons of 
accuracy, I choose the Efron method of which approximations are more precise than the 




To sum up, applying the Cox proportional hazard model, survival time is specified as a 
function of theoretically relevant variables, and time is just a nuance. The Cox model makes 
no assumptions about the distributional characteristics of the baseline hazard rate, yet can 
provide estimates of the independent variables of interest and hence allow for testing of 
hypothesis. Moreover, baseline estimates, though highly adapted to the observed data, can be 
retrieved from Cox estimates (See Box-Steffensmeier 2004:193). Furthermore, the Cox model 
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 For a more technical discussion of the approximation methods, advice Box Steffensmeier and Jones 
(2004:54ff) or Cleves (2010:148ff). 
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is extended to the case of competing events structures. The specification and interpretation of 
competing risks is what follows. 
 
3.3.5 Cause specific hazards 
Complicated social processes are much too often treated by social scientists as if they were 
only at risk of experiencing a single event, while in fact they are also at risk of making a 
transition to another state (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). One-way-transition models 
are easy to employ, but not always reasonable for the problem at hand. Only recording 
democratization as an outcome of liberalization would be acting as if we live in a world where 
reversals does not exists. Not taking the competing event of reversal into account would thus 
produce biased results. Therefore, liberalization should be treated as a process of competing 
risks. Furthermore, the effect of covariates need not be the same across different type of risks. 
Rather, we may want to test how the variables relate to particular risks of different event 
types. The Cox approach can be extended to account for competing risk by modeling cause-
specific hazards. Recall how the hazard rate is the risk that liberalization will end at time t, 
given that it has not yet ended within time t. Similarly, a cause-specific hazard is the 
instantaneous risk of failure from a specific cause given that no failure from any cause has yet 
occurred (Cleves et al., 2010:366). Given i = 1…, k causes, and that failure can occur for any 
















For T equal to the time to first failure from any cause (Cleves et al., 2010:366). This is 
equivalent to what Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004:168) calls the “latent survivor time 
approach”. It assumes that there are K,k = 1, 2 …r specific outcomes or destination states and 
that there is assumed to exist a potential or latent failure time associated with each outcome. 
The different destination states represent competing risks: they are competing because only 
one of them can happen first. Once the system has failed, the remaining lifetimes are lost to 
observation (Crowder, 2001:38), meaning we only observe liberalization up to the first failure 
before it exits the risk set. Hence, the remaining failure times are latent, but it is assumed that 
any of the K possible events could have occurred had the clock just kept ticking long enough 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004:168-169). In translation, one could expect that had we 
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continued to observe the liberalized regime for an unlimited time, one of the other competing 
events could have occurred, eventually.  
Because liberalization can only have one outcome we assume independence among the 
competing events, meaning that there is no correlation between the risk of democratization 
and the risk of reversal. When liberalization stops, it is either because of a setback or a 
democratic advance. Democratization is therefore an independent cause of failure from that of 
reversal and vice-versa. According to Cleves (2010:366), making such an independence 
assumption about competing events can be tricky because it is not something we can test for 
or tell from the data. Evaluating how competing events are related to each other, only theory 
can guide us in judging their “biology”. Reversal and democratization are different events in 
nature; they do not belong to the same family of event types. If we however wanted to 
discriminate between different types of transitions to democracy (for example Huntington‟s 
(1991) transition types; transaction, transformation and replacement) or different types of 
reversal (by coup, civil war, state break-down, foreign intervention), it would be reasonable to 
assume the outcomes (belonging to the same event “mother”) exist in conjunction with each 
other. If we had reasons to assume such dependent risks, we would rather want to report sub-
hazards following the alternative semi-parametric model of Fine and Gray (1999).
36
 However, 
it is not of substantial relevance to the research question exactly how democratization or 
reversal came about, just that it did, and hence, the analysis operates with two main 
termination states – that of democracy and that of autocracy. As democratization is a 
qualitatively different (or even opposite) cause of liberalization ending than that of reversal, 
the analysis will report cause-specific hazards. 
Standard methodology and software can be applied for competing-risk-analysis if we, 
operationally, estimate the cause-specific hazard separately and treat the competing event as 
right-censored. Doing so, we estimate two single models
37
, that is, the coefficient estimates 
are allowed to differ for both events, as is the underlying baseline hazards (Cleves 2010:366, 
see also Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:169). This is similar to standard methodology, 
only the interpretation changes, which must be modified to take into account that competing 
events can also occur (Cleves, 2010:367). There is one more caveat: in the case of competing 
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 The Fine and Gray (1999) model is a direct analog to the Cox regression, only traditional hazards are replaced 
by subhazards and the interpretation changes (see Cleves 2010:383). 
37
 Alternatively I could have executed a simultaneous regression of the two by stratifying on event type as well 
as letting the covariates interact with event type, and this would have produced the same results (see Cleves, 
2010:378-380). But for the sake of simplicity I will present the coefficients in two separate models.  
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risks, the hazard and survivor function is not two sides of the same coin as in standard 
methodology, and so, the survivor function can no longer be retrieved directly from the 
hazard rate.
38
 Hence, the question of survival cannot be interpreted directly from the hazard 
rate but demands special estimation.
39
 For a Cox competing risk model this is computationally 
cumbersome. Nevertheless, this thesis is primarily interested in the question of risk rather than 
survival. Modeling cause-specific hazards, we obtain refined estimates of how an independent 
variable relates to the particular risk of democratization as oppose to reversal. In turn, I will 




3.3.6 Interpreting coefficients and hazard ratios 
The coefficient estimates report information about the change in the hazard rate associated 
with a change in the corresponding variable. In order to interpret how much a change in the 
variable affects the hazard rate, we must report the hazard ratio, that is, the exponential of the 
coefficient estimates.  While the hazard rate reflects the risk of failure, the hazard ratio 
reports the impact of variables on the hazard rate. More specifically, the exponential of the 
coefficients shows the ratio of the hazard rates for a one unit change in the corresponding 
variable (Cleves, 2010:131). A coefficient of for example 0.5 means that a one point increase 
in the variable increases the hazard rate by 65 percent, because exp(.5)=1.65, and (1.65-
1)*100=65 percent. Similarly, a coefficient of -0.5 shows that an increase in the variable by 
one point lowers the hazard rate by 39 percent, because the exp(-.5)=.69 and (.69-1)*100=39 
percent. Thus, the hazard ratio reflects how much an increase in the variable changes the risk 
of failure. 
 
3.3.7 Accounting for dependence among observations 
Just like common regression methods assumes independence among observations, so does the 
Cox model. Concretely this entails that the effect of a variable in one year is not dependent on 
the effect of that same variable in the previous year. This is not likely to be the case in the 
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 For competing risks the survivor function is translated to the “cumulative incidence function” while the hazard 
function is the equivalent to “cause specific hazards”.  
39
 If one where specially interested in the cumulative incident function rather than the cause specific hazard – one 
should consider applying the alternative semi-parametric model by Fine and Gray (1999). 
40
 Note that the following discussion of interpretation is specific to the Cox model. Results from other models 




analysis of liberalizations as it is in its essence a process. In addition this analysis utilizes 
time-varying variables which require multiple time observations in each spell of 
liberalization, suggesting temporal or serial dependence within the spells.  We also know that 
liberalizations occur within regions, and consequently there are possible intra-group effects. 
This possibility leads to the conclusion that it should be accounted for by operating with 
robust standard errors. By doing so the resulting standard errors are “robust” in that they 
produce estimates that are robust to violations of the independence assumption, by accounting 
for grouping or clustering of observations (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 114-115). 
Therefore the Cox competing risk model is specified with robust standard errors.   
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4.0 Data and operationalization 
Now that I have specified a Cox competing risk model, cases or spells of liberalization must 
be recorded. This requires quantitative observation of regimes which have liberalized before 
eventually democratized or reversing, if ever. The theoretical background concept and 
conceptual discussion has led to a systematic concept of liberalization being the process by 
which a regime becomes more competitive or inclusionary without reaching democracy. 
Based on this concept I will develop a quantitative approach to observe empirical cases of 
liberalization before presenting data on independent variables and the operationalized 
hypotheses. 
 
4.1 Choosing among “same, same but different” 
In order to observe and compare cases of liberalization worldwide throughout the post-war 
period, quantitative measurement is required. Because there do not exist any clear-cut 
measurement of liberalization that I know of, I will have to apply one of the available regime 
indices to trace different types of regime change such as liberalization, democratization and 
authoritarian reversal. Because liberalization is a process evolving through time, the data 
source had to consist of cross-sectional as well as longitudinal information on regime change. 
Furthermore, since the research question involves movement towards or away from 
authoritarian and democratic regimes, it should be a continuous scale of both authoritarian 
and democratic regime characteristics, although with a clear threshold distinguishing 
democratic from non-democratic regimes. Today, the most frequently employed longitudinal 
regime indices of democratization, which cover an extensive period of time, are the 
democracy index offered by Vanhanen (2000), the Polity IV combined regime index by 
Marshall and Jaggers (2009a), or Freedom House (2010). Also, Hadenius and Teorell (2004) 
offer a merged index of the Polity IV and Freedom House pin-pointed against a third indicator 
by Hadenius (1992). Their scores highly correlate with each other on an aggregate level, 
suggesting that they capture some of the same phenomenon (see Berg-Schlosser 2004; 
Gleditsh and Ward 1997; Hadenius and Teorell 2005).
41
 However, their correlation vary 
depending on different levels of the scaling, making the choice of index imperative for the 
ability to observe regime changes. This is especially evident in the intermediate “grey zone” 
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 For a review of these democracy indexes, confer Berg-Schlosser (2004), Hadenius and Teorell (2004), 
McHenry (2000), and Munck and Verkuilen 2002. Also, for a comparison of Freedom House and Polity in this 
respect, see Ph.d. by Knutsen (2011: Ch.2). 
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(Gandhi 2008, Hadenius and Teorell 2004) where we typically find the liberalized regimes. 
Choosing among “same, same but different indices” (Hadenius and Teorell 2005), I will 
assess their face validity according to the content of the systematized concepts of this thesis, 
overall reliability and data coverage.  
The abovementioned indices all follow the theoretical back ground concept of Dahl (1971) 
and are frequently employed to measure democratization.
42 
However not all of them are suited 
for measuring the systematized concept of liberalization. The Vanhanen index (2000) is based 
on mere election data, which could be an appropriate measurement of democratization, or 
liberalization of elections at best, but that would give poor face validity according to the 
broader process of the liberalization as defined in this thesis.
43
 Freedom House (2010) could 
work as liberalization of rights given a theoretically narrower definition on a lower level of 
abstraction.
44
 However, for reasons explained in the theoretical discussion, I consider this to 
narrow a definition given the broader meaning of the liberalization process. Validity 
assessment of the Polity (III) has shown it to be more sensitive to the contestation dimension 
– as are many definitions of both liberalization and democratization (Berg-Schlosser 2004, 
Dorenspleet 2001, Gleditsch and Ward 1997, Munck and Verkuilen 2002). On the other hand, 
Freedom House is more sensitive to the participation dimension (Gleditsch and Ward 1997).  
This trade-off could be counter-balanced by applying the merged Polity-Freedom House 
index by Hadenius and Teorell (2004). However, that would be to confuse different levels of 
measurement. Also, in order to operationalize the concepts of this thesis I have to interpret its 
qualitative meaning and moreover, to do that I need sufficient information on the coding and 
content of the index as to assess the “adequacy of content” (Adcock and Collier 2001). 
Therefore, the index must be chosen on the grounds of reliability as well, which should not be 
taken as a given. 
In terms of reliability, The Freedom House scorings are based on mere subjective measures, 
the reliability impossible to assess by outsiders (Berg-Sclosser 2004, Munck and Verkuilen 
2002). Not only has Freedom House been found to hold political bias in its measures (Bollen 
and Paxton 2000:73), but also that the scorings are inaccurate over time and that changes in 
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 The Vanhanen index (2000) indicates participation and contestation in elections; The Polity Project (2010) 
measures authority patterns based on institutional contestation and participation with emphasis on executive 
constraints and openness as a part of the “contestation” dimension; Freedom House follows a lower level of 
abstraction were formal rights are prerequisites for contestation and participation. 
43
 In the case of the Vanhanen index (2000), the process of liberalization cannot be captured by mere election 
data on voter proportion of total population and percentage vote on largest party*100, obviously.  
44
 For example, Smith (2000) applies civil liberties as liberalization while political rights as democratization, 
although they highly correlate, thus not treating them as autonomous processes. 
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the Freedom House scores over time might reflect global changes and not national 
institutional transformations (Neumayer 2002).
45
 Consequently, the same goes for the merged 
Polity-Freedom House index by Hadenius and Teorell (2005) which is an average of the two 
pin pointed against a third, cross-sectional democracy index by Hadeniuos (1992) making it 
hard to detect what a one unit change in the score actually means qualitatively. Polity is the 
only one that offers a clear coding list of how the scores are weighted; making it possible to 
detect what qualitatively causes changes in the scores (see Marshall and Jaggers 2009a; 
2009b, Gleditsch and Ward 1997, Henriksen 2010, Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Furthermore 
Gleditsch and Ward (1997) asses Polity to be a better indicator when it comes to observing 
regime change. This is a considerable strength compared to other indexes since the thesis is in 
search of tracking political changes such as liberalization. Moreover Polity IV offers data 
farer back in history, which is considered an advantage over Freedom House (from 1972) 
since maximizing empirical coverage is the prime reason for choosing a quantitative approach 
in the first place.  
For these reasons, the revised and combined Polity IV index was considered the most 
appropriate measurement of regime change. Below I will develop the operational rules for 
which movements along the scale is to be recorded liberalization, democratization and 
reversal based on how the Polity IV index is composed (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2009a; 
2009b). As the discussion below will show, the procedure is analytically straight forward and 
precise as to capture variations in the shape of the liberalization process, as well as its 
distinction from democratization. Its transparency also makes the approach reproducible for 
other projects concerning regime change.  
 
4.1.1 Content validity of the Polity IV 
The Polity 2 index is an institutional measurement of the authority patterns of political 
regimes and so, it is adequate for the level of analysis. The Polity 2 scores hold time-series 
data, combining measurement of both authoritarian and democratic authority characteristics. 
The combined score in Polity 2 then consists of a 21 point scale from – 10 to +10, -10 being 
fully institutionalised autocracy and +10 being fully institutionalised democracy. 
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 Also I agree with Przeworski (in Munch 2003:26) who criticizes Freedom House for being formalistic and 




Conceptually, it follows the theoretical line of Dahl (1971), acknowledging that the authority 
patterns of regimes are a question of degree, and that regimes can have a mix of authoritarian 
and democratic attributes, ranging from institutional authoritarian, mixed to institutional 
democratic regimes. A regime within the score from -10 to -6 is categories as being 
autocratic, -5 to +5 as “mixed” systems and +6 to +10 as democratic regimes. It is in the 
interim of -5 to +5 that we find so called “liberalized autocracies” which have scores on both 
the democratic and autocratic sub-indicators. These are the most unstable regimes that tend to 
experience significant changes in their polity score (Marshall and Jaggers 2009a; 2009b).  
Operationally, the Polity 2 index is based on weighted codings of six indicators: 1) 
competitiveness, 2) openness and 3) regulation of executive recruitment, 4) competitiveness, 
and 5) regulation of political participation, and 6) constraints in the Chief of the Executive 
(see Marshall and Jaggers 2009b). Thus Polity follow Dahl‟s understanding of democracy as 
institutional contestation and participation, while emphasising constraints on the exercise of 
power by the executive as a part of the contestation dimension.  
In contrast to Dahl‟s theory however, the creators of the Polity IV does not treat competition 
and participation as distinct but rather interchangeable dimensions, for example, openness of 
executive recruitment is defines as “the extent that all the politically active population has an 
opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process” (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2009b: 22). „Open‟ recruitment through free and fair elections thus refers to both 
dimensions. Similarly, competitiveness and regulation of political participation refers to 
whether and how alternative political preferences are expressed and pursued in the political 
arena, thus involving both contestation and participation.  
Earlier versions of the Polity have been criticized for not treating participation as a distinct 
dimension (Dorenspleet 2001, Munck and Verkuilen 2002). However, I find it reasonable to 
understand political participation in a broader sense than strictly that of participation in 
elections (see response from Marshall, Gurr, Davenport and Jaggers 2002). Although it should 
be noted that due to the level of analysis the measurement holds participation and contestation 
dimensions at the level of political regimes. Consequently, it leaves out other external aspects 
like broader acts of participation such as organization and exercise of civil liberties in civil 
society. 
Another critique concerns the weighting where constraints on executive power are given more 
weighting than other parts of the index, and that this has not been justified (Dorenspleet 2001, 
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Gleditsch and Ward 1997). True, this does not follow directly from the theorizing by Dahl. 
But given that contestation and participation are a matter of degree and we recognize that 
regimes can have mixed attributes, including executive constraints in the contestation 
dimension becomes an important aspect of accountability which differentiates non-democratic 
from democratic regimes, and liberalization from democratization (Huntington 1991, 
O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Therefore, I consider the indicators of Polity 2 to be 
reasonable reflections of the dimensions of political regimes as defined in this thesis.  
A third critique goes for the categorical nature of the index. In consequence, regimes 
receiving the same score might have different types of institutional design, executive 
recruitment and political participation. In the case of this thesis, this is rather considered an 
advantage. As Gleditsch and Ward (1997:366) notes, since the index is categorical, preserves 
the analytical goal of allowing multiple paths for participatory and competitive processes in 
the regime institutions, thus allowing for various paths in liberalization and reversal processes 
as well as in democratization. That being said, observing what is democratization as oppose to 
liberalization requires we operate with a threshold distinguishing democratic from non-
democratic regimes.  
 
4.1.2 Democracy threshold 
As a starting point of reference, we can compare this problem to how The Polity IV Project 
records (democratic) changes in the regime score (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009a; 2009b). For 
Marshall and Jaggers (2009a; 2009b), democratization consists of an increase in the polity 
index of six points up to and including a total polity score of 6. This means that a positive 
change of six points is only considered as democratization as long as it reaches a threshold of 
6. I find it reasonable to have a threshold of democratization reflecting the procedural 
minimum of a democratic installed government. Not all do. In their study of survival of 
democracies, Kapstein and Converse (2008:38) use the Polity IV regime index to measure 
democratization. Instead of using “a complicated measurement with thresholds”, 
democratization is simply perceived as a 6 point positive change in the Polity score in a given 
year. Kapstein and Converse admit that theoretically this measure does not hold given that an 
increase from -10 to -4 is still an autocracy (the threshold for democracy being +6). But 
because empirically this does not happen in any of their cases, they are satisfied with the 
measurement. The problem with their operationalization, I find, is that it cannot distinguish 
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between the two qualitatively different processes of liberalization and democratization and 
consequently is in danger of recording cases of change as democratization while they are in 
fact liberalizations. In contrast to Kapstein and Converse (2008), I believe we need a 
minimum threshold as a point of reference for what constitutes democracy and hence, be able 
to judge what kind of change involves democratization and not. Only thus can we distinguish 
change in terms of democratic transition from that of liberalization and obtain an 
operationalization that is both theoretically and empirically valid. Therefore, a threshold of 
democratization is applied, following a logic where we do not know whether a regime change 
is a democratization before it reaches democracy (or not). 
 According to the authors of the Polity IV Project, a regime with a score of +6 has reached the 
minimum level to be categorised as a democratic regime (Marshall and Jaggers 2009b). 
Accordingly, the threshold for democratization is set to +6. Concretely this entails that the 
executive power is democratically elected through free and fair elections and constrained by 
democratic procedural rules. Recall O‟Donnells definition of democratization: “transition 
from autocratic regime to the installation of democratic government” (O‟Donnell 1992:18-
19). A regime beneath the threshold of democracy (+6) is some version of a non-democratic 
regime. When an autocratic regime moves up the regime score as to pass this threshold, it has 
been in a state of liberalization, perhaps even a transition period of uncertainty, that finally 
ended with the installation of a democratic government. We cannot capture the qualitative 
sequence of these events or when exactly the democratization started. We can however 
observe a procedural threshold for the process to qualify as a democratization by recording its 
endpoint, namely the installation of a democratic government. Recall the four criteria‟s by 
Pzeworski et. al (2000): an unfree and unfair election will fall short of this threshold; a free 
and fair election without the installation of the democratically elected government will fall 
short of this threshold; a free and fair election of government that is not the top decision 
makers of the regime, will fall short of this threshold; a free and fair election of a ruler that 
eventually did not step down, will not reach this threshold (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009a; 
2009b).
46
 This threshold is strict, but it is precise and in accordance with the procedural 
minimum theory, and it makes sense.   
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 This is of course an evaluation one can only do in retrospect. In real life, when observing a democratic 
election, its procedural reach is still a question of uncertainty which lies in the future. Judging whether we are 
really dealing with a democratic outcome eventually is hard to predict beforehand. However, we can study them 
in the aftermath.  
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4.1.3 Tracking liberalization 
So far we can refer to a democratic threshold. The question remains how to translate a change 
in Polity IV to a case of liberalization. Liberalization can, in principle, happen at any level of 
autocracy, and to various degrees. So what kind of changes should be considered as 
liberalization? Recall from the conceptualisation that liberalization must mark a significant 
departure from the authoritarian regime. According to O‟Donnell and Schmitter (1986), 
political liberalization signifies a qualitative change in and significant departure from the 
authoritarian regime, in short of reaching political democracy. Consistent with the authors of 
the Polity IV Project, a substantive change in the polity score is considered at least 3 point 
change during the course of three years (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2009b). Recall that in 
theory the liberalization is continuous and gradual in nature, though not a linear process 
(O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Bratton and van de Walle 1997). The change may come 
about slowly during several years or rapidly during one year. In practise then, the 
liberalization process may have several shapes and magnitudes: A continuous increase of 1 
during three years, at minimum, a continuous increase of 2 during two years or a positive 
increase of 3 in one year. In principle, it may be as immense as a 16 point positive change, as 
long as it does not reach the threshold for democracy at +6. No matter the shape or 
magnitude, a political liberalization of the regime is operationalized as a positive increase of 3 
points or more in the polity score up to and excluding the point where it reaches the level of 
democracy at +6, specifically.
47
 After an increase of +3 or higher in one year, any further 
increase in the polity up to +5 is considered a continuation of the liberalization process. 
Furthermore, it is considered as continuous as long as the positive change in the polity score is 
not reversed. Should a liberalization process become so advanced as to reach the level of +6 
or higher, the process of liberalization has transformed into a process of democratization, and 
will be recorded as a liberalization that ended with democracy. But liberalization may never 
reach democracy, rather, it may end with autocracy. To be consistent with theory, the 
liberalization process is over as soon as there is a temporary setback (even if there are positive 
developments after the setback) or a permanent reversal (recall Bratton and van de Walle 
1997). Operationally this means that the setback may be -1 or more. As a consequence, the 
setback may be less substantive than the opening in the offset of the liberalization process. 
More importantly, it did not end with democracy.    
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 An alternative measurement with a change of 2 instead of 3 during three years was considered. The cases of 
liberalization change somewhat in their yearly recordings, only marginally affecting the sample selection.  
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To illustrate, political liberalization in Albania started in 1990 when the one party rule came 
to an end. This is observed in the polity score as an increase from -9 in 1989 to +1 in 1990.  
Recall also that liberalization is a gradual step-by-step process, After an increase of +3 or 
higher in one year, any further increase in the polity up to +5 (democracy) is considered a 
continuation of the liberalization process. Like in Albania, where the liberalization process 
continues when it holds its first multiparty election in 1995, although the regime is still 
suppressive as the governing party uses its power to suppress the opposition party (a 4 point 
increase from +1 to +5). Had the polity score reached the democratic threshold of +6, the 
liberalization would have been terminated with democratization. Recall that liberalization has 
failed with any temporary set-backs or permanent reversal. We stop counting if the polity 
score decreases by at least -1 or more in one year (reversal). Then the liberalization process 
has terminated into autocratic reversal. In principle then, the reversal may be less significant 
than the opening. Its magnitude is not of importance here, only that it records liberalization 
terminating into some level of autocracy, and even more importantly, without merging into 
democratization. The first liberalization process in Albania was interrupted in 1996 by a 
government collapse after economic turmoil and government corruption (polity score drops to 
0). However, already the next year the polity score jumps back to +5. This is recorded as a 
second case of liberalization and the clock starts ticking again as the government is restored 
and a new election is held (polity score jumps back to +5). This liberalization ends with 
democracy (+7) in 2002 with the installation of a democratically elected government.  
Another illustrative example is the cases of Algeria. From 1989 to 1991 there was a short-
lived liberalization of the Algerian political system (polity increase from -9 to -2). The 
process came to a sudden halt in 1992 when the military intervened and cancelled the second 
round of legislative elections when it became apparent that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) 
was poised to win (polity score drops to -7). Consequently, the process is recorded as one that 
ended with reversal in 1992. A new liberalization process is marked by presidential elections 
in 1995 and 1999, but, executive recruitment did not meet the threshold of a procedural 
democracy (+6) as polity only increases up to -3. While elections were held, the military and 
the bureaucracy orchestrated these events to such an extent that citizens had no real ability to 
change their government. The regime continues to liberalize in 2004 with a competitive 
presidential election. Despite the largely free election, however, the election outcome was not 
properly obliged as the military continues to hold nearly hegemonic power of the regime. The 
data set does not allow us to observe the liberalization later than the year 2006, up to which 
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the process of liberalization is considered continuous or one that neither ended with 
democracy nor reversal. Hence, the case of liberalization in Algeria from 1995 to 2006 (as far 
as we can observe) is recorded as right-censored.  
Some reservations should be made. Although liberalization means a qualitative change in the 
regime it should be distinguished from a transition. Liberalization may merge into a period of 
transition, that is, a period where the leaders and rules of the game is unclear and therefore its 
coding unknown (-88 in Polity 2). As transitions is a period of uncertainty with an unknown 
outcome, the liberalization is considered to continue trough out the period of transitions and 
lasts for as long as the polity score does not fall nor reach the democratic threshold of 6. Its 
termination follows the same logic as always: if the transition culminate in a positive 
direction, liberalization is still ongoing, if the polity score drops, liberalization has reversed, if 
it reaches the democratic threshold, liberalization merged into democratization. Also, 
democratization can happen without preceding liberalization. Democratic revolution or instant 
democratic transition is the case if polity reaches the democratic threshold instantaneously 
during one year. Then it is considered to be an instantaneous installation of democracy 
without preceding liberalization. Hence, this thesis does not consider a liberalization process 
as a necessary precondition for the occurrence of a democratic government.
48
 Thus cases of 
democratization without liberalization are not a part of the sample.  
Armed with a new measurement, I search for 3-point increases in every country through all 
years in the Polity dataset, currently a total sample of 163 countries.
49
 With this measurement 
the data set holds a total of 115 cases of liberalization in the post-war period from 1950 to 
2006. An overview of liberalization spells is reported in the Appendix. Some comments on 
the sample should be provided.  
 
4.1.4 The generality of the sample 
A key rule in quantitative analysis is that the sample should be drawn randomly. This thesis 
sets out to study the outcome of liberalization globally, in the sense that it analyzes all cases 
of liberalization according to the operational definition applied. As the case often is, the 
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 On this point it disagrees with scholars who consider “liberal” as a prerequisite for “democracy” (see Gill 
2000, Diamond 2001). 
49
 Even if Polity IV has a measure for “minor democratizations” of +3 increases during 3 years up to and 
including the democratic threshold of +6 (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2009b), this information would have saved 
me little time. I would still have to search for 3 point increases during 3 years without reaching democracy, 
which was even more common, and also check the preceding history of the minor democratizations. 
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sample is influenced by the data available. The Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2009a) provides extensive, world-wide sources of data on political regimes ranging from 2009 
and as far back as the 19
th
 century. However, the data on theoretically relevant variables 
collected from Penn World Table (Heston, Summers and Aten 2010) and Banks (2010) are 
only available from 1950-2006. Within the constraints of available data, I find it reasonable to 
compare regimes from the post world war period across various decades, considered 
historically distinct from the once prior to the world war. Neither does the Polity Project 
provide data on states with a population smaller than 500.000, excluding minor states. This 
affects the generality of the sample, but may increase its precision, if we consider mini-states 
and islands to be qualitatively distinct from larger states. Therefore it is my assessment that 
this does not impose serious bias in the sample selection.    
 
4.2 The dependent variable(s) 
The dependent variable of the analysis is the outcome of liberalization – in “survival” terms, 
the failure or “death” of liberalization. The second step of the operationalization involves 
determining what failure consists of. Liberalization may terminate in two different states: 
democratization or reversal. Therefore, failure is operationalized as these two competing 
events of democratization and reversal. An indicator variable is created based on a three-way-
categorization of event occurrence or non-occurrence; coded 1) if democratization occurred, 
2) if reversal occurred and 0) if none of them occurred (right-censored). Thus the dependent 
variable relies both on duration until event and of occurrence of this event. The survival time 
contribute information about duration of liberalization, and failure time give information 
about the event occurrence. Censored cases (0) only contribute to information about survival 
times. Uncensored cases (1, 2) of liberalization contribute information on both survival and 
failure times. In practice then, the dependent variable looks like a three-way indicator 
recording occurrence of either occurrence of democratization and reversal or non-occurrence 
of both (right-censored). 
Furthermore, the failure types – democratization and reversal – will be modeled separately as 
one model for each failure type will be applied, treating the competing failure type as right-
censored. The analysis will apply two models for the same cases of liberalization – one 
modeling occurrence of democratization as the failure event of interest, and one model where 
occurrence of reversal is the failure event. Thus the analysis operates with two dependent 
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variables – democratization in one model and reversal in the other. Operationalizing the 
dependent variable thus will allow for testing how the independent variables affect the 
particular risk of democratization as oppose to the risk of reversal. The operationalization of 
the independent variables is what follows 
 
4.3 Independent variables and hypotheses 
Below follows the operational variables and the expected effects on liberalization outcomes as 
such. This is visualized by formulating one main (H) and two sub-hypothesis (H.A and H.B 
below) for each independent variable. Since the analysis will execute two models where the 
dependent variable – the outcome of liberalization – is operationalized as democratization in 
one model and reversal in the other, the two sub-hypothesis, one for each model, are the ones 
to be tested in the analysis.  
 
4.3.1 Economic growth 
As discusses previously regarding theoretical expectations to the impact of economic 
performance, the immediate regime performance should be more relevant in explaining the 
outcome of liberalization than economic levels per se. Therefore this thesis will test the effect 
of economic growth on the outcome of liberalization, and not level of economic development. 
The operationalization of the Growth variable is fairly straight forward. It measures annual 
growth rate of GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). The PPP-adjustment is 
performed in order to make growth rates comparable across nations despite of variations in 
price level and exchange rates. The data is collected from Penn World Table (Heston, 
Summers and Aten, 2010) (version 6.3) which according to most observers is the most 
reliable source of economic data (Temple 1999). I have followed the recommendation of the 
authors and chosen the variable RGDPL. It has been revised from earlier versions of growth 
rate that received some critique (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2010.) Because the theoretical 
expectations implies that economic growth can have both negative and positive effects on 
democratization and reversal,  we should examine the effect by a two tale test, meaning we 
hypothesise that economic performance has an effect on regime change, but we do not know 
the direction of the effect: 
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H1: Economic performance has an effect on the outcome of liberalization.  
H1.A: Economic performance has an effect on democratization. 
H1.B: Economic performance has an effect on reversal. 
 
4.3.2 Type of Autocracy 
Previous analyses (Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996; Geddes 1999; 2003; Brownly 
2007; Teorell 2010) operate with institutional regime characteristics which are not mutually 
exclusive categories: for example military compared to civilian types such as one-party, 
multi-party, personalist, monarchical and hybrids of these regimes. However both military 
and civilian regime may be more or less personalistic and exclusionary and more or less 
institutionalized and inclusionary, for example one party or multi party systems are not 
reserved for civilian types but may also be present in military regimes, as Teorell (2010) 
admits. Therefore I will choose to define autocracy types exclusively according to top 
decision maker, the most pronounced division being civilian and military types (further 
differentiation between types of military and civilian regimes would only be appropriate on a 




Autocracy type is an ordinal variable set up with three dummy variables applied in the 
analysis. Each regime year is coded either as Civilian, Military-civilian or Military, based on 
the coding of Banks (2010) variable Type of Regime (Political02). All liberalized regimes 
included in the analysis fitted into these categories.
51
 Any government that is controlled by a 
non-military component is coded Civilian. In Military-civilian autocracy, a military elite is 
effectively in control of the civilian government, although the top posts, including the Chief 
of State, is held by civilians. Military autocracy in contrast, involves direct rule by the 
military, often following a coup d‟état, either by the use of military chain of command or a 
more ad hoc administrative hierarchy with the top decision making institution staffed by 
military personnel. 
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 The institutionalizing effect of legislators and parties are treated independently below. 
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Technically, an ordinal variable is included by coding a regime year according to these three 
dummies that is receiving 1 on say Civilian means receiving 0 on all other variables. An 
ordinal variable is included in the analysis by choosing a reference category which is not 
included in the model. The resulting coefficients (or hazard ratios) on the other variables, 
then, are interpreted as „…compared to Civilian‟. For instance, a hazard ratio of 0,05 on 
Military-dummy means: A military regime has 5 % the hazard rate of death, compared to 
Civilian regimes. 
Accordingly, the variable Autocracy type is a categorical variable with three values (military, 
military-civilian and civilian) and cannot be included in the model as a regular continuous 
variable. It is included in the dataset as three dummy variables (each country year scores 1 on 
one of the dummy variables and 0 on the two others). In the model the dummy Civilian 
regime is excluded and treated as reference category, that is; the effects (hazard ratios) on the 
two remaining dummies must be interpreted as: “the hazard of failure is … higher/lower in 
military/military-civilian regimes compared to civilian regimes”. Note that the relative effects 
between the three regime types do not depend on choice of reference category.  
Because liberalization ending with democratization always, as a matter of definition, will 
imply a change in Autocracy type to civilian regime (because democracies are always 
civilian), it creates a form of endogenity. Thus, the variable Autocracy type is lagged with one 
year. The variable then, reflect the type of regime in the year before the failure 
(democratization or reversal) occurred.  
In addition to the interpretation the variable cannot be tested with a regular t-test since it is 
now two variables in the model which in fact represents one variable, and so they must be 
tested as one variable jointly, not as two separate ones. In basic OLS we would perform a F-
test on the joint significance of the variables. In survival analysis (and other 
limited/dichotomus dependent variable) the most common parallels are either a Log Ratio 
(LR) test or a Wald test. Since I have specified my model with a regional group effect 
(clustering) which produces robust standard errors model, STATA won‟t perform a LR test as 
it is likely to be wrong. Instead I perform a Wald test (Sribney 2010). 
A Wald test approximate the LR test and when applied to the whole model says whether this 
estimated model is better than the null model (that is; model without variables) (UCLA 2011). 
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In other words it tests the joint significance of the all variables in the model.
52
 This will be the 
first step toward evaluating the two models in the analysis chapter.
53
 In addition to testing the 
model as a whole, a Wald test can also test whether a group of variables are jointly 
significant. It is therefore also applied when we want to check the significance of the 
dummies representing the variable Autocracy Type. 
Since the theoretical expectations towards the effect of military-civilian relations are 
somewhat divertive, the hypotheses will be formulated as two-taled: 
H2: Military-civilian power relations have an effect on the outcome of liberalization.  
H2.A: Military-civilian power relations have an effect on democratization. 
H2.B: Military-civilian power relations have an effect on the outcome of liberalization.  
 
4.3.3 Conflict level 
If liberalization is a continuous interaction between regime and opposition, the relative 
strength between them is crucial for the outcome of liberalization. As there does not exist any 
direct measure of independent organization in civil society comparable for all countries in the 
world (Gandhi 2008), one must search for a measure indicating the interaction between 
regime and civil society.  
The variable Conflict level is a duplicate of the variable Domestic9 in Arthur Banks National 
Time-Series Data Archive (2010). It is a weighted
54
 index consisting of eight conflict 
indicators; Assassinations, General Strikes, Guerrilla Warfare, Government Crises, Political 
purges, Riots, Revolts, Anti-Government Demonstrations. Banks source is daily files of The 
New York Times.  
Together, these contingent events indicate the state of interaction between government and 
popular forces, in terms of both radical and less radical type of actions, and thus capture the 
overall conflict level during the liberalization period.  
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 More precisely the Wald test answers the question of whether excluding the variables from the model will 
“significantly reduce the fit of the model”? (UCLA 2011). 
53
 A Wald test can in some cases also give an indication on which of two models are best, by comparing the test 
statistic; the higher the number, the better the model. However these numbers can get very high and in many 
cases comparison based on the test statistic makes little intuitive sense. Hence, in this thesis it will only be used 
as a test of the model against the null-model. 
54
 The weighting is not straight forwards and is therefore saved for the interested in the Appendix along with the 
definitions of the various indicators.   
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The conflict index has extreme variation in its values, ranging from a minimum value of 0 and 
maximum value of 21250 (Mexico in 1995). This reflects the internal flow-off effect of these 
events, responding to conflict often produces more conflict. Isolating the effect of these events 
would therefore make less sense than to test the aggregate effect. Because of the extreme 
magnitude of high values relative to low values though, the functional form of the variable 
Conflict level is transformed to a logarithm to avoid model estimation disturbance. 
Consequently, high values of the variable are less influential than they otherwise would be. 
When logging a variable the interpretation of the effect changes. First, we manipulate the 
estimated hazard ratios so that we get the effect of a change of 1 percentage point in Conflict 
level. This is done by dividing the estimated hazard ratio by 100 and then exponentiating this 
number. Say we after manipulation get a number of 1.05, the new interpretation is then: a one 
percentage point increase in Conflict level increases the hazard rate by 5 percentage points. 
Thus the overall Conflict Level accounts for the aggregate effect of contingent events along 
the way, which are not captured by the structural factors. In what direction should we expect 
increases conflict to push liberalization? According to Przeworski (1992), an increases 
conflict level pushes the regime to choose between democratization or reversal. However, it 
does not say which way the game tips. For democratization to happen, the masses have to 
enforce substantive pressure on the regime, in other words, it has to get hot. But it should not 
get too hot; if the conflict level gets so high as to distort social order, the hardliners are more 
likely to intervene and reverse the liberalization process. Therefore, we expect the conflict 
level to have a two-sided effect: 
H3: The higher the conflict level, the more likely that liberalization will end. 
H3.A: The higher the conflict level, the higher the risk of democratization. 
H3.B: The higher the conflict level, the higher the risk of reversal. 
The different events imbedded in the index are likely to point in different directions, the 
aggregate effect of increased conflict is only likely to make liberalization short lived. 
Institutional organization rather than contingent events are more likely to push liberalization 




4.3.4 Legislative assembly 
Does a legislature exist? A dummy variable is created from “Effectiveness of Legislature” 
(Legis03) also from the Banks (2010) dataset. It differentiates on how effective the legislative 
assembly is (see Appendix for definition). However, in this thesis I am interested in the effect 
of legislature not only as a decision maker but also as a possible legitimizing institution for 
the incumbent liberalizing regime. Hence the dividing line is drawn between presence ore 
non-presence of a legislative assembly. Leg dummy answers Yes (coding 1) or No (0). It 
differentiates between whether a legislature exists or not, independently of whether this 
legislature is effective or not. Thus it does not measure the formal powers of the legislature 
but rather the de facto effect of its presence.
55
 The effect is hypothesized as follows: 
H4: Legislative assembly has an effect on the outcome of liberalization. 
H4.A: Legislative assembly has an effect on democratization. 
H4.B: Legislative assembly has an effect on reversal.  
 
4.3.5 Party inclusion  
Measures of oppositional strength in terms of autonomous organization can be hard to come 
by on a world-wide coverage (Gandhi 2008).
56
 The organization of parties is the closest one 
can get. As already discussed in the theory chapter, multiple parties are not just a phenomenon 
reserved for democracies, but can also exist under autocracies (Diamond 2002, Gandhi 2008, 
Levitskey and Way 2002, Ottoway 2003, Shedler 2002,). It will be assumed that if there is 
more than one party, it indicates that the opposition is relatively strong compared to the 
regime. However, as the theoretical discussion about whether parties are a civil society or a 
regime phenomenon has shown, one should distinguish between “fronts” and true 
oppositional parties as they are expected to have quite different consequences for the outcome 
of liberalization. 
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 The reader might wonder why the Legislative assembly variable is not lagged, while Autocracy type and Party 
inclusion (see below) is. The reason is the oprationalization of the variable, which does not put the dividing line 
between effective (democratic) and ineffective (autocratic, window dressing assembly), but rather between 
presence or non-presence. Thus it does not create the same endogenity problem because a democratization will 
not create the same “democratization change” in this variable. 
56
 Gandhi (2008) applies “democracies in the world”, “previous changes in executive” and “inherited parties” to 
indicate oppositional strength. Obviously, these indicators have poor face validity. 
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The variable Party dummy is derived from Banks (2010) variable Party Legitimacy (Legis06) 
which separates between different levels of exclusion of parties. Legis06 has coding as 
follows: (3) No parties excluded, (2) One or more minor or "extremist" parties excluded (1) 
Significant exclusion of parties (or groups), (0) No parties, or all but dominant party and 
satellites exclude ed. I have recoded the ordinal variable into a dummy grouping together 
values 3 with 2 and 1 with 0. This gives the following dummy variable values: (0) Significant 
exclusion of parties/groups or no parties exist or all but dominate party and satellites are 
excluded and (1) No parties excluded or one or more minor “extremist” parties excluded.  
As with Autocracy type the Party dummycould have a type of endogenity problem, because 
democracies always will be coded as 1, that is no parties or only extreme parties are excluded. 
Accordingly this variable is also lagged with one year. 
I chose to draw the dividing line between significant exclusion and minor exclusion because 
this is the most pronounced dividing line between autocracy and liberalized, competitive, 
regimes.  
H5: Oppositional parties have an effect on the outcome of liberalization. 
H5.A: Oppositional parties have an effect on democratization. 
H5.B: Oppositional parties have an effect on reversal 
 
4.3.6 Ethnic fractionalization  
The variable Eth_frac describes how ethnically fractionalized a society is along linguistic and 
racial lines. The data is retrieved from Al Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & 
Wacziarg (2003a; 2003b). The variable measures the probability that “that two randomly 
selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethno linguistic group”. The 
variable thus has the range 0 to 1, where 1 reflects the case where every person in the society 
belongs to different ethnic groups. In other words the higher the number the more 
fractionalized the society. The variable is based on data from 1979-2001 but is time constant 
as Alesina et. al (2003a) assumes little variation in ethnic demography with time. 
The variable combines racial and linguistic characteristics, producing a higher degree of 
fractionalization than would a merely racial index (Alesina et al 2003a; 2003b). Because of 
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the consistent theoretical expectations of the directional effect, the main hypothesis of 
Eth_frac is two-taled, while the cause-specific hypotheses are one-tailed:  
H6: Ethnic fractionalization has an effect on the outcome of liberalization. 
H6.A:  Ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect on democratization. 
H6.B: Ethnic fractionalization has a positive effect on reversal. 
 
4.4 Describing an event history data set 
The data set, or the risk set, consists of 115 cases of liberalization recorded on a yearly basis. 
They are the units or subjects of analysis. Liberalizations are thus recorded as spells which 
enter the sample from the first year of risk, which is the first year of liberalization, and stays 
in the risk set until an event occurrence of either democratization or reversal or until the last 
year of analysis time. Once a liberalization spell has ended with one of the two events, it will 
exit the risk set, if it does not end with either; it is right censored, and will stay in the data set 
until the final observation year. The analysis time runs from 1950-2006. The dependent 
variable looks like a three-way category based on event occurrence or non-occurrence, and is 
coded as 1) if democratization 2) if reversal and 0) if right-censored. The data set also 
includes independent variables, which are expected to influence the occurrence of either 
democratization or reversal. Some of which coding vary with time and some of which coding 
are constant. Because time varying variables are included, the data is recorded for each unit of 
liberalization at each observation point in time, and the dataset will take the form of a panel.   
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5.0 Analysis chapter 
The aim of this thesis is to explain why some liberalized regimes democratize while others do 
not. It poses the conditional question: given a history of liberalization, what is the chance that 
the process will lead to democracy or reverse? In order to answer that question in a precise 
and generalizable manner, data is collected for all cases defined as liberalization during the 
post war period.  Because of an innovative measurement of liberalization based on observed 
regime changes by the Polity IV project, this thesis is able to compare cases of liberalizations 
occurring in various decades, across different regions and political systems, ending with 
democratization or reversal, or still in the process. The various consequences of liberalization 
will be explained through a methodological approach of event history analysis, as previously 
explained. More specifically, a Cox competing risk model is applied in order to explore the 
relationship between explanatory variables and the particular risk of democratization as 
opposed to that of reversal as an outcome of liberalization. The former chapters have 
explained the theoretical background for the hypotheses of interests. The object of the 
analysis is to test these hypotheses empirically.  
The theoretically expected relationship is analyzed through empirical evaluation of the data 
and hypothesis testing. Firstly, the cases are presented according to region and the underlying 
passage of time retrieved before the model estimation. Operationally, two models will be 
estimated – one modeling cause specific hazards for democratization and one modeling cause 
specific hazards for reversal. The model specifications will be systematically tested and 
sensitivity checks performed as to ensure robust results. The empirical findings are discussed 
and compared to the theoretical expectations in the second part of this chapter, offering some 
points to the future.   
 
5.1 Describing the cases 
During the analysis time from 1950 to 2006, the operationalization recoded a total of 115 
spells of liberalization, 44 of them ending with democratization and 49 with reversal while 22 
were still ongoing at the end of analysis time in 2006 and are recorded right-censored. 
Some of these liberalizations occur within the same country. While most countries experience 
only one spell during the analysis time, some experience two, three or even up to four (Peru 
and Thailand). Because each of the liberalizations is considered to be unique histories they are 
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not treated as repeated events
57
; although they occur within the same country during the 
course of 56 years, it is not necessarily the same regime that liberalizes.  
Even more, liberalizations occur within regions (see Table 1). Since some regions are more 
represented than others, this has been taken into account by clustering on regions and 
applying robust standard errors as already explained in the Methodology section. Clustering
58
  
on region reflect that this thesis understands each liberalization as unique event histories, but 
it is expected that “neighboring” or “snowballing” effects can work within regions, where an 
event of democratization or reversal in one part of the region may influence the occurrence of 
an event of democratization or reversal elsewhere within the same region. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that this intra-group effect is hard to specify, but that it can be adjusted for by 
applying robust standard errors. Table 1 (next page) shows that this was a reasonable call to 
make, as the variation in the cases is somewhat constrained by region.  
In the case of experiencing histories of liberalization, all corners of the world are represented. 
On first, Africa is the region with most occurrences of liberalizations, in total 44 spells of 
liberalization along the years from 1950 to 2006, over twice as many as Latin-America on 
second with 21 spells. While both Eastern Europe and the Middle have 12 liberalization 
occurrences, South-East Asia has 11. East-Asia with 4 and the West with only 3 liberalization 
events are less prone for regime changes; whereas most regimes are already consolidated 
democracies in the West, East-Asia holds stable autocracies as well as democracies (China 
would be an example of the former, South-Korea the other). Regarding the outcome of the 
liberalizations, there is variation in most regions, except in the West where all liberalizations 
ended with democratization. Notably also is the Middle East, which experienced no 
democratizations as a consequence of liberalization, they either terminated with reversal or 
were still ongoing at the last observed time point of the analysis, namely in 2006.  I expect 
these systematic variations to be explained by the independent variables applied in this thesis.  
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 Modeling repeated events would be to consider liberalizations as happening repeatedly within the same 
country. However, although liberalizations within the same country are phenomena similar enough as to belong 
to the same “universe” of historical events, one process of liberalization will be qualitatively different from 
another process of liberalization, hence, they cannot be treated as the same. Furthermore, as a sensitivity check, a 
model with repeated events was run, showing no impact on the outcome whether it was the first, second, third or 
up to sixth event of liberalization within the same country. 
58
 There are several ways of accounting for group effects besides clustering, among others; stratifying, fixed 
effects, random effects or a combination of these approaches. According to Cleves (2010:200), in the context of 
survival models, only experience together with model fitting can decide how to best account for group effects in 
the model. Since the theorizing aims at testing the effect of variables both within and between regions, fixed 
effect is not an option. Furthermore, it does not warrant different baselines and different variable effects across 
regions, so stratification and random effects are not applied. Intuitively also, clustering on region adjusts for the 
(unmeasurable) expected flow-off effects between liberalizations and provides a satisfactory solution.  
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Table 1: Liberalization and failure event by Region59 
 Failure event type Sum 




Eastern Europe 6 4 2 12 
Latin America 12 8 1 21 
Middle East  0 8 4 12 
Sub-Sahara 14 17 13 44 
The West 3 0 0 3 
East Asia 3 1 0 4 
South East Asia  3 7 1 11 
South Asia 3 4 1 8 
Sum: 
Failure type 
44 49 22 115 
 
Because of missing data on independent variables (Growth, Eth_frac and Party_dummy) ten 
cases of liberalization was lost from observation; three of them ending with democratization, 
five of them in reversal, two of them being right-censored, leaving the analysis with a total of 
105 spells of liberalizations where 41 ends with democratization, 44 with reversal, the rest 
being right-censored (see Appendix Table A1 for details). Such observation losses due to 
missing data are always a caveat for the grounds of generalization, although it does not 
represent a systematic problem for the analysis. Now that the cases at hand are described, one 
can take a closer look at their journey through the passage of time by retrieving the baseline 
hazard. 
 
5.2 Tidal trends of the baseline 
To view the passage of time we turn to the baseline hazard function – the independent effect 
of time on the risk of failure. Recall that the Cox model makes no assumptions regarding the 
shape of the baseline hazard function (hereafter „baseline‟), and so it is entirely retrieved from 
the data of the analysis (Golub 2008, Box-Steffenmeier and Jones 2004: 88). This flexibility 
could be seen as a great advantage (Golub 2008: 531) or as a potential problem, as do 
Royston and Parmar (2002). Since the estimated baseline here is adapted to the cases at hand, 
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 The regional understanding of this thesis is not strictly geographical but a politico-cultural one, following the 
categorization of Banks (see Codebook in Appendix). For example, it includes Australia and New Zealand as a 
part of the West, and North Africa as a part of the Middle East. For reasons of parsimony, the Pacific is included 
in South East Asia and the Caribbean considered a part of Latin America.  
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it is not necessarily useful for generalization beyond the scope of this individual analysis. 
However, the analysis is a global
60
 one and need not be generalized beyond the cases in the 
analysis. Nor is it a purpose of this thesis to develop a theoretically “fixed” time path for all 
liberalizations. The passage of time is only considered relevant for the research question as far 
as it can reveal any historical developments that can tell part of the story why some 
autocracies democratize (at certain times) while others do not (at other times). In addition, it 
will reveal whether the liberalization measurement applied in this thesis will pass the 
empirical test of validation when compared to the historical “waves” of regime change as 
described by Huntington (1991) among others.  
Since the baseline hazard function represents the passage of time, it constitutes the hazard rate 
when all the independent variables are set to zero (Golub 2008: 531 Box-Steffenmeier and 
Jones 2004: 65). All variables in my analysis have a natural zero, but it is worth mentioning 
that the null point for Autocracy Type is the reference category, namely Civilian autocracy. 
For the democratization model STATA estimated the following baseline hazard rate below 
(Figure 1). It is the recorded failure times of democratizations during the analysis time from 
1950 to 2006, hence the underlying democratization hazard for liberalizations under study 
when all variables are equal: 
Figure 1: Baseline hazard function, Democratization 
 
                                                          
60
 That is ”global” in the sense that all liberalization according to my definition and operationalization of 
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We see that from a fairly low starting point the democratization baseline is increasing up to 
time 46 then decreasing until the end of the analysis at time 57. In other words; the hazard rate 
of democratization is highest around 1996. This is consistent with the historical description of 
the Third wave. While the chances of a liberalization ending in democratization in the 60s and 
early 70s were rather small, at this point the Third wave had made its effect upon a large 
number of autocratic regimes, and can be considered at its peak (Huntington 1991). The risk 
of a given liberalization ending in democratization is at its highest in the mid 1990s, and then 
the hazard is decreasing as we get closer to the 2000s (time>46). At this point the baseline 
falls, meaning that the hazard of democratization falls. This only reflects the fact that a share 
of the liberalizations in the dataset are censored; that is they have not yet ended and 
consequently we do not know the outcome of those liberalizations.  
Turning to the Reversal model, the baseline looks quite different (see Figure 2, next page). In 
contrast to the democratization baseline, starting out at a much higher hazard, the reversal 
baseline also reaches its peak much earlier, increasing up to time 22, that is 1972, and then 
steadily decreasing for the remainder of the time period. This then is yet another confirmation 
of Huntington‟s description of democratization waves and reverse waves. This peak clearly 
reflects the autocratic trend – described by Huntington as the “second reverse wave” (1991: 
19-21) – up to this point in time. Several attempted democratizations failed, and we might ad; 
so did liberalizations. However, from here on the risk of reversal decreases rapidly and 
without ambivalence as more and more liberalizations ends in democratizations.   
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As the Third wave takes over from the Second reverse wave there are fewer and fewer 
attempted liberalizations failing and ending with reversal, which one sees reflected in the 
increase of the proportion of democracies in the world at this point in time. Up to that point in 
time, around 1990, the democratization waves and reverse waves suggested a two-step-
forward, one-step-back pattern (Huntington 1991: 25). From where Huntington was sitting at 
his time of writing, one would expect a new reverse wave. The baseline show no sign of a 
Third reverse wave following such a prognosis. As with the democratization baseline, the 
reversal baseline flattens out during the nineties, but in contrast it stays at this level 
throughout the rest of the time span, meaning that the combined number of cases of 
democratization and censored
61
 stay fairly constant from 1990 and onwards. The climate has 
certainty changed in the aftermath of the Cold War. The flat reversal slope implies that the 
pace of “two-steps-forward, one-step-back” is no longer a trend for liberalizations from the 
1990s onwards. This is indeed consistent with more contemporary empirical analysis such as 
Brumberg‟s “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy” (2002) where liberalizations prove to be 
more persistent than theory would previously expect. Since this trend has lasted for almost 
two decades without a new reversal wave, at this point in time one sees no sign of the trend 
turning in the future. That however, only time will tell.  
The consistency of the time pattern with the historical, qualitative “waves” described by 
Huntington (1991) is a good sign for the internal validity of the operationalization of 
liberalization, the democratization threshold and reversal threshold, as it has visibly captured 
the historical development of regime changes during the post war period. Now that we have 
explored the time development, we turn to investigating the relationship between the outcome 
of liberalization and explanatory variables seeking answers to why some liberalized 
autocracies democratize while others do not.   
 
5.3 Model estimation 
Starting out, two models were estimated – one for democratization and one for reversal – 
which included all six independent variables (descriptive data is presented in Appendix.). 
Before interpreting the variable estimates one should make sure that they are reliable. In turn, 
the variable effects were checked for multicolliniarity and specification tests were performed 
concerning the proportional hazard assumption and functional form of the variables.  
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 Recall that democratizations and censored cases are pooled together in the Reversal model. 
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Firstly, one must search for high correlation between the independent variables, so called 
multicollinearity. Avoiding multicollinearity is important because the estimates of one 
variable effect rely on the assumption that all other variables are held constant; then the 
variables must not correlate to high with each other.  That variables are collinear to a certain 
degree is nearly always the case in multivariate regression. However if the bivariate 
correlation between variables exceeds a level of 0.7 they are under so high influence of each 
other that the individual effects are impossible to isolate – we cannot trust that the standard 
errors are not a result of measurement errors (Skog 2004: 288, Pennings, Keman and 
Kleinnijenhuis 2006:162-163). To avoid this problem, highly correlated variables should not 
be included in the same model. The correlation matrix shows that multicolliniarity is not a 
problem in the variable set meaning one can trust the variable effects are indeed independent 
from each other (correlation matrix is reported in the Appendix, Table A9).  
Secondly, martingale residuals were estimated in STATA to assess whether any other 
functional forms than the linear would be more correct (Cleves 2010: 214-215). These 
residuals represent the difference between observed failures and failures predicted by the 
model.
62
 By plotting residuals obtained by a null model (i.e. without variables included) 
against each variable one can determine whether some other functional form should be 
considered. The growth variable showed clear signs of a “U”-shape in the reversal, and 
possibly signs of an inverse “U” in the democratization model (see Appendix, Figures A3 and 
A4). Thus, the functional form needed to be specified further by including Growth squared 
(Growth
2
) in the models to account for this possible non-linearity.
63
 The inclusion of Growth
2
 
in addition to Growth requires a joint significance test of these variables and is thus, like the 
Autocracy variables, performed with a Wald test (Sribney 2010). 
No other variables showed any sign of non-linear shapes, except the conflict variable Conflict 
Level was already logged, 
64
 and their plots are consequently not reported. As no systematic 
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 For a more technical introduction on martingale residuals, confer Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004), see 
also Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999:224). 
63
 The suspicion that Growth in fact is curve linear in the democratization model was confirmed by a linktest 
which tests the model specification (see below).  The model without Growth squared included clearly failed the 
linktest, indicating that in fact there was some misspecification. At the same time, as we shall see in section 5.3.1 
the model passes the test when Growth
2
 is included (see Appendix, Tables A5 and A6 for details)..  
64
 Initially, conflict level consists of very high maximum values (as shown in the operationalization section). 
When the values on a variable vary immensely, they are in danger of disturbing the overall effects in the model. 
Therefore its functional form was specified with a natural logarithm, so that its maximum effects are less 
influential. The models estimated above contain the logged version of conflict level.    
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non-linear shapes were found comparing the two models, the initial functional forms are 
maintained as they are.  
Furthermore, a proportionality test was performed as to detect whether any of the independent 
covariates fail the Cox models basic assumption of proportional hazards, i.e. that the effect 
does not vary with time. More specifically, the test performed was based on the Shcoenfeld 
residuals, called estat phtest in the STATA software (Grambesch and Therneau 1994 in 
Cleves 2010:206-209). The individual residuals were tested for every single variable in both 
models, as recommended by Golub (2008) and Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001). Test of 
the reversal model showed that no individual covariate had any indication of violating the 
assumption of proportional estimates in either model (test results are reported in Appendix). 
Globally, both models passed the proportionality test. However, in the democratization model 
the Growth
2
 variable failed the test. Thus, both Growth and Growth
2
 required a specification 
of time dependency and TVCs (Growth_TVC and Growth
2
_TVC) was included as in the 
democratization model, as advised by Golub (2008).
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 Hence, the two models differ in that 
Growth is specified to have a time dependent effect in the democratization model, while not 
in the reversal model.
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 This does not change the fact that the two models are comparable in 
that they contain the same variables, only their effects are allowed to vary in relation to 
different versions of the dependent variable.  
Now that the set of variables are confirmed to be properly specified, one can continue 
interpreting the coefficient results. Finally, the analysis has the following two models as 
presented in the Table 2 (next page). The estimates in the tables are reported in hazard ratios, 
meaning the change that a one unit increase in the independent variable induces in the hazard 
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 As Table A9 (Appendix) show, there are high correlations (0.92 and 0.93 respectively) between the Growth 




 variables. At first glance this might look like a problem of 
multicollinearity. However, it is not, because absence of multicolliniarity is only relevant before executing the 
analysis. As Allison (2010:417) notes: “…multicollinearity is all about linear relations among the covariates, it 
is not necessary to evaluate it within the context of a survival analysis” (emphasis added), and Menard (2002: 
76) thus concludes “…the functional form of the model [i.e. squared terms and TDCs] for the dependent variable 
is irrelevant to the estimation of collinearity” [authors note].   
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 It should be noted that if TVC-versions of the Growth variables are included in the Reversal model this 
severely weakens its performance according to the Wald test (see Appendix, Table A10). In addition a Wald test 
on the joint significance of the two TVC variables show that these are not significant, confirming that they 
should not be included (also see Table A10). 
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 See p.52 for detailed explanation of hazard rate and hazard ratios.   
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Table 2: Effect of independent variables on risk of Democratization and Reversal, hazard ratios 






























































Number of country-years (N) 


























Note: Effects are hazard ratios, Sign.level: * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Clustering on region; robust standard errors in parenthesises 
Efron approximation used for handling ties 
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Firstly, the results from the democratization model are interpreted and the hypotheses 
evaluated accordingly. Second, the same procedure goes for the reversal model before the 
findings are summed up, compared and discussed more thoroughly in light of theoretical 




The democratization model is based on 41 cases where liberalization leads to democratization.  
The Wald test reported above confirmed that the model as a whole is significant. Column 
number 2 in Table 2 reports the findings. 
First, the model estimates a positive effect of Growth on democratization. The effect is 
however not straight forward, since we have specified the model with both a squared 
parameter and that it varies with time. Both the original variable (Growth) and the squared 
version (Growth
2
) are positive, so this means that the effect is positive and increasing with 
higher growth rates (the functional form is exponential). In other words: as growth rates reach 
higher levels the effect of one percentage point higher annual growth increases the hazard rate 
with more than one percentage point does at a lower levels. However, while the hazard ratio 
of Growth
2_
TVC is estimated to 1 (i.e. the estimated effect on the hazard rate is zero), 
Growth_TVC has a small negative effect, meaning that the exponential effect is countered by 
an opposite time effect. But, as the numbers clearly show, this effect is not strong enough to 
significantly alter the positive effect of the non-time varying hazard ratios, not even in the 
very long run. Thus, we conclude that the overall effect of growth is that it increases the 
hazard rate of democratization, and increasingly so with higher growth rates. The Wald test of 
the four variables together shows that the estimated effect(s) are significant at a 0.1 percent 
level; we reject the hypothesis that growth has no effect on the chances for democratization.
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Hypothesis 1A is strengthened. 
We recall that the categorical Regime variable consists of the dummies Military Civilian, 
Military and Civilian. As mentioned in the Data section Civilian is the reference category, 
meaning that only Military Civilian and Military is included in the model estimation and that 
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 Note also that a joint Wald test on the two TVC Growth variables (that is; not including the non-TVC versions 
of Growth) is also significant at 5 percent level (test statistic 7.42), which is a confirmation that this specification 
was correct for the Democratization model.  
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the resulting hazard ratios are interpreted as compared to civilian autocracy. Recall also that 
the regime variables are lagged in order to avoid “simultaneity” or endogenity. That is; if not 
lagged we would end up with regime type only reflecting how liberalization ended 
(democratization or reversal – democratizations would always be coded as civilian in the 
year), when in fact we want to examine if the regime in charge during the liberalization 
affects the resulting type of failure event. And it does. Model estimation shows that a 
Military_civilian regime has more than three times the chance of ending the liberalization 
with democratization, compared to civilian regimes. Military autocracies also raise the risk of 
reaching democratization, and even more so than the mixed autocracy: the hazard rate for 
Military autocracy increases four times compared to the reference category civilian autocracy. 
This means that we can conclude that Military autocracies are most prone to democratization 
of the autocracy types. Can these results be trusted?  
As already explained, t-tests are not relevant for testing the significance of the Autocracy Type 
variable(s). The Wald test takes its place. It shows that together the variables are significant at 
0.1 percent level, meaning that we can reject the null-hypothesis that type of autocracy has no 
effect on the risk of democratization. This finding will be discussed further later on, but first I 
will interpret the remaining variables. Hypothesis 2A is thus strengthened. 
Next is the variable Conflict Level. Since this variable has been logged, it gives little intuitive 
meaning to interpret its magnitude. However, as described in section 4.3.4 (p. 67) we can 
manipulate the hazard ratios so that we get the effect of a change of 1 percentage point in 
Conflict Level. After manipulation, we get a hazard ratio of 1.011; a one percentage point 
increase in Conflict Level increases the hazard rate by 1.1 percentage point. The higher the 
conflict level, the higher the risk of a liberalization ending with democratization. The effect is 
significant at 1 percent level according to a one-tailed test. The null hypothesis that it has no 
effect or negative effect is hence rejected. Accordingly, hypothesis 3A is strengthened. 
The effect of Leg dummy – whether or not a legislative assembly is present in the regime – 
has an estimated strong positive effect on the hazard rate for democratization. Even though 
this variable does not make a difference between a “window dressing” (Gandhi 2008), non-
effective legislative assembly and an effective one, there is a clear cut conclusion: a 
legislative assembly, in whatever form and with whatever function, positively affects the 
chances that the liberalization ends with democratization. In fact, according to this model it 
quadruples the chances compared to a regime without a legislative assembly. The effect is 
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significant at a 5 percent significance level, and thus we reject the null hypothesis. Hypothesis 
4A is strengthened. 
Also the Party dummy has a strong estimated positive effect. Having an inclusive regime with 
few restrictions on party organization doubles the hazard rate of democratization compared to 
exclusive regimes. This effect is however not significant. We cannot say with certainty that 
parties, like legislative assemblies, do affect the hazard of democratization. Instead we keep 
the null hypothesis, and Hypothesis 5A is rejected. 
Lastly is the estimated effect of Eth_frac, the index of ethnic fractionalization. It has a fairly 
strong negative effect on the risk of democratization, with a one unit increase leading to 88 
percentage point lower hazard rate. However, what one unit consists of qualitatively is hard to 
say given that this is an index. The one-tailed test shows that the estimated effect is significant 
at 0.1 percent level, indicating that we can trust that the hypothesized effect is non-zero and 
negative. Thus the expectation that liberalization in heterogeneous societies runs a lower risk 
of democratization than in homogeneous societies is confirmed. Hypothesis 6A is 
strengthened.Table 3 sums up the findings for the Democratization model. 










Military-Civilian +  
Civilian - 
Conflict Level YES + 
Legislative dummy YES + 
Party dummy NO No sign. 





There are 44 cases of liberalization ending with reversal. As with the democratization model, 
a Wald test of the reversal model as a whole confirms that it is significant; it helps explain 
why almost half of the liberalizations end with reversal. As column 3 in Table 2 shows, four 
variables are significant – Growth, Autocracy type, Leg dummy and Conflict Level. 
The model estimates a negative effect of the Growth (not squared) but a positive effect of 
Growth² (squared version). This implies a convex shaped effect; negative but depending on 
growth rate. As growth rates increases the hazard rate decreases. But the negative effect 
becomes less intense with higher levels of growth. More concretely the results state that at 
moderate levels of Growth the risk of reversal is decreasing as growth levels increase, but less 
so the higher the Growth level. At extreme high levels of Growth, at 30 percent to be exact, 
the effect turns, and increasing growth rates above this level is associated with increasing 
hazard of reversal.
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 Since growth rates above 30 percent are empirically rare, it is fairly 
realistic to say that generally growth has a negative influence on the risk of reversal. Like in 
the democratization model, the Wald test shows that the joint effect is significant at 0.1 
percent level. We reject the null hypothesis that Growth has zero effect on the risk of reversal. 
Hypothesis 1B is strengthened. 
Moving on to the effect of autocracy types, the reversal model partly confirms the picture 
established in the democratization model. Military involvement in the government during 
liberalization has a negative effect on the risk of ending with reversal. A pure Military 
autocracy decreases the risk of ending with reversal by 83 percentage points compared to 
civilian autocracy, and mixed regimes the same qualitative but smaller effect, reducing the 
risk of reversal by 45 percentage points. The Wald test confirms that the autocracy types 
matter significantly, rejecting the null hypothesis at a 0.1 percent level. Hypothesis 2B is 
strengthened.  
The estimates of Conflict Level show a positive effect on reversal, just like it had a positive 
effect on democratization. The recalculated effect is that a one percentage point increase in 
the Conflict index increases the hazard rate with (exp[1.24/100]) 1.3 percentage points. The 
effect is only slightly stronger from that in the democratization model (1.01 percentage 
points), and is significant at 1 percent level according to a one-tailed test. Therefore it is 
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 Turning point (min level) of the function ax+bx
2
 (where a is Growth  and b is Growth
2
)  is where the 
derivative of the function equals 0. It is calculated according to the following formula:  
-(a/2b)=-(Growth/2*Growth2). Here, it was calculated based on the coefficients, that is ln(Haz.ratio).  
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tempting to interpret this as the more conflict the more unstable and risky is the liberalization 
and hence the chances of it tipping either way increases. Increased conflict between regime 
and civil society then positively affects the risk of reversal as it did for democratization. 
Hypothesis 3B is strengthened. 
Whereas Leg dummy proved to have a positive effect in the democratization model, the effect 
in the model for reversal is the flip coin of this. Here, there is a negative effect: the risk of 
reversal falls if the regime allows a legislative assembly to be established. More precisely put, 
the hazard rate decreases by 87 percentage point if a Legislative assembly is present during 
the liberalization (as compared to not present). The effect is clearly significant; we can be 
99.9 percent sure that rejecting the null hypothesis is correct. Hypothesis 4B is strengthened. 
By contrast, this is not the case for Party dummy which is estimated to have a negative effect 
on reversal. While the hazard ratio indicates that no significant exclusion of political parties in 
fact increases the hazard rate with 16 percentage points, this effect is far from significant. So, 
as with democratization we cannot say that this (surprising) effect is trustworthy. Hypothesis 
5B is rejected. 
Lastly, and as a mirror of the effect estimated in the democratization model, Eth_frac is 
estimated to have a positive effect on reversal. Intuitively, this makes sense, especially given 
that the theoretical expectations were met in the democratization model. This model estimates 
that more heterogeneous societies have a greater risk of ending the liberalization with 
reversal, with a one unit increase in the fractionalization index leading to a corresponding 20 
percentage points increase in the hazard rate for reversal. The effect is however not 
significant, not even with a one-tailed test (as the hypothesis implied). Hypothesis 6B is 
rejected.Table 4 (next page) sums up the findings for the Reversal model.  
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Conflict Level YES + 
Legislative dummy YES - 
Party dummy NO No sign. 
Eth_frac NO No sign. 
 
From the numbers of significant results in both models they both seem to be explaining risk of 
democratization and reversal fairly well. However further model diagnostics is needed before 
one can assess the overall performance of the two models. Before discussing the theoretical 
implications of these findings, the overall robustness of the results and model fit will be 
evaluated below. 
 
5.3.3 Robustness test and model fit 
In order to evaluate the overall performance of the models several diagnosis tests were 
performed. As already mentioned the models maintain the proportional hazard assumption 
and show correct variable specification of functional form, with the exception of Growth in 
the democratization model. This was accounted for by including TVCs, which proved to be a 
correct treatment, considering that the Growth variable proved significant (Cleves 2010: 204-
208).
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 Now remains checking the explanatory of the models, in terms of model fit and model 
specification.  Four post-estimation diagnostics based on residuals where performed in 
accordance with Cleves (2010): 
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 A Wald test on the joint significance of the two TVC variables (and only these) showed that they were 
significant at 5 percent level (p value=0.02), with a test statistic of 7.42. 
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First, because a LR test is not available when operating with robust standard errors, the Wald 
test checks the overall significance of the model, that is, whether the variables included in the 
models significantly explain variation in outcome of liberalization. Both models were 
significant at levels over 99 percent. Comparing the test statistic of the two models, the 
reversal model performs better than the democratization model (see Table 2).  
Second, we want to check that no single observation or group of observations has a 
disproportionally big influence on the results. This is done by comparing the model where all 
observations included with a model where one observation is excluded and see whether it 
affects the estimates. This is done one by one for all individual observations. Since this is a 
practical impossibility, we use the DFBETA scores as approximation. The results show some 
outliers on all the variables though none systematically across the variable set. Hence they do 
not have a dramatic influence on the results overall and are not submitted (therefore not 
reported). Anyhow, one should be cautious as to drop single observations on the background 
of the empirical data. Unless it dramatically alters the general impression, it is not advisable to 
“manipulate” the results (Orr, Sackett and Dubois 1991). Even outliers play a part in how the 
world works and should be taken into account.  
Third, the linktest tests the model specification, i.e. whether the variables included in the 
model are correctly specified with correct functional form. The test is performed after model 
estimation, and the concrete hypotheses tested are whether the estimated coefficient for the 
predictor is significant and at the same time that the squared predictor is not significant. The 
results of the test are reported in Appendix Tables A5 and A8, confirming that both models 
pass the test, with the predictor significant and the squared predictor not significant. Hence 
one can conclude that the choice of functional form for all variables in both models are 
correct.
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 However linktest is weak in detecting omitted variables. For this purpose we must 
advice Cox Snell residuals. 
Finally then, overall model fit was checked through the Cox Snell residuals. In short, the test 
plots the cumulative hazard of the Cox Snell residuals, and should form a 45 degrees line if 
the model fits well.
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 The two plots are reported in the Appendix (Figure A1 and A2).  
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 As already mentioned in footnote 53, a linktest of the democratization model without Growth
2
 failed (see 
Table A6). 
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Both models show a reasonably good fit, before reaching the right hand side of the panels. 
Here, they show a serious lack of fit. However since there are fewer and fewer cases to base 
the residuals on as more and more cases fail, this type of deviation is expected for all models 
(Cleves 2010: 222). At the same time we should note that Cox Snell residuals are not 
infallible: “Deviations from the assumption that the residuals are distributed as unit 
exponential could simply be a function of uncertainty in the data” (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2004:125).  
Comparing the two plots, the democratization model seems to be better fitting the data than 
the reversal model, which contradicts the conclusion based on comparison of the Wald 
statistic of the two models. The Cox Snell residuals are sensitive to incorrect functional form 
of the variables, but other diagnostics tests showed no signs of this.  In sum, while the 
theorizing on explanatory variables might be more directly linked to democratization than 
reversal, the two models show that they explain both outcomes well. It thus justifies the 
choice to explore the effects of the same variables in relation to democratizations as well as 
reversals.  
Overall, the model diagnostics show good model fit and robust estimates, leaving the analysis 
with noteworthy results that should be taken seriously. Having reviewed the sensitivity and 
fitness of the model, one can conclude that results are robust according to the assumptions 
applied for a Cox competing risk model. With this in mind, I will continue to discuss the 
findings overall in light of the theoretical expectations formulated in the hypotheses. 
Furthermore, the findings should be considered to have theoretical implications beyond this 
analysis. The following discussion will elaborate further on this point.  
 
5.4 Discussion 
All variables except parties significantly influence the outcome of liberalization either in the 
direction of democratization or reversal. Over all, the analysis results leaves us with these 
significant findings; (1) a positive effect of growth on democratization (and increasingly so 
with higher levels of growth) and a negative effect of growth on reversal (but decreasingly so 
with higher levels of growth); (2) Military and Military-civilian autocracy has a positive effect 
on democratization and a negative effect on reversal compared to civilian autocracy, with the 
former having the strongest effect; (3) a positive effect of conflict level on both 
democratization and reversal, (4) a strong positive effect of presence of legislative assembly 
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on democratization, and a negative effect on the risk of reversal; (5) Ethnic fractionalization 
has a negative effect on the risk of democratization. The findings have some interesting 
theoretical implications. Overall, both structural variables performed well, and two out of 
three institutional variables is valuable when it comes to explaining the endpoint of 
liberalization. Lastly, also the contingent conflict variable gives some interesting implications 
for liberalization outcomes. Future researchers should be advised that a combined approach 
proves fruitful in the study of liberalization and its outcomes.  
The regimes economic performance, operationalized as economic growth, proves to be a 
significant factor structuring the liberalization game. It has a rather intricate interpretation, 
especially in the democratization model where the effect also depends on time. However the 
qualitative effect is roughly as follows: if a liberalizing regime increases economic growth 
rate in one year, this lessens the risk of reversal and increases the risk of democratization. The 
higher the growth rate, the higher becomes the chance that liberalization ends with 
democratization, and not reversal. The effect on democratization is exponential, meaning that 
higher growth rates increases the hazard rate relatively more than lower growth rates. 
Although time works in the opposite direction, it is so small that the effect is qualitatively the 
same, and hence the time effect is not further elaborated. The effect on reversal has a convex 
shape; negative (except for extreme growth rates), but the negative change in hazard rate 
becomes less with higher growth rates.  
In sum, these results support the argument stated by Mainwaring (1992) that strong economic 
performance is conducive to democratization and works against autocratic reversal. 
Additionally, it is partly supportive of Huntington‟s claim (1991) in that rapid economic 
growth is conducive to democratization: actually the higher the growth rate, the larger the 
positive effect on democratization. However, at extreme levels of growth, the risk of reversal 
also increases.  
Turning the effect on its head, a negative economic trend indicates no support for the claims 
that economic performance crisis increases the chances for democratization by delegitimizing 
the liberalizing regime and stirring popular unrest. This finding stands in stark contrast to the 
assumptions made by O‟Donnel, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) as well as the expectations 
formulated by Gill (2000) and findings of Acemoglu and Robinsen (2001). It also contradicts 
the expectation that performance crisis will trigger transition in any direction (Bermeo 1990; 
Epestein 1984; Diamond and Linz 1989; Richards 1986; Markoff and Baretta 1990; Haggard 
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and Kaufman 1995). Rather, performance crisis will turn liberalization towards autocracy by 
reversing while reducing the chances for democratization. Furthermore it contradicts the 
findings by Gasiorowski (1995) that economic recessions did not significantly affect 
democratizations in Third World countries from 1950 to 1989. With a larger sample including 
all corners of the world, I find that it did during liberalization processes, but in an obstructive 
way. The counter-logic offered by Share and Mainwaring (1986 in Bratton and van de Walle 
1997:36) seems to hold with some moderation: An economic crisis does create problems for 
the transition to democracy, and it will also contribute to the erosion of liberalization towards 
authoritarianism.  In short one can conclude that all good things go together, and all bad 
things go together: economic growth supports democratization trends while economic crisis 
increases the risk of reversing liberalization towards autocracy.   
The consequences of a higher conflict level in the interaction between regime and civil 
society are somewhat puzzling because the conflict variable has a significant, positive effect 
on both democratization and reversal. This may lead to a critique of the operationalization 
because I cannot exclude the possibility that differentiating between violent and non-violent 
actions by the regime and civil society would point in more consistent directions. However, 
since the theorizing involves multiplier effects I believe we come closer to grasping real 
world evolution of conflict by examining the consequences of the aggregate conflict level that 
such actions produce. Moreover, that conflict has the same directional effect on 
democratization and reversal is in accordance with how Pzeworski (1992) describes the 
consequences of increased conflict – that it will eventually force the Liberalizers to end the 
liberalization project and choose between democratization ore renewed repression. Although 
most scenarios described by Przeworski (1992) end with repression, this analysis shows that 
in fact more conflict does increase the chances for democratization, as Mainwaring (1992) 
suggests. The recalculation suggests a marginally stronger effect on reversal than 
democratization, implying that it takes shorter time to reverse the process than it does 
reaching democracy as implied by O‟Donnel and Schmitter (1986). By taking their struggle 
“to the streets”, the opposition risk provoking the hardliners to restore order and control 
through repression, however, the risk of repression should be weighed against the fact that an 
increased conflict level at the same time is conducive to democratization. The advice to the 
regime opposition is thus ambivalent: rebel, revolt, rally, strike, and fight, do not yield – there 
may be all to lose, but there is also all to gain. Overall, the dubious sum effects of contingent 
events do not seem to be sufficient an explanation for liberalization outcomes; driving up the 
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conflict level might tip liberalization towards democratization; it might as well tip the game 
towards the adverse. Making a more complete calculation of their strategy, the opposition 
should take the political institutions of the regime into account, starting with the type of 
political elite in charge of the liberalization.  
Although this analysis operates with a more parsimonious regime categorization based on a 
larger sample, the results of this analysis confirms the same systematic relationship between 
type of autocracy and democratization as found by Gasiorowski (1995), Geddes (1999;2003, 
Brownlee (2004) and Teorell (2010). This suggests that the effects of military-civilian power 
relations are robust and not sensitive to the sample or regime definitions. But because these 
previous analyses have put executive types and other institutional or personalistic regime 
characteristics in the same box, while my operationalization is based exclusively on the level 
of executives, I can be more certain that the pattern is indeed a result of military-civilian 
characteristics and not some other institutional attribute of the regime. Furthermore, the 
relationship between autocracy type and democratization has not been tested conditional on 
the liberalization process hence my finding comes closer to explaining why there exists such a 
pattern. The findings here regarding regime effects on democratization and reversal are a 
result of this frame: Given liberalization, type of autocracy governing the interaction between 
regime elites and opposition during the process is decisive for its outcome. The risk of 
liberalization leading to democratization is highest under a purely military rule. Under mixed 
regime of military-civilian power relations, the chances for democracy are higher than for 
civilian autocracies, although lesser compared to direct military rule. The results shed clarity 
on the theoretical expectations towards type of regime elites in contrast to the somewhat 
contradictive arguments found in the literature. When military and civilian elites are unified in 
the political regime, following liberalization is a split between them, and this type of disunity 
makes it easier for the military to reassume its institutional role while sacrificing the civilian 
puppets fronting the regime. When a military-civilian regime decides to liberalize, it signifies 
that the military prefers to assume a professional role rather than continue political 
governance. Furthermore, facing a politicized military the civilian leaders are not in control of 
the arms and cannot repress in order to ensure their own survival. Under a purely military 
autocracy one can expect that the risk of reversal will be even less, as the military elite driving 
the liberalization is the same as those controlling the army. When a military regime decides to 
liberalize, one can expect their motivation to leave office is genuine, or else they would not 
have chosen to liberalize in the first place. The motive of civilian autocrats however is rather 
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one of ensuring regime survival, willing to reverse the process if it does not prove successful. 
In that case, one assumes that the civilian autocrats are in control of the regime resources, 
including the armed forces. A second interpretation is that the civilian leaders are willing to 
democratize but that they are not the ones controlling the guns. Then there is a risk that 
hardliners within the military will intervene and reverse the process if they feel threatened by 
opposition forces. Which interpretation is the most plausible we do not know, it could be 
both, but this we cannot tell for sure given the information from the data. Nevertheless, the 
outcome is generally the same: when military autocrats are in the lead of liberalization, they 
tend to democratize more systematically and reverse less than civilians; when civilian 
autocrats liberalize, it involves less a democratization hazard but more of a reversal hazard.  
However, the results may judge the civilian autocrats too hard. Civilian autocracies are not as 
rare a phenomenon as military and military-civilian regimes in the world and consequently, in 
this sample. Of a total of 124 cases of liberalization spells, 83 of them where civilian during 
the first year as compared to 28 military-civilian and 13 military initiated liberalizations. 
Although civilians tend to liberalize more often, given there are different types of civilians, 
the motives are likely to be varying. It might even be that in absolute numbers, there are more 
civilian autocracies that democratize than military ore mixed ones. That, the analysis does not 
capture. It only says that, given preceding liberalization, military-led and military-civilian-led 
ones are more likely to democratize and less likely to reverse the liberalization than civilian-
led ones. Thus the conclusion drawn on the impact of autocratic elites on democratization is 
conditional on its history of liberalization.  
On account of nominal democratic institutions, the presence of a legislative assembly during 
the liberalization has a negative effect on reversal and a positive effect on democratization. 
This finding should have implications for former theorizing about the functions of institutions 
under autocracy. Gandhi (2008) bases her work on the presumption that legislative 
arrangements will promote the survival of dictatorships (what I would call autocracies). It 
should be noted that in her event history analysis she does not find a statistical significant 
relationship between legislature and dictator‟s tenure in office. Lacking empirical support 
none the less, her interpretation maintains the assumption that the degree of 
institutionalization is an appropriate response to the relative need for cooperation and hence 
will not advantage or disadvantage the survival of neither dictatorships with nor without 
legislatures (Gandhi 2008:178). My findings do not say anything about the survival of 
incumbents, but on a higher level of abstraction, it does however suggest that such 
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institutionalization do in fact have consequences for the survival of a liberalized regime. Since 
a legislature lessens the hazard for reversal, the isolated interpretation would have been that 
the legislature is initially an instrument of liberalization, and thus a support of the theoretical 
assumption following Gandhi (2008), namely that nominal democratic institutions under 
autocracy assure its survival. However, since the effect of legislative assembly on 
democratization was strongly positive and significant, together it indicates that a legislative 
assembly is a driving force in pushing liberalization towards democratization and at the same 
time acting as a bulwark against autocratic reversal. Thus this findings support the assumption 
by Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) and Gandhi (2008) that institutions such as legislatives are 
instruments of cooptation; only if cooptation is a “two-way street” (Valenzuela 1992:87) it 
shows were the road leads: it helps the liberalized regime to survive the hardliners but it helps 
the opposition in promoting democracy. In sum then, and in contrast to the theorizing of 
Gandhi (2008) and Przeworski (2007), one should expect the presence of legislative assembly 
during liberalization to offer good prospects for democratic transition.  
Lessening restrictions on party organization as a part of political liberalization, even with a 
causal lag, do not significantly influence democratization ore reversal. The finding regarding 
party inclusion is consistent with the findings of Lai and Hoover (2004) while contradicting 
the findings of Teorell (2010) that multiple parties in the regime will be conducive to 
democratization. Naturally, free party competition in elections will be a part of a 
democratization process. But to grasp the true impact of parties on the outcome of 
liberalization one should separate the effect of party inclusion and competition, as well as the 
process of liberalization from that of democratization.  
Although the analysis found no support for the claim that a fractionalized society is at greater 
risk of reversing a liberalization process, it does find support for cultural structures to have a 
negative impact on the chances of democracy. To liberalize under the conditional constraints 
of a culturally heterogeneous society involves a lesser risk of democratization than under 
culturally homogeneous societies. Thus the underlying group structure of ethnicity and 
language does play a constraining role on the chances of democracy, supporting the “old 
school” (Dahl 1971; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Sheples 1972; Rokkan and Lipset 1967; 
Lijphart 1977; Alesina and colleagues 2002; 2004) while leaving renewed scientism towards 
the (negative) impact of ethnicity unjustified (see Beissinger 2008, Fish and Brookes 2004, 
Teorell 2010). The mechanisms at work may not be a result of demography per se, but of 
political choice as many have argued. Still, the Alesina data of ethno-linguistic structures is 
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the best indicator available (Fish and Brookes 2004). Together with a process-oriented 
approach I have done my best to capture the assumed mechanism that latent structures will be 
mobilized and exploited in the wake of liberalization (Beissinger 2008; Bowen 1996; 
Mosseau 2001; Rabushka and Sheples 1972, Snyder 2000). The finding that ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization does in fact reduce the chances of liberalization leading to democratization 
should not lead us to draw deterministic conclusions about democracy being a culture-specific 
phenomenon possible only for some cultures but not others. The analysis gives no information 
about the qualitative nature of culture; rather, the source of constraints lies in the cultural 
composition of society, where cultural cleavages make divide and rule easier for the regime 
and harder for the opposition to unite in a unified, pro-democratic front.  
 
5.5 The explanatory power of structural contingency 
On the level of explanation, the analysis contributes to the ongoing debate about the 
explanatory power of contingent versus structural factors. According to these findings, 
O‟Donnell‟s (1986) claim that periods of uncertainty demand contingent explanations rather 
than structural ones must be modified. Surely, the contingent variable of this analysis, the 
conflict level produced by contingent events along the liberalization process, explains when 
liberalization will end. But its implications are ambivalent. It is not sufficient in explaining 
why the liberalization would tip in either direction. This could suggest that scholars like 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and Gill (2000) are right in their claim that a mere actor 
approach would come short of explaining the endpoint of uncertainty. The institutional 
variables – type of autocracy, legislative assembly – do not generate the same ambivalence. 
Whereas military and military-civilian regimes will move liberalization towards democracy 
and away from reversal, legislative assembly will move liberalization away from reversal. 
Economic growth is found to mediate the liberalization strategies, furthermore the interaction 
between is structured by cultural cleavages, where ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity moves 
liberalization away from democracy. Structures in terms of political institutions and cultural 
groupings do condition conflict and thereby influence its path. The findings accumulated here 
should encourage future researchers to be less caught up in methodological boxes and rather 
build analytical bridges between actors as makers and objects of history, and structures as a 
product of as well as constraints on politics – the combined approach of this thesis represents 




News of sudden change in face of political events of liberalization are not uncommon, and 
have once again drawn the attention of the whole world, this time in the Middle East (2011). 
What everyone wants to know is what to expect next. Searching the literature for answers, I 
found a striking lack of global comparative analysis of liberalizations which has resulted in 
democratization as oppose to those that reversed. Therefore the object of this thesis has been 
contributing to solving a part of the puzzle why some liberalized autocracies democratize 
while others do not.  Operationally, I have asked the conditional question: when a regime 
liberalizes, what affects the risk of the process ending with either democratization or 
authoritarian reversal? What distinguishes this question from earlier democratization studies 
is that it is treated as a potential consequence of liberalization dependent on the structural, 
institutional and contingent “conditions” of liberalization. Finding answers requires 
systematic comparison of such conditions, leaving the final outcome open. Thus this thesis 
aims at contributing in explaining what consequences are likely to expect from real world 
political liberalization. 
 
6.1 An original approach 
Comparing liberalization cases across various times, conditions and outcomes required a 
concept with global reach, and well-defined boundaries. This thesis applied Dahl‟s 
participation and contestation dimensions as a background concept for political regimes. The 
systematic concept drawn from the competing liberalization definitions is that liberalization is 
the process by which a regime moves towards greater contestation or participation without the 
installation of democratically elected government. Liberalization as more competition or 
participation without democratization is a universal concept with a clear cut boundary, 
applicable in the study of relationship between liberalization and democratization for other 
projects beyond this particular analysis. Due to precise criteria the concept can be applied to 
measure liberalization, which is a necessity for all projects wanting to investigate the 
consequences of liberalization world-wide.  
Operationally, liberalization processes were traced by observing movements along the Polity 
IV scale, allowing recordings of liberalization processes which are multilayered with various 
magnitudes, lengths and effects. This operationalization has proven to hold empirical value as 
it reflects the historical trends of regime change along the post war period as described by 
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other sources, namely Huntington‟s (1991) waves and the modern trap of liberalization 
described by Brumberg (2002). The operationalization of liberalization applied in this thesis 
might be done differently elsewhere, but it proves O‟Donnell and Schmitter (1986) wrong in 
their assessment that liberalizations vary in their particular shape to such a degree that it is not 
possible to measure them according to common scale based on defining criteria.  
This thesis chose a quantitative approach in order to maximize causal leverage. Event history 
analysis was chosen for its process tracing and longitudinal qualities, capturing timing and 
change. More specifically, a Cox competing risk model allowed us to investigate the 
relationship between independent variables and particular risks of democratization and 
authoritarian reversal without a predefined time development.       
This process-oriented approach was applied to test the structural contingency perspective, 
bridging competing explanations for why some liberalizations lead to democratization while 
others end in autocratic reversal. The independent variables reflect conditions of the 
liberalization process, expected to structure the strategies of political choice of actors, pushing 
liberalization towards democracy or back to authoritarianism. The findings are as follows. 
   
6.2 Findings and implications 
This approach enabled a global comparative analysis of 105 cases of liberalization occurring 
from 1950-2006. The analysis showed that the outcome of liberalization processes is indeed 
variable: 44 liberalizations ended with democratization and 41 with reversal, while 20 were 
still ongoing at the end of analysis time. Because the thesis sets out to test the structural 
contingency approach, the same set of independent variables were included in both models, 
only the dependent variable varies between democratization and reversal as an outcome of 
liberalization. In contrast to previous research, these variables have not been tested in relation 
to liberalization or competing outcomes of this process. The expectations so far has been 
unclear regarding what makes liberalization likely to end with democratization as oppose to 
reversal. Testing the hypotheses have contributed to more certain knowledge about which 
direction one can expect liberalization to go given the following conditions;  
on a structural level, regime performance in terms of economic Growth has a significant and 
consistent influence on the outcome of liberalization, but its effects depends on the level of 
growth. While Growth during liberalization has a positive effect on the risk of 
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democratization, and increasingly so with higher growth rates, it has a negative effect on the 
risk of reversal, but as growth rates increases the effect gets smaller. Also, the effect of ethnic 
fractionalization (Eth_frac), given liberalization, is negative on the risk of democratization, 
while positive, but not significant for reversal. 
On an institutional level, purely Military autocracies are more likely to democratize than are 
both Military-Civilian or Civilian autocracies. Purely Military autocracies are also less likely 
to reverse the liberalization process than the other autocracy types. Comparing Military-
Civilian and Civilian autocracies, the former is most prone to democratizations and least 
prone to autocratic reversal. In sum, the results imply that the more the military involvement 
in executive powers the greater the chance of a liberalization process ending in 
democratization. Conversely, civilian leaders are, given that liberalization is already set in 
motion, most prone to reverse it. The presence of a Legislative assembly (Leg dummy) has a 
positive effect on democratization, while a negative effect on reversal. The inclusion of 
oppositional parties (Party dummy) in the regime however does not have any significant 
effect, either on democratization or reversal. 
As a proxy of contingent events, an increased Conflict level in the interactions between 
government and civil society increases the chances that liberalization will end. Interestingly, 
and in accordance with expectations, for Conflict level the estimated direction of the effect 
pointed in the same direction in both models. This variable had a positive effect on the 
hazards of both democratization and reversal. 
These findings allow me to answer the research question:  In general, democratization is more 
likely and reversal less likely to be the outcome when liberalization is led by a military 
regime, when a legislative assembly is present, when the regime is able to perform 
economically. Given liberalization, ethnic and linguistic divided societies reduce the chances 
for democratization. Somewhat surprisingly, political parties are not a significant driving 
force for democratization during liberalization as many researchers suggest. 
The performance of the models suggests that the combined approach of the structural 
contingency framework is fruitful in explaining democratization and reversal as possible 
outcomes of liberalization. Both models proved to be robust in face of specification tests, and 
all explanatory variables except Parties have significant effects on either risks of 
democratization or authoritarian reversal. That does not exclude the possibility that there 
might be other relevant variables that could be applied studying liberalization outcomes. Also, 
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some of the liberalized systems seem more persistent than others. Due to choice of model, this 
analysis alone could not explain that part of the puzzle. Therefore I would suggest further 
research is required in part of liberalization survival. 
 
6.4 Suggestions for future research 
Some of the liberalization cases last for a significant period of time. These may be understood 
as cases of consolidated liberalization. Since the question of survival cannot be directly 
interpreted from the findings on cause specific hazards of this analysis, it is up to future 
research to put these types of liberalized regimes under closer scrutiny. Thus this thesis raises 
a new puzzle regarding survival of liberalized regime which should be fruitful for future 
research.  
It is tempting to at least hypothesise about the link between civilian autocracies and stable, 
liberalized regimes. It might be that civilian autocracy is better able to sustain itself under 
liberalization, and therefore does not democratize or reverse the process. A military regime 
cannot stay liberalized as easily, they cannot participate in rigged elections; they cannot co-
opt the opposition as easily through the adoption of civilian institutions like legislative 
assembly. Political institutions may play a part in explaining why civilian led liberalizations 
run a lower risk of democratization than military-led liberalizations. Civilian autocrats more 
often than military influenced regime, adopt political institutions like legislative assembly and 
parties (Gandhi, 2008). In this analysis, legislative assembly seems to promote democracy and 
prevent reversal, while including more parties does not have a significant effect on the 
outcome of liberalization. In a case of thought where both civilian autocracy and legislative 
assembly are present and party organized opposition absent, the liberalization process might 
be a sustainable equilibrium. Contrary to the claims by Huntington (1991) and others, the 
half-way house does stand, sometimes. Whether this is the relationship between political 
institutions and liberalization persistence, only further investigation can answer. Thus the 
analysis bears fruits for new hypothesis which can be tested in future research.    
If I was to suggest a methodological approach to investigate these hypotheses further, I would 
opt for the semi parametric competing risk model by Fine and Gray (1999). This type of event 
history analysis involves the same benefits as the Cox model, only it allows examination of 
the relationship between competing risks and liberalization survival. Also it is fit to trace 
multiple transitions and reversals during a continuous spell, not just one transition during a 
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single spell. Thus one could treat the question of survival and death of liberalization, as well 
as emergence and consolidation of democracy in the very same model. The procedure would 
be more demanding, raising the complexity of the interpretation as would its level of 
sophistication, its potential innovations even more promising. Illuminating how these 
processes are related to one another would contribute to solve the major puzzle why some 
regimes become and remain liberalized while others become and remain democratic.  
A prerequisite for executing such global analyses of regime changes is quantitative 
measurement of short- and long term regime changes. The analytical tools are available, only 
the measurement procedure requires more of an effort. The suggestive approach of this thesis 
can only be further evaluated by comparing indexes and their qualitative performance in 
measuring events of political liberalization. Hopefully, my experiment has shown that 
measuring liberalization quantitatively is possible, and will encourage students of comparative 
politics to continue to develop operational measures that can be applied in process-oriented 
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Spells of liberalization;  
Country, enter and exit, duration and failure status 
Table A 1: List of spells of Liberalization 
Country 
Entry (First 
Year in Spell) 






Afghanistan 1964 1978 15 2 
Albania 1990 1996 7 2 
Albania 1997 2002 6 1 
Algeria 1989 1992 4 2 
Algeria 1995 2006 12 0 
Angola 1991 1992 2 2 
Argentina 1955 1966 12 2 
Armenia 1998 2006 9 0 
Azerbaijan 1992 1993 2 2 
      
Bahrain 1973 1975 3 2 
Bangladesh 1978 1982 5 2 
Belarus 1995 1996 2 2 
Benin 1970 1972 3 2 
Benin 1990 1991 2 1 
Bhutan 2005 2006 2 0 
Bolivia 1978 1980 3 2 
Brazil 1974 1985 12 1 
Burkina Faso 1970 1980 11 2 
Burkina Faso 2001 2006 6 0 
Burundi 1992 1993 2 2 
Burundi 1998 2005 8 1 
      
Cambodia 1971 1975 5 2 
Cambodia 1998 2006 9 0 
Cameroon 1992 2006 15 0 
Central African 
Republic 
1993 2003 11 2 
Chad 1978 1979 2 2 
Chad 1992 2006 15 0 
Chile 1955 1964 10 1 
Chile 1988 1989 2 1 
Comoros 1990 1994 5 2 
Comoros 1995 1999 5 2 
Comoros 2002 2004 3 1 
Congo 1991 1997 7 2 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic 
2005 2006 2 0 
Cote d'Ivoire 1999 2002 4 2 
Croatia 1999 2000 2 1 
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Djibouti 1999 2006 8 0 
Dominican Republic 1961 1962 2 1 
      
Ecuador 1968 1970 3 2 
Egypt 2005 2006 2 0 
El Salvador 1964 1972 9 2 
El Salvador 1980 1984 5 1 
      
Fiji 1990 1999 10 1 
      
Gabon 1990 2006 17 0 
Ghana 1969 1972 4 2 
Ghana 1991 2001 11 1 
Greece 1974 1975 2 1 
Guatemala 1966 1970 5 2 
Guatemala 1985 1996 12 1 
Guinea 1995 2006 12 0 
Guinea-Bissau 1994 1998 5 2 
Guinea-Bissau 1999 2003 5 2 
      
Haiti 2005 2004 2 0 
Honduras 1981 1982 2 1 
Hungary 1988 1990 3 1 
      
Iran 1997 2004 8 2 
      
Jordan 1951 1957 7 2 
Jordan 1989 2006 18 0 
      
Kenya 1997 2002 6 1 
Korea, South 1963 1972 10 2 
Korea, South 1981 1988 8 1 
Kyrgyzstan 2005 2006 2 0 
      
Laos 1956 1957 2 1 
Lebanon 1970 1975 6 2 
Lesotho 2000 2001 2 1 
      
Madagascar 1991 1992 2 1 
Malaysia 1971 1995 25 2 
Mali 1991 1992 2 1 
Mauritania 2006 2006 1 1 
Mexico 1977 1997 21 1 
Mongolia 1990 1992 3 1 
      
Nepal 1957 1960 4 2 
Nepal 1981 1999 19 1 
Nicaragua 1984 1991 7 1 
Niger 1991 1992 2 1 
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Niger 1999 2004 6 1 
Nigeria 1978 1979 2 1 
Nigeria 1998 2006 9 0 
      
Pakistan 1962 1970 9 2 
Pakistan 1972 1973 2 1 
Pakistan 1985 1988 4 1 
Panama 1955 1968 14 2 
Paraguay 1989 1992 4 1 
Peru 1950 1961 12 2 
Peru 1962 1968 7 2 
Peru 1978 1980 3 1 
Peru 1993 2001 9 1 
Philippines 1950 1969 20 2 
Philippines 1986 1987 2 1 
Poland 1989 1991 3 1 
Portugal 1974 1976 3 1 
      
Romania 1989 1996 8 1 
      
Senegal 1978 2000 23 1 
Sierra Leone 1968 1971 4 2 
Sierra Leone 1996 1997 2 2 
Sierra Leone 2001 2006 6 0 
Spain 1975 1978 4 1 
Sudan 1964 1965 2 1 
Sudan 1985 1986 2 1 
Syria 1950 1951 2 2 
      
Taiwan 1987 1992 6 1 
Tajikistan 1998 2003 6 2 
Tanzania 1995 2006 12 0 
Thailand 1955 1958 4 2 
Thailand 1968 1971 4 2 
Thailand 1973 1975 3 2 
Thailand 1976 1991 16 2 
Togo 1992 2005 14 2 
Tunisia 1987 2002 16 2 
      
USSR/Russia 1989 2000 12 1 
Uganda 1993 2006 14 0 
      
Yemen 1993 2006 14 0 
Yemen, North 1962 1966 5 2 
      
Zambia 2001 2006 6 0 
Zimbabwe 1999 2001 3 2 
Notes: see next page for notes. 
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Note: LSTAUS: 1=Democratization, 2=Reversal, 0=Censored 
Countries in Italic Bold are cases lost because of missing data on failure time (9).  
Total number of spells in the analysis (total spells, incl. missed): 105 (115) 
Spells ending in Democratization in analysis (total): 41 (44) 
Spells ending in Reversal in analysis (total): 44 (49) 
Spells censored in the analysis (total): 20 (22) 
 
A country that experience a split due to a secession of a smaller part of the country is coded as 
the same country after secession, while the breakaway republic is treated as a new country 
which needs to fulfill the threshold for being counted as a liberalization on its own. For 
instance USSR and Russia is treated as the same country before and after 1990, and the 
liberalizing measures in the USSR during Perestroika is hence treated as the start point of a 
liberalization ending in democratization in Russia in 2000. And Bangladesh‟s break from 
Pakistan lead them to be treated as a new country, while Pakistan is treated as if it was the 




Table A 2: Codebook 




Coded by author 
on the basis of 

























Annual growth rate 
(percentage) of real GDP. 
Missing values leading 
to 6 exclusions: 
Azerbaijan, Laos, 
Nepal, Sudan, Syria, 
Yemen (North). 













lagged by one 
year. 
Three Dummy variables: 
Civilian, Military-Civilian 
and Military.  
1 on one of the three 
dummy variables, 0 on the 
two others. 
Civilian autocracy is 
reference category. For 
details on definitions of 
types, see below. 
Variable is lagged with 
one year to avoid the 
problem of endogenity 
(see below).  




Logged. Original variable consists of 
large gaps and extreme 
values. Logged in order to 
achieve linearization.  
Details on the indicators 
composing the index see 
below. 
Effect of variable is 
“one percent change in 
the confl.ix leads to a 
… percentage point 

















0=No legislature exists 




(Values 1, 2, 3 in 
Legislative effectiveness) 
Value 1 does not 
differentiate whether 
the legislature is 
effective or not. That is; 
the variable asks merely 
does a legislature exist? 
















0=Significant exclusion or 
no parties exist or all but 
dominate party and 
satellites are excluded 
(Values 0 and 1 in Party 
Legitimacy) 
 
1=No parties excluded or 
only minor “extremist” 
parties excluded (Values 2 
and 3 in Party Legitimacy). 
 
 
Missing value leading 












. The probability that two 
randomly selected people 
from a given country will 
not belong to the same 
ethno linguistic group. 
Higher numbers reflect 
more fractionalized 
societies. 
Variable is constant for 
each spell.  
Missing values leading 
to 3 exclusion of 
Pakistan („70, ‟73), 
Yemen 
 
Details on original variables 
Weighted Conflict Index 
The variable is described in Arthur Banks Codebook (2009b). The data for weighted conflict 
index according to Banks derived from The New York Times. The weighted conflict index is 
calculated by each indicator multiplied by a individual number (in parenthesis in definitions 
below) and then summed up and divided by ten in the following manner: 
Assassinations. Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government 
official or politician (multiply by 24). 
General Strikes. Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more 
than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority (43). 
Guerrilla Warfare. Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent 
bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime (46). 
Government Crises. Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of 
the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow (48). 
Purges. Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the 
ranks of the regime or the opposition (86). 
Riots. Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of 
physical force (102). 
Revolutions (revolt). Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt 
at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is 
independence from the central government (148). 
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Anti-Government Demonstrations. Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for 
the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or 
authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature (200).” (Banks 2009: 
Codebook) 
 
 Autocracy Type 
The autocracy types in the dummy variable set are defined according to Banks‟ definitions in 
Regime Type, and are as follows  
Civilian regime. Any government controlled by a nonmilitary component of the 
nation's population. 
Military-Civilian regime.  Outwardly civilian government effectively controlled by 
a military elite.  Civilians hold only those posts (up to and including that of Chief of State) 
for which their services are deemed necessary for successful conduct of government 
operations.  An example would be retention of the Emperor and selected civilian cabinet 
members during the period of Japanese military hegemony between 1932 and 1945. 
Military dictatorship. Direct rule by the military, usually (but not necessarily) 
following a military coup d‟état.  The governing structure may vary from utilization of the 
military chain of command under conditions of martial law to the institution of an ad hoc 
administrative hierarchy with at least an upper echelon staffed by military personnel.  
The Variable is lagged with one year to avoid the problem of endogenity, that is; a regime 
will always be coded as civilian in the year it democratizes, but this does not reflect that 





The first PH-test implied that the Growth variable was time dependent (see Bold): 
Table A 3: Test of proportional-hazards assumption, Democratization model without TVC 









-0.20309          
-0.32498          






























Global test  9.03 7 0.2504 
 
When TVCs on Growth and Growth
2
 was included though, the same test implied that there 
were no longer any violations of the PH assumption: 
 
Table A 4: Test of proportional-hazards assumption, Democratization model with TVC 





















































Linktest of the model for democratization indicated no signs of wrong specification of the 
parameters included in the model. However as mentioned in footnote 53, the model without 
Growth
2
 failed the linktest. If the models estimated predictor is not significant or the squared 
predictor is significant this indicates that the model is misspecified. Table A3.1 shows the test 
results for the (final) model in the analysis, and that predictor, squared (hatsq) is not 
significant- Table A3.2 shows the test results for the model without Growth squared, and that 




Table A 5: Linktest, Democratization model (final) 












.3775969    1.114907 
-.0190286     .223463 
Note:  LR chi2(2) = 40.10 
Log likelihood = -99.561752                      
Prob > chi = 0.0000 
 
 
Table A 6: Linktest, Democratization model without Growth2 




.1802403   
.3880706     
.6463591     





-1.0866   1.4470 
-.1906969    .9668381 
Note: LR chi2(2) = 14.80 
Log likelihood = -107.16516                      








Model fit, Cox-Snell 
























Test of proportional-hazards assumption 
 
Table A 7: Test of proportional-hazards assumption, Reversal model 









































Global test  2.46 7 0.9301 
 
Linktest 
As with the democratization model, the linktest showed no signs of misspecification with 
predictor siginificant at 0.1 percent level and predictor squared not significant: 
Table A 8: Linktest, Reversal model 





-.01485   
.1624632   





.629166    1.26601 
-.1971612    .1674612 
Note: LR chi2(2) = 53.61 
Log likelihood = -86.009013  








Model fit, Cox-Snell 
Figure A 2: Model fit Reversal: Plot of Cox Snell residuals vs. 45’line 
 
 
Outliers and influential observations, both models 
Martingale residuals were estimated in both models, and showed that some observations could 
be called outliers and possibly have a disproportionate effect on the estimated effect of 
individual variables. There is no consensus on the treatment of such outliers (exclude or not 
exclude) (Orr, Sackett and Dubois 1991). In the end it is a matter of discretion. In the case of 
this analysis it was a fairly easy choice since there was no single observations that 
systematically deviating from the others on several variables. Therefore it would be wrong to 













Pair wise correlations between independent variables do not reveal any problem with multicollinerarity:
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Civilian    
Military Conflict 
Level    
Leg   
dummy 
Party 
dummy    




Growth 1.0000          
Growth
2 
0.3827 1.0000         
Military Civilian    0.0293 0.0156 1.0000        
Military 0.0411 0.0035 -0.0599 1.0000       
Conflict Level    -0.0806 0.0457 0.0605 0.0239 1.0000      
Leg dummy 0.0842 0.0029 -0.2664 -0.2548 -0.1302 1.0000     
Party dummy  -0.0326 -0.0314 -0.3471 -0.1470 -0.1177 0.2399 1.0000    
Eth_frac  -0.0102 0.0454 0.1064 0.0595 -0.2043 -0.0569 0.1138 1.0000   
Growth_TVC 0.9215 0.4007 -0.0086 -0.0451 -0.1178 0.1016 -0.0037 0.0116 1.0000  
Growth
2
_TVC 0.3495 0.9343 -0.0177 -0.0068 0.0145 0.0103 0.0210 0.0536 0.4546 1.0000 
 (Obs: 766)  
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Functional form of Growth; Martingale residuals plots, and alternative specification of 
the Reversal model. 
The Martingale residuals indicated that growth might have a non-linear curve-shaped effect 
on the risk of democratization and reversal. The plots are reported in Figure A3 and Figure A4 
Figure A 3: Martingale residuals; Functional form of Growth in Democratization model 
 
 























































As seen above, the PH-test of the democratization model run with Growth2 included showed 
that Growth2 violates the PH-assumtion. Therefore, Time Dependent Covariates of the 
Growth variables was included. However, neither Growth nor Growth
2
 violates the PH 
assumption in the Reversal model. This is confirmed by the Wald test on the whole model 
where the test statistic suffers severely from this alternative specification compared to the 
final model without TVCs (although this model also is significant and, like the final model, 
passes the linktest). More importantly, a joint Wald test on the TVC-Growth variables in the 
Reversal model proves not significant which is a clear confirmation that the Growth variable 
in this model does not violate the PH-assumtion, and consequently should not be accounted 
for by TVCs (Cleves 2010: 204-206). The results are reported in Table A8 (next page), where 
I have repeated the results from the final model in the Analysis chapter (from Table 2) for 
comparison. Hence the final model in the Analysis chapter includes TVCs in the 
Democratization model, but not in the Reversal model. 
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Table A 10: Reversal model with and without TVC on Growth 
 Rev model without TVC on 
Growth variables  
(Final model) 
Rev model with TVC on 










































_TVC - 1.000 
(0.0000706) 
 
Wald tests:  
Model 















Linktest; significans of predictor 
(_hat) and 
Squared predictor (_hatsq) 
P>z 




(_hat):    0.000 
(_hatsq): 0.202 
linktest passed 
Note: Effects are hazard ratios, Sign.level: * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Clustering on region; robust standard errors in parenthesises 
Efron approximation used for handling ties 
 
